Have you seen https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-uri-lake-pquake/ <eec0b963-9645-4e41-a4ba-90e88c8d2cdb>, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-uri-cfrg-pquake-00 <ca888d1b-d7e5-4e45-93cb-d2d80749fcae>, and https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1749 <48ba4a48-2686-4101-8c45-39d2ff379df3> (first publication without formal proofs in 2023)?
Having said that — I support the approach (obviously 😉). Thanks! -- V/R, Uri From: 赵运磊 <[email protected]> Date: Wednesday, September 16, 2026 at 23:46 To: Renzo Navas <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; lake <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; cose <[email protected]>; ace <[email protected]> Subject: [EXT] [COSE] Re: [Lake] Request for standardized lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG) This Message Is From an External Sender This message came from outside the Laboratory. Dear All: I am Yunlei from Fudan university, Shanghai. I would draw your kind attention on our recently published paper:Post-Quantum Internet Key Exchange via Authenticated Forward-Secure KEM (named AFS-KEX), which is available from: https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1581 <margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;> In this work, we present a novel AKE construction from KEM without using signature: more compact, more efficient, more secure against state exposure. We hope this work is applicable to LAKE and post-quantum IKE. With a brief study, a suggested solution is as follows: First, using ECDH to setup communication encryption key $EK$, due to the MTU limitation of the first two rounds of IKE. Then, using $EK$ to protect the first two rounds of AFS-KEX. Compared to using ML-KEM and MS-DSA, this could reduce about 80% communication bandwidth. Best regards Yunlei -----原始郵件----- 發件人: "Renzo Navas" <[email protected]> 發送時間: 2026-09-13 17:52:46 (星期日) 收件人: [email protected] 抄送: lake <[email protected]>, [email protected], cose <[email protected]>, ace <[email protected]> 主題: [Lake] Request for standardized lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG) Dear CFRG, The LAKE working group is chartered to work on a lightweight mutually authenticated key exchange protocol targeting constrained network environments such as NB-IoT, 6TiSCH, LoRaWAN, IEEE 802.15.4, and BLE. The base LAKE/EDHOC protocol (RFC 9528) is now being updated for the post-quantum setting [1]. In March 2026, the LAKE working group formed a post-quantum Design Team (DT) scoped to evaluate the constrained network scenarios where a quantum-resistant variant of LAKE is realistically deployable. DT identified that the resulting large message sizes due to current PQC algorithms are not well suited for the most constrained IoT environments [2]. At the same time, constrained IoT systems also need to migrate to post-quantum cryptography. LAKE kindly requests CFRG to consider research and specification of lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange algorithms. 1. As shown in the analysis [2], a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE)-based approach to quantum-resistant LAKE could reduce the message size of a mutually authenticated AKE compared to KEM-based approaches, which is particularly beneficial for constrained IoT deployments. In particular, the specification of a lightweight NIKE, such as CTIDH and MIKE, would allow, for example, the deployment of quantum-resistant LAKE in network environments with Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of up to 127 bytes (classes S1/S2 [3]). 2. The specification of more optimized KEMs, such as lattice-based KEMs (e.g., BAT and DAWN) would also reduce the message sizes, making quantum-resistant LAKE more efficiently deployable in these constrained settings. LAKE would be happy to provide further input on this topic and to evaluate candidate proposals from a performance point of view. Kind regards, Renzo Navas on behalf of the LAKE WG P.S.: I cross-post this to some WGs that might be interested in this information. [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-pqsuites/ <margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;> [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-lake-08-pq-edhoc-dt-summary-ietf126presentation-00 <margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;> [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-iotops-7228bis/ <margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;>
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
_______________________________________________ COSE mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
