Poof goes the neocon stand-off armor around the nazis, and top cabinet
officials even if nazi are not fourth generation Bush Warco who backed
Hitler from the 1920's and set up the little hitler factory which
brought us hitlers from Reza Pahlavi to Saddam Hussein and Osama bin
Laden and the Taliban and muslim brotherhood al-CIA-duh.

Armitage admits to outing Valerie Plame to Robert Novak, but not to
knowing she was Real CIA. Blame division, how slick, couldn't have been
planned? And Armitage hides in jail from the streetfight there, as these
superficial 911 public confidence stories make the rounds of Warco-owned
media, begging the questioning of Armitage on what he and Porter Goss
were talking to 911 tactical managers in August and September 2001,
before 911. There could be a whole separate Congressional committee just
investigating Armitage by himself for his role in Coup 2K, 911, and
Niger Yellowcake aka Plame outing.

-Bob

--- In cia-drugs@yahoogroups.com, Eco Man <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>   Bush has to go before we can make any sustainable progress in the
USA.
> Only public opinion and/or a Democratic Congress can stop funds for
Iraq.
> The new book "Hubris", and the Senate report that just came out, blow
>   Bush's Iraq war lies right out of the water. Many more details:
>
>
>   -----------start. Please forward widely. Please register to vote.
Emphasis added.----------
>
>   http://www.davidcorn.com/archives/2006/09/hubris_the_pres.php
>
>     September 06, 2006  HUBRIS: The Press Release
>
>   HUBRIS: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the
Iraq War starts arriving in bookstores today--though it may take a day
or two to reach all the stores (given that the release date was pushed
up). Below is a copy of the press release that is being sent out by
Crown. It teases just some of the revelations in the book. As for the
boilerplate language hailing the book, the Crown PR team is responsible
for this. But, of course, it's all true.
>
>   ******
>
>   "Hubris is a bold and provocative book that will quickly become an
explosive part of the national debate on how we got involved in Iraq."
-- Tom Brokaw
>
>   "The selling of Bush's Iraq debacle is one of the most important-and
appalling-stories of the last half-century, and Michael Isikoff and
David Corn have reported the hell out of it." -- Hendrik Hertzberg,
Senior Editor, The New Yorker
>
>   March 2003: The United States invades Iraq.
>
> September 2006: The world finds out why.
>
>   HUBRIS
> The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War
>
> by Michael Isikoff and David Corn
>
>   What was really behind the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq? As George W.
Bush steered the nation to war, who spoke the truth and who tried to
hide it? HUBRIS: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of
the Iraq War (Crown, September 8, 2006) takes us behind the scenes at
the Bush White House, the CIA, the Pentagon, the State Department, and
Congress to answer all the vital questions about how the Bush
administration came to invade Iraq. HUBRIS, a gripping narrative, is
filled with new revelations. The book disclosures include:
>
>   * President Bush was driven by a visceral hatred of Saddam Hussein,
which he privately demonstrated in expletive-laden tirades against the
Iraqi dictator. In May 2002--months before he asked Congress for
authority to attack Saddam-Bush bluntly revealed his ultimate game plan
in a candid moment with two aides. When told that reporter Helen Thomas
was questioning the need to oust Saddam by force, Bush snapped: "Did you
tell her I intend to kick his sorry mother fucking ass all over the
Mideast?" In a meeting with congressional leaders, the President angrily
thrust his middle finger inches in front of the face of Senator Tom
Daschle to illustrate Saddam's attitude toward the United States.
>
>   * As part of an aggressive prewar covert action program--codenamed
Anabasis (after an ancient text about a botched invasion of
Babylon)--the CIA was authorized by the White House in the winter of
2002 to blow up targets in Iraq and engage in "direct action" (an agency
euphemism for assassination) to weaken Saddam's regime and to prepare
for his ouster by the U.S. military. For Anabasis, the agency smuggled
Iraqi exiles to a top-secret site in the Nevada desert and trained them
in sabotage and explosives. The Iraqi force, known as the Scorpions, was
being trained to seize an isolated Iraqi military post-in order to
create a provocation that could trigger a war with Iraq.
>
>   * When Bush was first briefed that no WMDs had been found in Iraq,
he was totally unfazed and asked few questions. "I'm not sure I've
spoken to anyone at that level who seemed less inquisitive," the briefer
told the authors.
>
>   * Colin Powell remains intensely bitter and angry about his UN
Security Council Speech, during which he presented the case for war.
