Ray,

I have worked with diffie-hellman quite a bit.  You have the correct gist of
it.  The key to the answer is the word anonymous in the cisco excerpt.  The
initial diffie-hellman public key exchange is subject to man-in-the-middle
attacts, if you run this key exchange anonymously.  On the other hand if you
do a manual verification of the intitial key exchange, by having the
recieving end visually check the public key against what the sender is
sending, then its secure and subsequent key exchanges will be secure.



-----Original Message-----
From: Ray Brehm [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Friday, December 07, 2001 1:50 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: diffie-hellman clarification [7:28438]


I need a security wizard here...

This question is from certification zone:

Diffie-Hellman exchange prevents what type of attack on secure 
communications?

A.

Denial of service

B.

Session key cryptanalysis

C.

Replay

D.

Man-in-the-middle

Your Answer: D

Correct Choice: d

Answer Explanation

Diffie-Hellman is used in the secure exchange of information from which 
session keys are generated for communications between legitimate users A 
and B. It prevents man-in-the-middle attacks, in which an intruder M 
lies to B, saying it is A, and lies to A, saying it is B. If A and B 
accept M's statement, A and B will both send to M, and M can read or 
change the information flow.


This excerpt is from Cisco's website and the Internet Protocol Journal 
6/98:

    * Anonymous Diffie-Hellman: The base Diffie-Hellman algorithm is
      used, with no authentication. That is, each side sends its public
      Diffie-Hellman parameters to the other, with no authentication.
      This approach is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, in which
      the attacker conducts anonymous Diffie-Hellman exchanges with both
      parties.


I understand the way Diffie-Hellman works and exchanges public keys 
using a mathematical formula and is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle 
during the original D-H exchange. I also understand how further key 
exchange for data encryption works after D-H is computed. What I'm 
getting at here is what's the Cisco answer? D-H is vulnerable to 
man-in-the-middle during the original exchange but protects the exchange 
of the real key used for data encryption if it is executed successfully. 
The answer to this question could quite possibly be B since once D-H is 
completed successfully it protects the session key. Again, can someone 
clarify what the Cisco answer would be?




Message Posted at:
http://www.groupstudy.com/form/read.php?f=7&i=28452&t=28438
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