Additionally, why should have to go find (and propagate) kiddy porn?
On Thu, Aug 12, 2004 at 03:10:55PM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote:
> On Sat, 2004-08-07 at 08:51, Toad wrote:
> > On Fri, Aug 06, 2004 at 11:25:46PM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote:
> > > Kiddie porn is a minor issue compared to the copyright problem.
> > > For that, I think there will be a technological solution which
> > > will make it less easy to find on Freenet, so that no one without an ax
> > > to grind will think node operators are liable. Regarding the copyright
> > > problem, come and get us. We aren't going to give up without a fight.
> >
> > Uh, like what?
>
> I think everyone agrees it's not hard to convert a base 64 CHK key to
> the hex representation used in filenames, and to delete matching files
> from the datastore. (I don't see why SSK's would be any more difficult
> but I haven't actually looked at the details there).
>
> It is not hard to find out the "well known" kiddie porn CHK's. Monitor
> the KP Frost boards; also pick out KP from the descriptions in TFE.
>
> In order to avoid decrypting actual KP, use freenet.client.cli.Main
> with --noredirect and with the output redirected to /dev/null. The
> metadata comes out on stderr, and includes the CHK's of any splitfile
> blocks.
>
> So, without any help from developers, users could set up scripts which
> delete all "well known" KP CHK's from their datastores. Also, given
> patches and scripts, they could compile a version of fred (or distrubute
> a jar which goes ahead of freenet.jar on classpath) which gives
> immediate RNF to such keys.
>
> If they do that, I think no jury would find such a node operator
> criminally liable for carrying KP which he could not find out about
> without devoting large amounts of time looking for the keys. Hopefully,
> no prosecutor would go after such node operators, since being dragged
> into court is a considerable inconvenience even if the verdict is
> innocent. (The police rarely offer apologies, let alone compensation).
>
> On the other hand, investigators running freenet nodes themselves can
> easily find nodes which fail to censor well known KP CHK's. There is no
> need to "break" freenet to be able to do this.
>
> If the investigators are decent people, they will give such node
> operators a chance to voluntarily censor the KP, and even provide a list
> of CHK's which should be censored. The investigators themselves are
> able to look at the actual content and decide if it is KP without risk
> of illegal possession of decrypted KP.
>
> ---- file keyBlacklist/KeyBlacklist.java ----
> package keyBlacklist;
>
> import freenet.client.Base64;
> import freenet.support.HexUtil;
>
> public class KeyBlacklist
> {
> public static void main(String[] args)
> throws freenet.client.IllegalBase64Exception
> {
> int i;
> for (i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
> if (args[i].startsWith("CHK@")) {
> byte[] key = Base64.decode(args[i].substring(4));
> System.out.println(HexUtil.bytesToHex(key));
> } else {
> byte[] key = HexUtil.hexToBytes(args[i]);
> System.out.println(Base64.encode(key));
> }
> }
> }
> }
> ---- compile and run script ----
> /usr/java/j2sdk1.4.2_05/bin/javac -classpath \
> freenet.jar keyBlacklist/KeyBlacklist.java
> /usr/java/j2sdk1.4.2_05/bin/jar cvf keyBlacklist.jar \
> keyBlacklist/KeyBlacklist.class
> /usr/java/j2sdk1.4.2_05/bin/java -classpath \
> freenet.jar:keyBlacklist.jar \
> keyBlacklist.KeyBlacklist [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so.
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
_______________________________________________ chat mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general