After it became clear that much of his speech was wrong, he refused to
have anything to do with CIA director George Tenet. "It's annoying to
me," Powell told the authors. "Everybody focuses on my
presentation....Well the same goddamn case was presented to the U.S.
Senate and the Congress and they voted for [Bush's Iraq]
resolution....Why aren't they outraged....The same case was presented to
the President. Why isn'' the President outraged? It's always, 'Gee,
Powell, you made this speech to the UN.'"
>
>   * After the invasion, Dick Cheney's aides desperately sifted through
raw intelligence nuggets in search of any evidence that would justify
the war. On one occasion they sent the WMD hunters in Iraq a satellite
photo that they suspected showed a hiding place for WMDs. But it was
only an overhead photo of a watering hole for cows.
>
>   * A critical memo in the CIA leak case was based on notes of a State
Department official that were (as this official told the authors)
inaccurate. This memo reported that former ambassador Joseph Wilson's
wife was a CIA employee who played a key role in sending him on his trip
to Niger. Yet the State Department official now acknowledges his notes
did not describe Valerie Wilson's role accurately.
>
>   * At the time of her outing, Valerie Wilson was an undercover
officer in the CIA whose mission had been to gather intelligence about
WMDs in Iraq. She was the operations manager of the Joint Task Force on
Iraq, a unit in the clandestine service of the CIA. This unit
desperately tried to obtain evidence to back up the Bush
administration's assertions about Saddam's WMDs, yet it found no such
evidence.
>
>   * Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state, was the original
leaker in the CIA leak case. But as he was disclosing information to
columnist Robert Novak, Karl Rove, Scooter Libby and other top White
House aides were engaged in a fierce campaign to discredit Joseph
Wilson. Rove even told MSNBC anchor Chris Matthews that the Wilsons
"were trying to screw the White House so the White House was going to
screw them back."
>
>   * Many of the White House's most dramatic claims about the threat
posed by weapons of mass destruction were repeatedly questioned by
senior members of the U.S. intelligence community-but these dissents and
views were suppressed or ignored by the White House. Admiral Thomas
Wilson, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency until May 2002,
is quoted in the book as casting doubt on virtually the entire White
House case for an invasion of Iraq. "I didn't really think [Iraq] had a
nuclear program," retired Admiral Wilson told the authors. "I didn't
think [Saddam and Iraq] were an immediate threat on WMD."
>
>   * The CIA missed an obvious clue that showed that the infamous Niger
documents--the basis for Bush's false statement in a State of the Union
speech--were crude forgeries. The clue was a bizarre companion document
detailing a supposed global alliance of rogue nations (including Iraq
and Iran)--a notion so unlikely that one State Department intelligence
analyst immediately labeled it a hoax. The CIA also blew the call on
these documents partly because an officer misplaced the papers.
>
>   * U.S. intelligence officials suspected Iranian intelligence was
trying to influence U.S. decision-making through Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi
National Congress-yet they felt they could do nothing about it because
the INC had support within the White House and Pentagon.
>
>   * Congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle seriously doubted
the case for war-and questioned the top-secret briefings they received
directly from Cheney. One senior Republican, House Majority Leader Dick
Armey, warned the President in a September 2002 meeting that Bush would
be stuck in a "quagmire" if he invaded Iraq. But Armey and others were
afraid for political reasons to challenge the White House on the prewar
intelligence.
>
>   * An obscure academic, derided as a virtual crackpot by U.S. law
enforcement and the intelligence community, greatly influenced top Bush
administration officials, who adopted her farfetched theory that Saddam
was the source of most of the terrorism in the world, including the 9/11
attacks. But, oddly, this researcher, Laurie Mylroie, had once been a
Saddam apologist and had engaged in secret, back-door diplomacy aimed at
brokering a peace accord between Israel and Iraq. After Saddam invaded
Kuwait, Mylroie developed bizarre allegations about Saddam and
terrorism. Her theories were debunked by the CIA and FBI, yet Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz embraced them, cited them in official
meetings, and repeatedly pressed the agency and bureau to come up with
evidence to substantiate Mylroie's work.
>
>   * The intelligence community's top nuclear experts were afraid to
challenge publicly the Bush administration's claim that Iraq had
obtained aluminum tubes for a nuclear weapons program, though they
disagreed with this assessment. The tubes case was relentlessly pressed
by one CIA analyst whose technical expertise did not match those of
these scientists and whose name is revealed for the first time in
HUBRIS.
