Well, authentication is an important component of cryptographic protocols.
If one manages to plant doctored CA software and in this way obtain the CA's
private key, can do several unpleasant things: spoof SSL web servers, mount
man-in-the-middle attacks against authenticated DH key exchanges, etc. In
fact, Applied Cryptography warns against using untrusted implementations of
DSA due to the especially fat subliminal channel available in that protocol.
Enzo
----- Original Message -----
From: John Kelsey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Enzo Michelangeli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, December 02, 1999 8:05 AM
Subject: Re: 128-bit support
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
> At 07:35 PM 01-12-99 +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote:
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: David Honig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >To: Bill Stewart <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
> ><[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >Sent: Wednesday, December 01, 1999 5:40
> >Subject: Re: 128-bit support
>
> >Speaking about which: isn't Certification Authority software subject
> to EAR
> >export controls? I'm asking because Hongkong Post (the Hong Kong Post
> >Office) has announced that they will start to offer CA services
> (being in
> >fact the first legally recognized local CA), and will use a system
> provided
> >by HP. HP swears that there are no backdoors or covert channels to
> leak bits
> >of the CA's root key, and Hongkong Post believes them, but then I
> wonder how
> >they got an export license.
>
> Why would they need this? You don't have to leak key material in
> signature
> or authentication applications, only in encryption applications.
>
> >Cheers --
> >
> >Enzo
>
> - --John Kelsey, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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> --John Kelsey, Counterpane Internet Security, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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