David Wagner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Jim Hughes writes: >> The IEEE P1619 standard group has dropped LRW mode. It has a vulnerability >> that that are collisions that will divulge the mixing key which will reduce >> the mode to ECB. > >Peter Gutmann asks: >> Is there any more information on this anywhere? I haven't been able to find >> anything in the P1619 archives (or at least not under an obvious heading). > >Alexander Klimov replies: >>Probably <http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/msg00962.html> > >Huh. Was that the reason? I suspect there may have been more to it than >that.
Actually there's a lot more to it than that, the original analysis was posted by Quantum crypto guy Matt Ball (that's the drive manufacturer Quantum, not quantum crypto) in late 2005: http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/msg00558.html with a followup in early 2006: http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/msg00588.html So it's not a case of "google is your friend", it's "'knowing which magic incantation to type into google to find what you're looking for' is your friend". Anyway, it's a pretty detailed analysis, well worth reading. Peter. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]