On Mon, Nov 4, 2013 at 1:40 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
> Sandy Harris <sandyinch...@gmail.com> writes:
>
>>Cited in a comment on Schneier's blog:
>>https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/nsa_eavesdroppi_2.html
>>
>>Register article with link to actual report:
>>http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/31/most_security_protocols_insecure_suggests_enisa/
>
> The original paper was written by some very smart cryptographers. And that's
> the problem, it was written by cryptographers, not security engineers. If I
> wanted to run crypto on a whiteboard, I'd definitely follow the
> recommendations in the paper. However, looking at systems deployed in
> practice... well, I'll refer people to the Crypto Gardening Guide and Planting
> Tips, http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/crypto_guide.txt, and in
> particular Questions I and J and the Final Thoughts.
>
> Beyond that, there are other problems with the recommendation. For example it
> strongly recommends DLP algorithms over RSA. DLP is great on a whiteboard but
> extremely brittle in practice, since the entire family has a distressing
> propensity to leak the private key if you get even the tiniest implementation
> detail wrong. Then it deprecates PKCS #1 v1.5 (which pretty much the entire
> planet uses) because it doesn't have a security proof, while recommending a
> bunch of exotic alternatives that more or less nothing uses.
>
> So what I'd be interested in seeing in response to this report is another one
> written by security engineers which makes recommendations on what's practical
> in real life rather than on a whiteboard. For example, we have several
> billion SSL/TLS apps deployed (every PC, laptop, tablet, and smartphone has
> one, not to mention any number of embdded devices, the figure "several
> billion" is not an exaggeration), how should we configure those to provide the
> best security possible?
Nist recently posted a raccomandation very recently (IN DRAFT)
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-52-rev1/draft_sp800_52_r1.pdf
>
> (NB: I am not volunteering to write this report :-).
>
> Peter.
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