----- Original Message ----
> From: Gian-Carlo Pascutto <g...@sjeng.org>
>
> Heikki Levanto wrote:
>
> > No amount on crypto-mumbo-jumbo will solve the problem that the server will
> > have to trust the program, and its author. Signing can provide some little
> > assurance that the program running today is the same as was running
> > yesterday, but that's about all. As long as we can write our own programs,
> > there is no way to stop us from cheating in them, intentionally or by
> > accident.
>
> Very true.
>
> To the people that point to timeseal on the chess servers: both the
> binaries and the protocol itself are trivially reverse engineerable. I
> know of at least 2 people (not counting myself) who have done this.
>
> Because the client side is fully under your control, you can cheat all
> you want with this system. But you can also write a client for a
> non-supported platform :)
>
> The only reason why this doesn't create more problems is that the people
> who have the ability to do this reverse engineering usually have better
> things to do with their time than to cheat on chess servers.
>
> It's like copy protections: it stops some people, but it sure as hell
> ain't "secure" in any meaningful sense.
So it's trustworthy enough the people accept it as a palliative for net lag, in
an environment where most people can be trusted. From browsing chess-specific
web sites, there are customs and procedures for dealing with cheats. In this
day and age, unless you're in the boonies, only so much "net lag" is believable.
Preserving one's reputation is a good enough incentive for most people to do
the right thing.
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