>First of all, that's not "privacy", that's "anonymity".
>
>We have voter registration precisely so that we know who the voters
>are! We are not changing voter registration....
>
> 4. Fail-safe privacy in universal verifiability. If the
> encrypted ballots are successfully attacked, even with
> court order, the voter’s name must not be revealed. In
On Keeping Votes Secret
If you give people a paper receipt with their votes on it
(as WAS's scheme mentions) then their votes can be bought or blackmailed.
Now, this may be an acceptable *tradeoff* (trust gained from paper trail
vs. increased succeptability to coercion), that's not for me to decide.
One potential solution is to make the 'receipts' readily forgable --something
anyone could print up at home, on ordinary commercial blank paper. Such
ready counterfeiting would deter vote buying and blackmail.
On Banning Video Cameras From Voting Places
The voting apparatus may keep a serial record of each vote, in order, for
auditing purposes. This is also mentioned in WAS's legislative text. Now,
if an evil vote buyer had someone recording who entered which booth
and also had access to the audit records, the correlation lets them
buy or blackmail votes. Note that this requires only *one* conspirator if
that conspirator is a poll worker with a concealed camera.
There should be little free-speech problem with this; political signs
are already banned within X feet of polling places.
David Honig
.......
"What company did you say you were from, Mr. Hewlett?"
---Walt Disney to Bill Hewlett eetimes 22.01.01 p 32
