Arash - commented: https://gitlab.rtems.org/rtems/rtos/rtems/-/work_items/5656#note_155148 There's a heap out-of-bounds write in the RTEMS FAT filesystem (dosfs) long-file- name (LFN) directory reader, reachable from a mounted malicious FAT image on the first readdir(), in the default configuration. Component: cpukit/libfs/src/dosfs -- msdos_dir_read() LFN reassembly (msdos_dir.c) + msdos_get_utf16_string_from_long_entry() (msdos_misc.c); default UTF-16 [poc-rtems-fs.zip](/uploads/5f70561288677d7986082da031f61492/poc-rtems-fs.zip) misc.c); default UTF-16 converter (msdos_conv_default.c, 520-byte buffer). Version: current HEAD (4840472) and all versions with the converter-based LFN reader. Type: CWE-787 out-of-bounds write via CWE-131 (byte size vs uint16 index) / CWE-1284. Severity: CVSS 3.1 \~7.8 High (est.) AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H. ## Root cause lfn_buf is a uint16_t\* view of a 520-BYTE converter buffer (msdos_dir.c:78,80). For an LFN entry, msdos_dir.c reads the sequence ordinal straight from disk with no clamp to the 20- entry maximum: :184 lfn_entries = entry\[0\] & MSDOS_LAST_LONG_ENTRY_MASK; /\* 0..63 _/ :219 lfn_entries--; :220 offset_lfn = lfn_entries \* MSDOS_LFN_LEN_PER_ENTRY; /_ (ord-1)\*13, a uint16 CHAR index _/ :221 msdos_get_utf16_string_from_long_entry(entry, &lfn_buf\[offset_lfn\], :224 buf_size - offset_lfn, ...); /_ BYTES(520) - CHARS : units mismatch \*/ The consumer (msdos_misc.c:1075-1078) then, when buf_size \>= 26, unconditionally memcpy's 26 bytes (10+12+4) at &lfn_buf\[offset_lfn\]. Because offset_lfn is a uint16 index (byte offset = offset_lfn\*2) but the guard subtracts it from a byte count, the guard does not protect the buffer: - ordinal 21 -\> offset_lfn 260 -\> &lfn_buf\[260\] = byte 520 (one past a 520-byte alloc), guard 520-260=260 \>= 26 passes -\> 26-byte OOB write. - ordinal \>= 42 -\> 520-offset_lfn underflows size_t -\> guard always passes -\> far OOB (ordinal 63 -\> +1092 bytes). The attacker controls both the offset (26-byte steps, via the ordinal) and the 26 bytes. The first-entry sequence/checksum checks (msdos_dir.c:199-201) compare the ordinal/checksum to the same entry, so a single crafted 32-byte LFN entry (entry\[11\]=0x0F, entry\[0\]=0x40|ord) passes them and triggers on the first readdir(). ## Impact Attacker-controlled heap out-of-bounds write from a mounted malicious FAT image (SD/USB media or a disk image the device mounts) -\> memory corruption -\> DoS and likely code execution. Default FAT mount uses the affected converter. ## Proof of concept A self-contained host AddressSanitizer PoC compiling the verbatim RTEMS consumer + driver logic is attached (poc-standalone/). It reports: heap-buffer-overflow WRITE of size 10 ... 0 bytes to the right of 520-byte region ... in msdos_get_utf16_string_from_long_entry We are following coordinated disclosure and will hold public details until a fix is released or by mutual agreement. Happy to provide anything else that helps. Best regards Arash -- View it on GitLab: https://gitlab.rtems.org/rtems/rtos/rtems/-/work_items/5656#note_155148 You're receiving this email because of your account on gitlab.rtems.org. Unsubscribe from this thread: https://gitlab.rtems.org/-/sent_notifications/4-deozfs06b6kreblz62epdypb4-1d/unsubscribe | Manage all notifications: https://gitlab.rtems.org/-/profile/notifications | Help: https://gitlab.rtems.org/help
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