---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Gaffar Peang-Meth <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, Sep 15, 2011 at 5:47 AM
Subject: CAMBODIA: Signatories of Paris peace accords cannot change
Cambodia, Cambodians can
To:


*FOR PUBLICATION
*AHRC-ETC-040-2011
September 15, 2011

*An article by Dr. Gaffar Peang-Meth published by the Asian Human Rights
Commission *

*CAMBODIA: Signatories of Paris peace accords cannot change Cambodia,
Cambodians can *

We live in interesting times – times of great challenges, opportunities, and
of creativity and hopeful changes.

This year, the 20th anniversary of the Paris Peace Accords falls on October
23. Some people celebrate and commemorate its achievement. Others reflect on
its meaning. Some others still, want the Accords to do something for them.

The Final Act of the Accords, signed by 18 governments (Australia, Brunei,
Cambodia – the four warring Cambodian factions – Canada, China, France,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam), with the
participation of officials of Zimbabwe and Yugoslavia representing the
non-aligned movement and of the UN Secretary-General and his special
representative, sought to "restore peace" and endow "a system of liberal
democracy" to Cambodia.

It was no small achievement that the Accords were signed.

It was miraculous that the four Khmer warring factions, whose members
harbored mistrust and hatred for one another in a traditional culture that
memorializes offenses not just for "muoy ayouk" (one's life or a generation)
but for "muoy cheat" (covering seven generations of "chi tuot," "chi luot,"
"chi leah," "chi ta," "ov pouk," "kaun," "chao"), came to the table to
conclude the Accords.

Yet, maybe they had no other choice but to accept the inevitable if they
were to remain relevant.

Certainly, the imminent dissolution of the Soviet Union and the uncertainty
of the looming power vacuum as the Cold War came to an end were catalysts to
bring this small regional war to an end. Asian backers of each Khmer faction
did not hesitate to discard their respective client's wishes and even
pressure them to accept a negotiated settlement. The major powers in the
Cold War made deals – the US ceased recognition of the Non-Communist
Resistance, China dropped the Khmer Rouge – at the expense of their
Cambodian allies. A change in the status quo ante was inevitable.

So, the signatories sought to end Cambodia's "tragic conflict and continuing
bloodshed" – from 1970, when Cambodia was engulfed by the Vietnam War,
through 1975-1979, under the brutalities of the Khmer Rouge, and from
1979-1989 when Vietnamese troops invaded and occupied Cambodia.

A "liberal democracy" in Cambodia reflected the world's intention to provide
that country with a government that mirrored the democratic changes also
occurring in Eastern Europe. In practice, ending the conflict and bloodshed
meant the different factions must be denied the means to continue fighting.
Foreign backers unplugged the Khmers' military supply chain.

*Cambodian conflict in the world context
*As a result of their regular contacts at the Khmer-Thai border with foreign
representatives, the high command of the Khmer People's National Liberation
Armed Forces was acutely conscious of impending changes in the world order
that would inevitably affect those waging the war for Cambodia. Notably, the
rise in March 1985 of Mikhail S. Gorbachev to the position of Secretary
General of the Soviet Community Party seemed to presage change in
international relationships.

As Special Assistant to Commander-in-Chief, I read and researched to keep
him abreast of changes that might affect the Front. We discussed a
correlation between Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia on Christmas Eve 1978 and
the reports of Soviet troops in Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 under
Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev. By 1988, I reported on the significance of
Gorbachev's social, economic, political, and foreign policy reforms; his
abolition of the Brezhnev doctrine that allowed Moscow to intervene in any
socialist country; and his policy allowing the Kremlin's Eastern European
allies to pursue independent domestic and foreign policies.

News of Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan in May 1988 (completed
in February 1989) was echoed by Hanoi's public announcement in January 1989
of Vietnamese troop withdrawals from Cambodia – withdrawals recorded by
reporters in the summer of 1989.

Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs) of the
Khmer warring factions were held in July 1988 and in February 1989, followed
by France's push for an international conference on Cambodia in July-August.


In Eastern Europe, six governments of the Kremlin's allies – Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany, Romania – collapsed in
1989, and the Berlin Wall came down in November of that year.

Heaven seemed to conspire to bring change. To say that change causes anxiety
is an understatement.

Having served actively with the KPLNF since 1981, I was a direct participant
in the KPNLAF's general staff and high command beginning in 1985-1986. My
theory: The KPNLAF was racing against time to achieve its goals. Unless the
army accepted risks, its future would be dictated by others.
"Overreacting," I was told.

I asked what price we would pay for "peace," and came to a personal
conclusion that we were going to pay far too dearly for a poor result. In
November 1989, I left the KPNLAF – ironically, after a visit to a KPNLAF
zone by a United Nations military delegation. I had reached a fork in the
road with members of the KPNLAF leadership. My views would have been an
obstacle to the course they had determined they must follow. In vogue was
hopeful talk of turning "battlefields into free markets" and "bullets into
ballots." They turned their attention to creating a political party in
anticipation of Cambodia's forthcoming national elections. I believed these
could be neither free nor fair, as Hun Sen and the CPP had been in complete
control of Cambodia for a decade. My colleagues embraced a "procedural
democracy." Our shared dream of establishing a "substantive democracy" that
comprises fundamental rights and freedom was no longer acknowledged.

