On Tue, 26 Apr 2005 16:16:31 -0700, John DeBudge wrote > The short summary > is that Saddam was working to get sanctions lifted as fast as > possible, while at the same time was working on ensuring that he > could rebuild his weapon stocks as quickly as possible as soon as > they were so he could deter any future actions against him.
Would these folks have us believe that sanctions were about to end? That we would permit this? > It depends on how you define imminent. Sanctions were in imminent > danger of being lifted If sanctions were in imminent "danger" of being lifted, how did we manage to start a whole war there? Seems to me that it's a given that we had the capability to keep the sanctions in place even without international cooperation, since we managed to go much, much further than just sanctions. Isn't this a bit ridiculous as an argument for war or imminent danger? We had to take extreme measures because the less-extreme measures that *we* had in place were in "danger" of ending? If we could go to war without U.N. approval, we sure as heck could keep sanctions in place without U.N. approval. All this argues for is keeping the sanctions going, to prevent the danger from Iraq from *becoming* immiment. Using this rationale for going to war is like saying that I had to shoot a prisoner because he was about to escape, which I knew because I was about to let him escape! This brings a whole new definition to "doing nothing about Iraq," since it posits that we would stop doing even what we were already doing! > I think that the fact that al-Zarqawi is able to evade the US in an > country that has a large amount of US military presence "Large amount?" Talked to any military people about this? We are and have been vastly under-staffed for the job we're trying to do there. Intitution tells me that's a major reason we're seeing so many troops return with PTSD. We are spread very, very thin over there. Nick _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
