James A. Donald wrote: > -- > "James A. Donald" >>> Let us imagine that SSH had certified keys. Well, >>> certifying a key is bound to be complicated, and >>> things are bound to go wrong, and the name that you >>> bind it to is bound to be somewhat shifty. > > Ben Laurie >> I don't see why that would happen all that much, > > It would happen at least as much as it happens with > https, and it happens enough with https that false > negatives enormously outweigh true negatives.
True, but I don't see false negatives very often with https at all. And I visit far more web sites than I log into machines with ssh. So, I'm not really buying this. > "James A. Donald" >>> So pretty soon users are frequently seeing error >>> dialogs - and so, pretty soon, are always clicking >>> through them. > > Ben Laurie >> Don't really buy this for what is, mostly, a protocol >> used by experts. > > An expert will reflexively click through a dialog that > is almost certainly a false negative. That's just not true. >> True names of hosts is not a deep problem. Indeed, it >> is even possible to discover rigorously > > but is the host with the true name the entity you have a > relationship with? > > My two most recent logins were with "First National Bank > of Omaha" and "Your IBM Savings plan" > > Is "firstnational.com" the same entity as "First > National Bank of Omaha"? Is > "https://lb22.resources.hewitt.com" the same entity as > "Your IBM Savings plan" You have logins at banks and IBM? -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/ ** ApacheCon - Dec 10-14th - San Diego - http://apachecon.com/ ** "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]