In an article in the China Morning Post in 1992, I questioned Cambodian
democrats' participation in a national election that would not be free and
fair as Hun Sen would use this priceless democratic process to legitimize
his Cambodian People's Party's dictatorship.

But, I was pleasantly surprised – embarrassed, but elated – as a nearly 90
percent voter turnout at the 1993 UN-supervised general elections gave
victory to Prince Norodom Ranariddh of the royalist FUNCINPEC party. Maybe I
was "overreacting"?

The pleasant surprise soon turned sour. Hun Sen, who lost the election,
refused to accept Ranariddh's victory, and threatened war. Then Prince
Ranariddh's father, now King Father Sihanouk, came up with his
"co-premiership" formula: The election winner should be First Prime
Minister, the election loser, Second Prime Minister. A two-headed government
was created. Each prime minister had separate ministries and armies.

Ironically, in an interview on Guam with a reporter of Bangkok's The Nation,
I warned of a coup. In July 1997, Hun Sen pulled a coup d'etat against
Ranariddh, ahead of the next general elections.

And so the dream of "national reconciliation" vanished, perhaps to be
revived when it is politically expedient?

Now, as celebrations and commemorations of the 20th anniversary of the Paris
Accords begin, I find myself an odd man out.

*Each to his/her own drumbeat
*Last month, on August 6, in a keynote speech to Sydney's University of New
South Wales Law School, Australia's former foreign minister (1988) Gareth
Evans described the pre-1991 "complex and intractable" Cambodian conflict
and admitted, "We have not yet seen a durable, human-rights respecting
democracy," but dubbed the Accords "a formidable achievement indeed for the
international community, and one in which … Australia played a quite central
part."

For Professor Evans, "nothing has given me more pleasure and pride than the
Paris peace agreement concluded in 1991," though Cambodia's "glass is still
half full. In democracy and human rights terms, Cambodia still has a long
way to go," he said.

Evans's remarks at the signing of the 1991 Accords should be recalled:
"Peace and freedom are not prizes which, once gained, can never be lost.
They must be won again each day. Their foundations must be sunk deep into
the bedrock of political stability, economic prosperity and above all else,
the observance of human rights."

Indeed, political stability and economic prosperity must not eclipse
"observance of human rights."

Also in August, in "Silencing Cambodia's Honest Brokers," former New York
Times reporter Elizabeth Becker wrote of "champagne and a huge sigh of
relief" as the 1991 Accords were signed; except Cambodia was not moving on
to peace and democracy. "It didn't turn out that way. Cambodia today is
essentially ruled by a single party with little room for an opposition, has
a weak and corrupt judiciary, and the country's most effective union leaders
have been murdered." To Becker, Hun Sen's proposed law on civil society
would silence Cambodia's "lively civil society and NGOs."

She suggested, as commemorations of the Paris Accords begin, "instead of
looking backward to the past glory, it might be better to focus on today and
reinforce the accords." Hun Sen wants a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security
Council, she wrote. Cambodia's "price for greater influence and prestige in
the world should be reinforcing democracy, not diminishing it."

I like Becker's column. But, it drew some critics.

While foreign government and United Nations officials commemorate the Paris
Accords, Cambodian opponents of the Hun Sen regime recognized by the United
Nations are using the anniversary as an opportunity to draw attention to the
Accords' successes and failures through conferences and rallies.

In general, Cambodian expatriates around the world are convening conferences
and rallies to petition the UN and the signatory governments "to reconvene
and re-enforce" the stipulations in the Paris Accords, because Cambodia's
neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as the Hun Sen government, have
violated Cambodia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity,
and the Hun Sen regime is violating the Khmer people's rights and freedom.
Many expatriates repeat the goal of their conferences and rallies to seek to
"safeguard" Cambodia's survival.

Cambodians have reason to be dissatisfied with the implementation of the
1991 Paris Peace Accords. When the election results of 1993 went awry and
then were overturned through a coup, signatory nations were occupied
elsewhere. Today, denouncing the Thais and the Vietnamese may make some
people feel better, but bashing them endlessly brings no change to the
situation, only fossilizes the "we-they" enmity. The UN and the 18 signatory
governments of the Paris Accords have no interest in reconvening to
"re-enforce" the Accords' stipulations. The world has moved on; signatory
nations find their self-interest currently involves productive engagement
with the government in place.

Time, energy, and resources would be better employed building the foundation
for the Cambodia enlightened citizens hope to develop. Teach people to
think. As Lord Buddha taught 2,500 years ago: "We are what we think … With
our thoughts we make the world." Bashing others makes an ugly world.

