At 3:43 AM -0400 10/29/99, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>On Fri, 29 Oct 1999, Dan Geer wrote:
>
>> Me, I'll use/buy the bloody best I
>> can, but I will rest vastly easier when even middling
>> encryption is a pervasive reality, i.e., when everybody's
>> mother is using 56 bits my 128 bit super-encryption will
>> be just as secure but much less likely to garner unwanted
>> attention from people I can never out spend.
>
>If, by the time everybody's mother is using crypto, we are
>still hitting a 56-bit barrier then not only will the "dark
>side" have won, they'll be in the process of making us
>look damn stupid.
Key lengths are perhaps the easiest parameter for a manufacturer to
change at a later date. Incorporating a useful and usable
cryptographic architecture is much harder. Apple deserves credit for
taking a serious stab at the later.
>Our goal: 256-bit crypto, worldwide, NOW!
Just having 256 bit keys does not mean that a program is secure.
There are many other vulnerabilities that have to be addressed. Also,
how many users are prepared to memorize and use a 256-bit strong
passphrase (e.g. 20 Diceware.com words)?
On the specific complaint that seems to have started this thread, the
lack of a wipe option in the file encryption, I would just like to
point out that wiping the original file when you encrypt it is
nowhere near enough. Many popular applications, such as MS Word,
create temp files all over the place. A better approach is to wipe
all disk free space regularly. This can be easily automated in the
MacOS using shareware utilities and Applescript.
Arnold Reinhold
Disclaimer: I own some Apple stock.
