> ----------
> From: Ray Hirschfeld[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Reply To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2000 1:18 AM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: Electronic elections.
>
> > Date: Mon, 29 May 2000 07:52:24 -0400
> > From: Dan Geer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> > There is no doubt whatsoever that the sanctity of a vote once
> > cast can be absolutely preserved as it is moved from your house
> > to the counting house. What cannot be done, now or ever, is to
> > ensure the sanctity of the voting booth anywhere but in a
> > physical and, yes, public location attended to by persons both
> > known to each other and drawn from those strata of society who
> > care enough to be present. There are no replacements for the
> > voting booth as a moment of privacy wrapped in inefficient but
> > proven isolation by unarguable witness, a place where we are
> > equal as in no other. Move the dispatch of a vote to a remote
> > browser and $100 bills, concurrent sex acts, a pistol to the head,
> > wife-beating or any other combination of bribes and coercion is
> > an undiscoverable concommitant of the otherwise "assured"
> > integrity of the so-called vote.
>
> There are a number of results in the crypto literature on receipt-free
> voting, most recently (that I'm aware of) one presented by Kazue Sako
> at last month's Eurocrypt 2000. Receipt-freeness means that voters
> cannot demonstrate to third parties how they voted, and thus addresses
> the bribery and coercion issue.
>
This is nonsense. If the person whose vote is being coerced has the
coercer looking over their shoulder as they cast it, no receipt is needed
to convince the coercer that their demand has been met.
If a receipt *is* created - allowing a voter to determine that their vote
was
recorded as being for a certain candidate - the coercer can use that to
ensure that their demands were followed.
[..]
> A completely different tack is to allow voters to cast as many ballots
> as they like and count only the last one. This effectively defends
> against buying and forcing of votes because the voter can always vote
> again. (I gather that corporate proxy voting works this way.)
>
This is more workable, as it increases the work factor for the coercer:
he/she/it has to ensure that the last vote cast was cast the way
demanded. I don't regard it as sufficient however - the greater
complexity opens the way for error.
> Although internet voting may be hunky-dory from a cryptographer's
> perspective, there are some cogent (both technical and political)
> arguments against its feasibility at this time. Cf. the report of
> California's task force at http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote.
>
I entirely agree. I don't truely trust voting machines either - I would like
to see all elections decided by paper ballots stuffed in a box, after being
marked in a way which is private, and publically observable to be private.
The ballots should be counted with representatives of all candidates
present.
Yes, this is more expensive, and slower. However, public confidence
in the fairness of elections is more than worthy of the expense. Dan is
write, and David is wrong.
Peter Trei
> Ray
>
