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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-8803?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13456075#comment-13456075
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Xianqing Yu commented on HADOOP-8803:
-------------------------------------

Hi Kingshuk,

>From long term, new features in hadoop can potentially give other management 
>systems, which are based on Hadoop, more flexible to design and use. The core 
>observation is that some improvements would be much easier to implement if we 
>can do that in Hadoop's code (and those features can be reused by other 
>systems, which save cost and time). For example, byte-range restrict design in 
>Block token can also be used by management system outside Hadoop. But without 
>this type of block token, programmer may need to design much more complex 
>method to achieve this function, so company need to pay money and time for 
>that. It is reasonable to think Hadoop is wrapped as middleware layers, but 
>the improvement of hadoop layer would give upper and lower layer better 
>flexibility, or performance, or security. 

Cloud provider can add additional security layer, but all of those services 
need extra paid. And even cloud providers invest huge money on those area, I 
think they still cannot guarantee that data is safe without huge performance 
penalty. Consider about balance of cost, performance, and security, I decide to 
do some work in Hadoop layer.

So what I believe is that, the hadoop, which is better designed and more 
secure, can reduce the difficulties to implement the overall system, such as 
Hortonworks HDP and IBM BigInsights, thus save time and cost. I think we should 
always look at what the hadoop users really need. For the programmer who 
writing system based on hadoop, they would like to see some good features come 
out of Hadoop. That is why I want to post my idea here to discus to see what is 
real need and difficulties from industry. 
                
> Make Hadoop running more secure public cloud envrionment
> --------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: HADOOP-8803
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-8803
>             Project: Hadoop Common
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>          Components: fs, ipc, security
>    Affects Versions: 0.20.204.0
>            Reporter: Xianqing Yu
>              Labels: hadoop
>   Original Estimate: 2m
>  Remaining Estimate: 2m
>
> I am a Ph.D student in North Carolina State University. I am modifying the 
> Hadoop's code (which including most parts of Hadoop, e.g. JobTracker, 
> TaskTracker, NameNode, DataNode) to achieve better security.
>  
> My major goal is that make Hadoop running more secure in the Cloud 
> environment, especially for public Cloud environment. In order to achieve 
> that, I redesign the currently security mechanism and achieve following 
> proprieties:
> 1. Bring byte-level access control to Hadoop HDFS. Based on 0.20.204, HDFS 
> access control is based on user or block granularity, e.g. HDFS Delegation 
> Token only check if the file can be accessed by certain user or not, Block 
> Token only proof which block or blocks can be accessed. I make Hadoop can do 
> byte-granularity access control, each access party, user or task process can 
> only access the bytes she or he least needed.
> 2. I assume that in the public Cloud environment, only Namenode, secondary 
> Namenode, JobTracker can be trusted. A large number of Datanode and 
> TaskTracker may be compromised due to some of them may be running under less 
> secure environment. So I re-design the secure mechanism to make the damage 
> the hacker can do to be minimized.
>  
> a. Re-design the Block Access Token to solve wildly shared-key problem of 
> HDFS. In original Block Access Token design, all HDFS (Namenode and Datanode) 
> share one master key to generate Block Access Token, if one DataNode is 
> compromised by hacker, the hacker can get the key and generate any  Block 
> Access Token he or she want.
>  
> b. Re-design the HDFS Delegation Token to do fine-grain access control for 
> TaskTracker and Map-Reduce Task process on HDFS. 
>  
> In the Hadoop 0.20.204, all TaskTrackers can use their kerberos credentials 
> to access any files for MapReduce on HDFS. So they have the same privilege as 
> JobTracker to do read or write tokens, copy job file, etc.. However, if one 
> of them is compromised, every critical thing in MapReduce directory (job 
> file, Delegation Token) is exposed to attacker. I solve the problem by making 
> JobTracker to decide which TaskTracker can access which file in MapReduce 
> Directory on HDFS.
>  
> For Task process, once it get HDFS Delegation Token, it can access everything 
> belong to this job or user on HDFS. By my design, it can only access the 
> bytes it needed from HDFS.
>  
> There are some other improvement in the security, such as TaskTracker can not 
> know some information like blockID from the Block Token (because it is 
> encrypted by my way), and HDFS can set up secure channel to send data as a 
> option.
>  
> By those features, Hadoop can run much securely under uncertain environment 
> such as Public Cloud. I already start to test my prototype. I want to know 
> that whether community is interesting about my work? Is that a value work to 
> contribute to production Hadoop?

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