At 2:24 AM +0000 3/1/03, Edwin R. Gonzalez wrote: >I came across this article about BGP earlier today, >check it out; > >http://news.com.com/2100-1009-990608.html >
The Stephen Dugan quoted in the article has not, AFAIK, made any contributions to IETF or NANOG. Blackhat's bio says he has presented at NANOG, but I can't find him in the NANOG author directory or in the last year or two on the NANOG mailing list. Sorry, this article really seems to have keyed on one presentation and doesn't refer to any of the top experts on BGP security, much less routing policy or BGP scalability. I _know_ he hasn't been involved in the IRTF-RR discussions on alternatives to BGP. At 3:30 AM +0000 3/1/03, Amazing wrote: >LMAO.... > >"the Bush Administration recently pointed to BGP as critical technology that >needs to be secured. > Your point? I don't think that you'd find anyone in NANOG or the IETF to agree it isn't critical. Now, whether digital signatures are necessary and sufficient is quite a different matter. I think the article is referring to the AS 7007 incident (a "small Virginia ISP", and simple digital signatures would not have prevented that. Requiring use of a routing registry and generating acceptance policy from validity-checked registry information is probably a much stronger technique. AS 7007 would have been preventable with prefix-limit. Message Posted at: http://www.groupstudy.com/form/read.php?f=7&i=64160&t=64123 -------------------------------------------------- FAQ, list archives, and subscription info: http://www.groupstudy.com/list/cisco.html Report misconduct and Nondisclosure violations to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
