Hongwei Sun schrieb: > Metze/Andrew, > > The subkey in the EncAPRepPart of the AP-REP should be used as the session > key when the mutual authentication is enabled(as described in RFC 4121). > When DES and RC4 are used in Kerberos, the implementation is based on RFC1964 > (instead of RFC4121). According to RFC1964, you can pick the subkey in > AP_REQ as the session key as it is the same as the subkey in AP_REP, but this > is not true when AES is used because both subkeys are different (again AES > means RFC4121 being used, not RFC1964). This explains what you > observed. We will add the information to [MS-KILE] to describe how the > session key is selected. > > The session key returned from Kerberos package can be used for SMB > signing as described in the section 4.3 of [MS-SMB]. You have to truncate > the keys to 128 bits in your code because SMB does the truncation on the > windows side. > > I ran the similar testing as you did. I had one Vista machine connected > to Windows 2008 DC/KDC and configured AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 as Kerberos > encryption type with mutual authentication enabled. I cannot duplicate your > SMB signing problem(see the network capture attached). It is working between > Windows servers and clients.
I got it working, the session key isn't truncated for the SMB signing. The problem was that we reseted the sequence number when updating the session key from the initiator subkey to the acceptor subkey between the session setup request and response. Also windows signs the response with the acceptor subkey, so that the client needs to check the signature after processing the response. metze
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
_______________________________________________ cifs-protocol mailing list cifs-protocol@cifs.org https://lists.samba.org/mailman/listinfo/cifs-protocol