>   * The CIA came close to recruiting Saddam Hussein's foreign
minister, Naji Sabri, to be an American spy. Through a Lebanese
journalist, Sabri passed word to the CIA's station chief in Paris that
Iraq had no active nuclear or WMD programs. But senior CIA and White
House officials dismissed the intelligence and opposed the effort to
recruit Sabri, fearing it would undercut the case for an invasion. The
chief of the CIA's Iraq Operations Group told the Paris station chief,
"One of these days you're going to get it. This is not about
intelligence. This is about regime change."
>
>   * Even as colleagues of Judith Miller at The New York Times were
suspicious of her reporting on Iraq's WMDs, her editors stubbornly stood
by her. HUBRIS details how some of the Times' most significant-and
wrong-stories about Saddam's WMDs came to be written.
>
>   * CIA analysts, over the objections of other intelligence community
analysts, rigged a post-invasion report to show that a trailer found in
Iraq was a mobile bioweapons lab.
>
>   * Before the invasion, Bush and General Tommy Franks only briefly
discussed how Iraq would be secured after the invasion-and did so in the
most general terms. The one idea they discussed--appointing a "lord
mayor" in each Iraqi city and town--was not even shared with the
military officers in charge of drawing up the plans for a post-invasion
Iraq.
>
>   * Karl Rove and his lawyer did not turn over a critical piece of
evidence in the CIA leak case (a document covered by a subpoena from the
special prosecutor) for nearly a year.
>
>   HUBRIS connects the dots between George W. Bush's outbursts at
Saddam Hussein, the bitter battles between the CIA and the White House,
the fights within the intelligence community over Saddam's weapons of
mass destruction, the real reason Valerie Plame was outed, and a top
reporter's ties to wily Iraqi exiles trying to start a war. Written by
veteran reporters Michael Isikoff and David Corn, this is the inside
story of how President Bush took the nation to war using faulty and
fraudulent intelligence. It is a news-making account of conspiracy,
backstabbing, bureaucratic ineptitude, journalistic malfeasance, and,
especially, arrogance.
>
>
>
>   Posted by David Corn at September 6, 2006 11:38 AM
>
>
>   -------------------end------------------
>
>
>   ------------next article begins. Emphasis added.-----------
>
>
>   http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060908/ap_on_go_co/iraq_report
>
>
>   Senate: Saddam saw al-Qaida as threat
>
>
>   By JIM ABRAMS, Associated Press Writer
>
> September 8, 2006
>
> WASHINGTON -
>
> Saddam Hussein regarded al-Qaida as a threat rather than a possible
ally, a Senate report says, contradicting assertions President Bush has
used to build support for the war in Iraq.
>
> Released Friday, the report discloses for the first time an October
2005 CIA assessment that before the war, Saddam's government "did not
have a relationship, harbor or turn a blind eye toward" al-Qaida
operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or his associates.
>
> Saddam told U.S. officials after his capture that he had not
cooperated with Osama bin Laden even though he acknowledged that
officials in his government had met with the al-Qaida leader, according
to FBI summaries cited in the Senate report.
>
> "Saddam only expressed negative sentiments about bin Laden," Tariq
Aziz, the Iraqi leader's top aide, told the FBI.
>
> The report also faults intelligence gathering in the lead-up to the
2003 invasion.
>
> As recently as an Aug. 21 news conference, Bush said people should
"imagine a world in which you had Saddam Hussein" with the capacity to
make weapons of mass destruction and "who had relations with Zarqawi."
>
> Democrats contended that the administration continues to use faulty
intelligence, including assertions of a link between Saddam's government
and the recently killed al-Zarqawi, to justify the war in Iraq.
>
> They also said, in remarks attached to Friday's Senate Intelligence
Committee document, that former CIA Director George Tenet had modified
his position on the terrorist link at the request of administration
policymakers.
>
> Republicans said the document, which compares prewar intelligence with
post-invasion findings on Iraq's weapons and on terrorist groups, broke
little new ground. And they said Democrats were distorting it for
political purposes.
>
> A previous report in 2004 made clear the intelligence agencies'
"massive failures," said Sen. Kit Bond, R-Mo., a member of the
committee. "Yet to make a giant leap in logic to claim that the Bush
administration intentionally misled the nation or manipulated
intelligence is simply not warranted."
>
> White House press secretary Tony Snow said the report was "nothing
new."
>
> A second part of the report concluded that false information from the
Iraqi National Congress, an anti-Saddam group led by then-exile Ahmed
Chalabi, was used to support key U.S. intelligence assessments on Iraq.