*Some Khmer weaknesses
*I am not seeking personal popularity. I write to encourage change through
constructive processes, critical reasoning, informed decision-making.
Generally, Cambodians have a tendency to personalize and see things in black
or white; hence, many have trouble thinking "outside the box."

Centuries of a Khmer culture of "smoh trang" (fidelity, loyalty) that
reinforces the teaching to "korup" (respect), "bamroeur" (serve), "kar pier"
(defend) the god-king or leader until the end of one's life, boxes people
into servitude to the god-king or leader, their minds forbidden to stray.
Human beings are creatures of habit. Centuries of doing and thinking the
same thing over and over results in too many who act thoughtlessly.
Improvement, change, is hard to accomplish when views are immoveable.

This culture has to be "unlearned." If learning consists of repeating the
same process, unlearning means to terminate the old and start new process
over and over. Unlearning means change, and change begins with the one who
looks into the mirror: You and me.

While Cambodian children were taught the "virtue" of the traditional culture
to be loyal and fight to the death for a god-king or leader, American
children are taught to believe in the "self-evident truths" and regardless
of their party affiliation, they fight when "life, liberty, the pursuit of
happiness" are threatened. Cambodia, with a history that dates back more
than 2,000 years, is in decline. The United States, born in 1776, still
holds world leadership.

There is a German proverb that goes, "Necessity unites." John F. Kennedy
famously said: "The unity of freedom has never relied on uniformity of
opinion."

Yet, the necessity to oppose Hun Sen's autocracy has not united Cambodian
democrats, many of whom inflexibly view uniting as being with "me," with "my
party," under "my leadership," – a uniformity of opinion that "I" or "my
party" defines. What's the difference between them and autocratic Hun Sen
and the CPP? Too many in the democratic opposition colorfully denigrate one
another and encourage their followers to engage in personal invective, to
the pleasure of Hun Sen and the CPP.

Remember Lord Buddha's preaching, "Words have the power to both destroy and
heal"?

"Pay no attention to the faults of others, things done or left undone by
others. Consider only what by oneself is done or undone," Buddha taught.

In other words, think only of what have we ourselves have done or not done.

Last week, I had the fortune to speak with a respected Khmer elder with
experience in Khmer affairs since the 1950s. I spoke my thought: "If for any
reason, Khmer democrats have problems ‘uniting' against an autocratic
opponent, can they at least refrain from ‘disunity' and be humble enough and
not paint one another black?"

*Khmer Revolutionists
*Regular readers know I am no fan of bashing anyone – though I am not shy
about offering critical analysis, which means assessing and evaluating
whether an action leads to a desired goal. Criticism is not a denunciation
or denigration. Nor do I stand in the way of others who fight for rights and
freedom. To the contrary, I give a hand when and if possible to help
opponents of autocracy. I don't remain "neutral" in the face of injustice
and violations of rights and freedom. I like the words of human rights icon,
Martin Luther King, Jr.: "Our lives begin to end the day we become silent
about things that matter."

Thus, I offer no objection to the Khmer People Power Movement of Sourn Serey
Ratha, albeit some listeners in Phnom Penh of KPPM radio station tell me
they are unhappy with the radio's "strong" language. Nor do I challenge
those in the Lotus Revolution of Ou Chal in France, though I am in agreement
with Dr. Tith Naranhkiri, formerly with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, who suggested the Lotus Revolutionists "shift
emphasis" from first "liberating" Cambodia from the Vietnamese, to first
liberating the Cambodian people from Hun Sen/Sihanouk, and not to count on
the Paris Accords to do the liberation for Cambodians. As Tith says, "It is
too late. That change was wrecked by Sihanouk when he joined Hun Sen after
the 1987 meeting in France."

What concerns me about "revolution" in Cambodia a la Arab Spring is not
whether a popular uprising is possible – I think it can be made to happen,
and opposition leader Sam Rainsy needed not consult Arab Spring
revolutionists – but, as I said to the Khmer elder last week, after a Khmer
uprising, "then what?"

As a movie character said, It's not so much time but so little to do, but
there's so much to do and so little time!

In the final analysis, the UN and the signatories of the 1991 Paris Peace
Accords cannot change Cambodia. It's Cambodians who will have to bring about
the change that they want to see.

Here is the test for Cambodians: Can they be masters of themselves or, put
another way by some disdainful commentators, can Cambodians rid themselves
of their "dependency syndrome"?


……………..

*The views shared in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the
AHRC, and the AHRC takes no responsibility for them.

About the Author:
Dr. Gaffar Peang-Meth is retired from the University of Guam, where he
taught political science for 13 years. He currently lives in the United
States. He can be contacted at [email protected].
*


# # #

*About AHRC: The Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional
non-governmental organisation that monitors human rights in Asia, documents
violations and advocates for justice and institutional reform to ensure the
protection and promotion of these rights. The Hong Kong-based group was
founded in 1984. *

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