On Fri, Jun 15, 2001 at 11:27:23AM -0400, Tony Lambiris wrote: > AFAIK its been fixed in -current, and it _will_ be in errata shortly.. > in the meantime, there is a hotfix for the code itself, read the mailing > lists.. OR > > in /etc/fstab, make /tmp nosuid and noexec, then mount -u /tmp (you did > make tmp a seperate partition.. didn tyou?) There are about a 1000 other places on a machine people can stick the file to be executed. The actual problem is not tmp-related, the provided exploit just happens to use /tmp. Making /tmp nosuid and noexec will only stop the kiddo's that are too stupid to change the exploit to work on such machines. Greetz, Peter -- Against Free Sex! http://www.dataloss.nl/Megahard_en.html
- OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Georgi Guninski
- Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Przemyslaw Frasunek
- Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Jason R Thorpe
- Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Andreas Haugsnes
- Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Rick Updegrove
- Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Georgi Guninski
- Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise dmuz
- Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Andreas Haugsnes
- Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Tony Lambiris
- Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Peter van Dijk
- Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Jason R Thorpe
- Re: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise jon
- RE: OpenBSD 2.9,2.8 local root compromise Brian McKinney