On Mar 8, 2013, at 4:12 PM, PJ Eby <p...@telecommunity.com> wrote: > On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 2:52 PM, Noah Kantrowitz <n...@coderanger.net> wrote: >> MD5 is _not_ acceptable for anything security related and we shouldn't be >> adding anything that increases our dependence on it. MD5's only use in the >> packaging world is to make people who forget that TCP has its own checksums >> feel all warm and fuzzy that there hasn't been _accidental_ download >> corruption. > > So, you're saying that someone has found a second-preimage attack > against MD5 that's more efficient than the current 2**127 threshold > established in 2009? > > "Anything security related" is pretty broad. Out of the many classes > of attacks on hashes, AFAIK the only class that's relevant to PyPI is > second preimage attacks, i.e. one where the attacker has the original > file and the hash, and must construct a new file that produces the > same hash value.
Relevant to PyPI is pretty broad, and when you're developing a secure system you need to look past what is ok *today* and design for the next 5, 10, or 20 years. So even if there's no attack that can directly allow replacing the target file with a new one, continuing to utilize it is bad. It has a number of weaknesses which do not install confidence in its future security meanwhile there are a number of other hashes which _do_. Unless you'd rather be trying to replace hashes everywhere once it's already completely broken. > > Did you have some other type of hash attack in mind? And in either > case, do you have a referent for the attack complexity? > _______________________________________________ > Catalog-SIG mailing list > Catalog-SIG@python.org > http://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/catalog-sig ----------------- Donald Stufft PGP: 0x6E3CBCE93372DCFA // 7C6B 7C5D 5E2B 6356 A926 F04F 6E3C BCE9 3372 DCFA
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