Full disclosure, I haven't read the referenced papers yet.

That said, am I correctly understanding that you're proposing a two-phase KEX, 
starting with ECDH for efficient setup of the encryption key but ultimately 
using that with ML-KEM for the final encrypted communication?  If my 
understanding is correct, can you please summarize how your proposal avoids 
risk from that initial exchange being captured and the ECDH being successfully 
factored once a CRQC is available to do so?

If the HNDL+CRQC risk vector that ML-KEM is meant to fix relies upon the 
collection of initial key exchange packets and the subsequent successful 
factoring of values with a QC, my gut reaction is that any scheme which relies 
upon ECDH to exchange any of the values used for subsequent ML-KEM transactions 
will be subject to the same risks as simply using ECDH alone.  In other words, 
if I can capture and decipher the initial ECDH with my CRQC then I will also be 
capable of capturing the subsequent ML-KEM exchange that uses them.  In other 
word, the weakness of ECDH will entirely undermine the final use of ML-KEM.

Again, I haven't read the referenced papers and apologize to all if this 
combination has been covered in archived threads that I've overlooked.  If this 
two-part use has been proven, I guess I need to find the time to read up on how 
it's proven safe.  It just doesn't seem logical to me at first glance.

Bobby

From: 赵运磊 <[email protected]>
Date: Thursday, September 17, 2026 at 3:27 AM
To: Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <[email protected]>
Cc: 赵运磊 <[email protected]>; Renzo Navas 
<[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; lake <[email protected]>; 
[email protected] <[email protected]>; cose <[email protected]>; ace <[email protected]>
Subject: [Pqc] Re: [Lake] Re: [EXT] [COSE] Re: Request for standardized 
lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG)

This Message Is From an External Sender
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Dear Uri:
Thanks for kind references. We indeed didn’t know the related work, will make 
study  and provide feedback soon.

As a sidenote, AFS-KEX was indeed designed for identity hiding. Unlike ECDH 
where Initiator (Alice) and Responder (Bob) use the same group and generator, 
for ML-KEM Alice and Bot use independent public-key matrix generated from 
random seeds \rho_A and \rho_B respectively.  If \rho_A=\rho_B,then AFS-KEX 
already supports identity hiding.

For identity hiding of AFS-KEX based IKE, only \rho_A and \rho_B need to be 
encrypted with the encryption key $EK$.

Best regards
Yunlei




-----原始郵件-----
發件人: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <[email protected]>
發送時間: 2026-09-17 12:01:18 (星期四)
收件人: 赵运磊 <[email protected]>, "Renzo Navas" 
<[email protected]>
抄送: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>, lake <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" 
<[email protected]>, cose <[email protected]>, ace <[email protected]>
主題: [Lake] Re: [EXT] [COSE] Re: Request for standardized lightweight 
quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG)


Have you seen 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-uri-lake-pquake/<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-uri-lake-pquake/__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLok8hgKGI$>,
 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-uri-cfrg-pquake-00<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-uri-cfrg-pquake-00__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLor580r3H$>,
 and 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1749<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1749__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLovG4MrPi$>
 (first publication without formal proofs in 2023)?

Having said that — I support the approach (obviously 😉).

Thanks!
--
V/R,
Uri

From: 赵运磊 <[email protected]>
Date: Wednesday, September 16, 2026 at 23:46
To: Renzo Navas <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; lake <[email protected]>; [email protected] 
<[email protected]>; cose <[email protected]>; ace <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXT] [COSE] Re: [Lake] Request for standardized lightweight 
quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG)

This Message Is From an External Sender
This message came from outside the Laboratory.


Dear All:

I am Yunlei from Fudan university, Shanghai. I would draw your kind  attention 
on our recently published paper:Post-Quantum Internet Key Exchange via 
Authenticated Forward-Secure KEM (named AFS-KEX), which is available from: 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1581<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1581__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLotWWfuOg$>


In this work, we present a novel AKE construction from KEM without using 
signature: more compact, more efficient,  more secure against state exposure. 
We hope this work is applicable to LAKE and post-quantum IKE.


With a brief study, a suggested solution is as follows: First, using ECDH to 
setup communication encryption key $EK$, due to the MTU limitation of the first 
two rounds of IKE. Then, using $EK$ to protect the first two rounds of AFS-KEX. 
Compared to using ML-KEM and MS-DSA, this could reduce about 80% communication 
bandwidth.


Best regards

Yunlei


-----原始郵件-----
發件人: "Renzo Navas" <[email protected]>
發送時間: 2026-09-13 17:52:46 (星期日)
收件人: [email protected]
抄送: lake <[email protected]>, [email protected], cose <[email protected]>, ace 
<[email protected]>
主題: [Lake] Request for standardized lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange 
(on behalf LAKE WG)


Dear CFRG,

The LAKE working group is chartered to work on a lightweight mutually 
authenticated key exchange protocol targeting constrained network environments 
such as NB-IoT, 6TiSCH, LoRaWAN, IEEE 802.15.4, and BLE. The base LAKE/EDHOC 
protocol (RFC 9528) is now being updated for the post-quantum setting [1].

In March 2026, the LAKE working group formed a post-quantum Design Team (DT) 
scoped to evaluate the constrained network scenarios where a quantum-resistant 
variant of LAKE is realistically deployable. DT identified that the resulting 
large message sizes due to current PQC algorithms are not well suited for the 
most constrained IoT environments [2]. At the same time, constrained IoT 
systems also need to migrate to post-quantum cryptography.

LAKE kindly requests CFRG to consider research and specification of lightweight 
quantum-resistant key exchange algorithms.

1. As shown in the analysis [2], a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE)-based 
approach to quantum-resistant LAKE could reduce the message size of a mutually 
authenticated AKE compared to KEM-based approaches, which is particularly 
beneficial for constrained IoT deployments. In particular, the specification of 
a lightweight NIKE, such as CTIDH and MIKE, would allow, for example, the 
deployment of quantum-resistant LAKE in network environments with Maximum 
Transmission Unit (MTU) of up to 127 bytes (classes S1/S2 [3]).

2. The specification of more optimized KEMs, such as lattice-based KEMs (e.g., 
BAT and DAWN) would also reduce the message sizes, making quantum-resistant 
LAKE more efficiently deployable in these constrained settings.

LAKE would be happy to provide further input on this topic and to evaluate 
candidate proposals from a performance point of view.

Kind regards,

Renzo Navas on behalf of the LAKE WG

P.S.: I cross-post this to some WGs that might be interested in this 
information.

[1] 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-pqsuites/<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-pqsuites/__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLorinWV0f$>
[2] 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-lake-08-pq-edhoc-dt-summary-ietf126presentation-00<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-lake-08-pq-edhoc-dt-summary-ietf126presentation-00__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLotFFIyzJ$>
[3] 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-iotops-7228bis/<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-iotops-7228bis/__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLosi4nhfq$>

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