Dear Franco,
I think your analysis is exactly up to the point. I think the question
is not so much, if the CRM is interested in modelling such a thing,
obviously it is out of scope so far, but to understand the distinction
between human terms and the actual concepts they represent. Clearly,
the identification of the river with a human being is a metaphor,
which shows how far stretched such metaphors can be, but still be
operational if suitably interpreted, otherwise the Maori wouldn't have
won the case. That does not mean, that we should extend E39 Actor with
this river, nor that the Maori confuse rivers with human actors.
Therefore I do not see a need to change the scope note, even if it
were in scope. Rather, we have to do with another instance of an even
more abstract phenomenon, that might be very interesting to understand
some time.
For me, this is a didactic example not to be fooled by surface
language terms in ontological analysis. George Lakoff, in "Women, Fire
and Dangerous Things" describes this "prototype effect", i.e, how a
core metaphor, such as "human being", can be extended in different
ways, with NO COMMON CORE meaning.
The question is always which definition of the behaviour of instances
of some concept answers which question.
You write: "In any case it should be explained in the E40 scope note
e.g. that the person(s) having property rights on something may not be
an actor because may be incapacitated to be liable and thus, by
definition, cannot perform intentional actions. In this case, how do
we document ownership? And what is the (CRM) relationship of the
guardian to the ward? "
This touches a fundamental question of exception handling. Since these
persons are accidentally handicapped and not a systematic life form,
I'd argue that they fall under the "potentially capable of intentional
action", and hence are actors.
To be discussed, a very nice topic of logic versus reality, intension
versus potential.
All the best,
Martin
On 25/3/2017 1:37 μμ, Franco Niccolucci wrote:
Dear Oyvind
I was interested from the question raised by Athina as well, and
started writing a reply similar to yours, but there remained some
doubts, so I left it in my large drawer of open issues.
I understand you suggest (as I planned to do) to model the river as
an E40 Legal Body. i.e. a subclass of E39 Actor, which, according to
its scope note, "comprises people, either individually or in groups,
who have the potential to perform intentional actions of kinds for
which someone may be held responsible. The CRM does not attempt to
model the inadvertent actions of such actors.”
Now, although the statement by the NZ government quoted in the
article refers to the “liability” of the river, is there any
intentionality in e.g. a flood? Can the river be called in court for
the damages? I do not think so. In my opinion, but we should ask
Maoris, the river has rights but no intentionality. It is similar to
natural persons who are "unfit to plead", for example because of
mental insanity or for young age, and so cannot be held responsible
for their acts: they cannot have a “mens rea” (guilty mind).
This consideration applies to bad behaviour, but of course it
applies to good one as well: for them there is no merit or guilt in
doing things. Nevertheless, such people have rights: even animals
do. They can even hold “legal rights”, for example they may own
things, with guardian(s) to act as trustees on their behalf.
Obviously the river guardians have to do anything possible to avoid
disasters, but cannot be held responsible for acts of God. So, what
is the difference between them and a river authority? This deprives
the news of much of its appeal: a National Park has similar
“rights” although not defined as a person, which are managed by
its director, the government or whatever. The Maori river story
seems much more a political/philosophical question rather than a
legal one.
However the example, beyond the picturesque news, shows that either
there is a need of rephrasing the above-mentioned scope note; or
that the CRM is not interested in such situations (I would go for
the latter).
If so, who P75 possesses the E30 rights: the guardian, who may be
held responsible, or the rightful right owner, who cannot? The E40
scope note suggests it is the guardian, and probably the same holds
for the Maori river.
In any case it should be explained in the E40 scope note e.g. that
the person(s) having property rights on something may not be an
actor because may be incapacitated to be liable and thus, by
definition, cannot perform intentional actions. In this case, how do
we document ownership? And what is the (CRM) relationship of the
guardian to the ward?
In sum:
the river guardians -> E39 Actors
the river itself -> E?
the guardians towards the river -> P?
Best regards
Franco
Prof. Franco Niccolucci
Director, VAST-LAB
PIN - U. of Florence
Scientific Coordinator
ARIADNE - PARTHENOS
Piazza Ciardi 25
59100 Prato, Italy
Il giorno 25 mar 2017, alle ore 11:15, Øyvind Eide
<lis...@oeide.no> ha scritto:
Dear Athina,
I have not moved beyond the article (thanks for posting it, it is a
very useful addition to other complex land right issues!) but by
reading that it seems like the river has the right of a legal
person, not an individual. Is that right? If so, the river can be
seen as an organisation, in line with the (and connected to) a group
of people (the Whanganui iwi). Or it can be seen as an organisation
connected to the two guardians, who will speak on behalf of the
legal person (the river).
Can this be seen as similar to, for instance, a trust? Then a lawyer
appointed to speak on behalf of the trust would be in line with the
two guardians of the river.
All the best,
Øyvind
On 20 Mar 2017, at 12:57, athinak <athi...@ics.forth.gr> wrote:
Dear all,
relating to the rights triangle P75,P104, P105 we proposed, here is
an interesting case of right holding:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being
[1].
The approach of the tribe is unique: the river is granted legal
rights as human-being; can we apply this (rights possessed by
river?) in the model? is there a possibility to find an equivalence
between human's behavior and a behavior of a phenomenon and in what
way? is there a generalization missing?
think about this,
BRs
Athina Kritsotaki
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