>
> It said U.S. intelligence agents put out numerous red flags about the
reliability of INC sources but the intelligence community made a
"serious error" and used one source who concocted a story that Iraq was
building mobile biological weapons laboratories.
>
> The report also said that in 2002 the National Security Council
directed that funding for the INC should continue "despite warnings from
both the CIA, which terminated its relationship with the INC in December
1996, and the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), that the INC was
penetrated by hostile intelligence services, including the Iranians."
>
> According to the report, postwar findings indicate that Saddam "was
distrustful of al-Qaida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his
regime."
>
> It said al-Zarqawi was in Baghdad from May until late November 2002.
But "postwar information indicates that Saddam Hussein attempted,
unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al-Zarqawi and that the regime did
not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward
Zarqawi."
>
> In June 2004, Bush defended Vice President Dick Cheney's assertion
that Saddam had "long-established ties" with al-Qaida. "Zarqawi is the
best evidence of connection to al-Qaida affiliates and al-Qaida," the
president said.
>
> The report concludes that postwar findings do not support a 2002
intelligence report that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program,
possessed biological weapons or had ever developed mobile facilities for
producing biological warfare agents.
>
> "The report is a devastating indictment of the Bush-Cheney
administration's unrelenting, misleading and deceptive attempts to
convince the American people that Saddam Hussein was linked with
al-Qaida," said Sen. Carl Levin (news, bio, voting record), D-Mich., a
member of the committee.
>
> Levin and Sen. Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, the top Democrat on
the panel, said Tenet told the committee last July that in 2002 he had
complied with an administration request "to say something about not
being inconsistent with what the president had said" about the
Saddam-terrorist link.
>
> They said that on Oct. 7, 2002, the same day Bush gave a speech
speaking of such a link, the CIA had sent a declassified letter to the
committee saying it would be an "extreme step" for Saddam to assist
Islamist terrorists in attacking the United States.
>
> They said Tenet acknowledged to the committee that subsequently
issuing a statement that there was no inconsistency between the
president's speech and the CIA viewpoint was "the wrong thing to do."
>
> Committee Chairman Pat Roberts, R-Kan., said the mistakes of prewar
intelligence have long been known and "the additional views of the
committee's Democrats are little more than a rehashing of the same
unfounded allegations they've used for over three years."
>
> The panel report is Phase II of an analysis of prewar intelligence on
Iraq. The first phase, issued in July 2004, focused on the CIA's
failings in its estimates of Iraq's weapons program.
>
> The second phase had been delayed as Republicans and Democrats fought
over what information should be declassified and how far the committee
should delve into the question of whether policymakers may have
manipulated intelligence to make the case for war.
>
> Committee member Ron Wyden, D-Ore., said he planned to ask for an
investigation into the amount of information remaining classified. He
said, "I am particularly concerned it appears that information may have
been classified to shield individuals from accountability."
>
> ___
>
> On the Net:
>
> Senate Intelligence Committee: http://intelligence.senate.gov
>
>
>   --------------end--------------
>
>
>   ---------------
>
>
>   Runoff voting, consecutive term limits, and paper ballot backups
with audits are the cure for fake democracy.
> http://corporatism.tripod.com/voting.htm and
> http://www.angelfire.com/rnb/y/ratesusa.htm
>
>
>   Growing fascism under Bush in the USA.
>  
http://gallery.marihemp.com/albums/charts/USA_BJS_Bulletin_NCJ213133.gif
>
>   Table 1 from "Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2005". A U.S.
Bureau of Justice Statistics report. According to a 2006 OJJDP (Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention) report there were 97,000
held in juvenile facilities as of October 22, 2006. [2] Add those to the
total inmates.
> http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/pjim05.htm
> http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/nr2006/html/chp7hl.html
>
>
> MMM (Global Million Marijuana March):
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/cannabisaction
> Newsweek, Nov. 14, 2005, page 36:
> "The most recent evidence comes from autopsies of 44 prisoners who
have died in Iraq and Afghanistan in U.S. custody. Most died under
circumstances that suggest torture. The reports use words like
'strangulation,' 'asphyxiation' and 'blunt force injuries.' ...  A few
months before the [Abu Ghraib] scandal broke [spring 2004], Coalition
Provisional Authority polls showed Iraqi support at 63 percent. A month
after Abu Ghraib, the number was 9 percent. Polls showed that 71 percent
of Iraqis were surprised by the revelations."
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------
> Get your email and more, right on the  new Yahoo.com
>






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