jbonofre opened a new pull request, #3057:
URL: https://github.com/apache/karaf/pull/3057

   ## Problem
   
   Karaf has no written security model: `SECURITY.md` only lists the supported 
versions and how to report a vulnerability. Operators can't tell what Karaf 
guarantees, and there is no shared basis to decide whether a report is a 
vulnerability or a hardening request. The ASF recommends documenting one: 
https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/SECURITY/Documenting+your+security+model
   
   ## Change
   
   Add a "Security Model" section to `SECURITY.md`, next to the reporting 
instructions as the ASF guide suggests. It covers:
   
   - what Karaf trusts: the installation directories, the local console, and 
the code you install;
   - the network endpoints, with their default addresses and authentication;
   - the default roles, and how command and JMX ACLs work (including commands 
that have no ACL);
   - what we treat as a vulnerability, as hardening, and as not a vulnerability.
   
   The facts come from the shipped defaults (`users.properties`, 
`system.properties`, `org.apache.karaf.shell.cfg`, 
`org.apache.karaf.management.cfg`, the ACLs in the standard and enterprise 
feature descriptors) and from the user guide.
   
   ## Decisions to review
   
   Two points set policy rather than describe the code. Please check them:
   
   1. **`manager` is trusted, not a boundary below `admin`.** With the shipped 
ACLs, a manager can already run code, for example by installing a bundle over 
JMX (`install = manager` in `jmx.acl.org.apache.karaf.bundle`) or by updating a 
bundle from a URL (`bundle:update`). The model says to give `manager` only to 
users trusted like admins, and treats a manager reaching admin capabilities as 
hardening. Restrictions such as #2861 stay useful as defense in depth.
   2. **Argument rules in the shipped ACLs are a boundary, custom ones are best 
effort.** The argument rules Karaf ships (ACL configuration PIDs, `-f` on 
bundle commands) must hold. Rules that operators add are matched against the 
raw text of each argument (`ACLConfigurationParser`), and many commands accept 
the same resource as an id, a name, an alias or a pattern, so Karaf can't 
promise that such a rule covers every form.
   
   Unauthenticated access, the ACL check itself, the `viewer` role and system 
bundle protection are treated as security boundaries, in line with recent fixes 
such as #2864 and #2883.
   
   ## Testing
   
   Documentation only.
   


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