Sounds excellent!

________________________________
From: Bruce Morton <bruce.mor...@entrust.com>
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2023 7:55:28 PM
To: cscwg-public@cabforum.org <cscwg-public@cabforum.org>; Tim Hollebeek 
<tim.holleb...@digicert.com>; Corey Bonnell <corey.bonn...@digicert.com>; 
Martijn Katerbarg <martijn.katerb...@sectigo.com>
Subject: RE: Ballot CSC-21: Signing Service Update


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Hi Martijn,



We discussed the Signing Service definitions and this is what is proposed, “An 
organization that generates the Key Pair and securely manages the Private Key 
associated with a Code Signing Certificate, on behalf of a Subscriber.”



Does this work for you?





Thanks, Bruce.



From: Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-boun...@cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Bruce 
Morton via Cscwg-public
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2023 4:49 PM
To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.holleb...@digicert.com>; Corey Bonnell 
<corey.bonn...@digicert.com>; cscwg-public@cabforum.org; Martijn Katerbarg 
<martijn.katerb...@sectigo.com>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Cscwg-public] Ballot CSC-21: Signing Service Update



So I think the allowance is that an entity which operates a CA can use the its 
Signing Service to generate the its Subscriber keys. Do we need to update the 
definition? Or put is an note? Or leave as is?



We might be over-churning on this definition. What if a third party operates a 
Signing Service and issues itself key for Code Signing certificates. Same 
problem.



I do think that a definition is a short-cut and not a requirement. Our 
intention of the BRs is to provide requirements for a Signing Service. The 
intention of the short-cut Signing Service definition was just to say that it 
is an organization which securely generates and manages the key pair on behalf 
of a Subscriber. An entity or organization can fill more than one role. As 
such, the original proposed definition might be OK.



Bruce.



From: Tim Hollebeek 
<tim.holleb...@digicert.com<mailto:tim.holleb...@digicert.com>>
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2023 3:45 PM
To: Corey Bonnell 
<corey.bonn...@digicert.com<mailto:corey.bonn...@digicert.com>>; 
cscwg-public@cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org>; Bruce Morton 
<bruce.mor...@entrust.com<mailto:bruce.mor...@entrust.com>>; Martijn Katerbarg 
<martijn.katerb...@sectigo.com<mailto:martijn.katerb...@sectigo.com>>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Ballot CSC-21: Signing Service Update



I think these are good clarifications.  I think it’s important to make sure the 
definition of Signing Service accurately encompasses the cases where a 
Subscriber is relying on the CA to provide key generation and protection, but 
doesn’t accidentally pull anything inappropriate else into scope.



If the definition and scope are not properly defined, it is almost inevitable 
that some existing or future requirement will have unexpected and damaging 
consequences.



-Tim



From: Cscwg-public 
<cscwg-public-boun...@cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public-boun...@cabforum.org>> 
On Behalf Of Corey Bonnell via Cscwg-public
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2023 12:34 PM
To: Bruce Morton <bruce.mor...@entrust.com<mailto:bruce.mor...@entrust.com>>; 
Martijn Katerbarg 
<martijn.katerb...@sectigo.com<mailto:martijn.katerb...@sectigo.com>>; 
cscwg-public@cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Ballot CSC-21: Signing Service Update



Hi Bruce,

I agree the current definition of Signing Service would encompass the CA’s own 
Subscriber keys. However, we are proposing to amend the definition to:



“An organization other than the Subscriber or any of its Affiliates, that 
generates the Key Pair and securely manages the Private Key associated with a 
Subscriber's Code Signing Certificate”. Under this definition, the CA’s own 
Signing Service would not qualify as a Signing Service for its own Subscriber 
key pairs.



Thanks,

Corey



From: Bruce Morton <bruce.mor...@entrust.com<mailto:bruce.mor...@entrust.com>>
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2023 3:27 PM
To: Corey Bonnell 
<corey.bonn...@digicert.com<mailto:corey.bonn...@digicert.com>>; Martijn 
Katerbarg 
<martijn.katerb...@sectigo.com<mailto:martijn.katerb...@sectigo.com>>; 
cscwg-public@cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org>
Subject: RE: Ballot CSC-21: Signing Service Update



Hi Corey,



Can you please elaborate why you have the concern?



My first take is an example where a Signing Service must use FIPS 140-2 Level 3 
and the Subscriber must use minimum Level 2. So if the Subscriber key was 
generated by the Signing Service, then Level 3 would apply. I don’t see a 
conflict as both requirements are met.



I guess I am not understanding why the Signing Service requirements would not 
apply even if the CA was using the Signing Service for its Subscriber’s keys.







Thanks, Bruce.



From: Corey Bonnell 
<corey.bonn...@digicert.com<mailto:corey.bonn...@digicert.com>>
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2023 3:06 PM
To: Martijn Katerbarg 
<martijn.katerb...@sectigo.com<mailto:martijn.katerb...@sectigo.com>>; 
cscwg-public@cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org>; Bruce Morton 
<bruce.mor...@entrust.com<mailto:bruce.mor...@entrust.com>>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Ballot CSC-21: Signing Service Update



In the case where the CA is generating its own Key Pairs to issue itself code 
signing certificates, their obligations for key protection would be outlined in 
the sections pertaining to Subscriber Key Pair protection, even if the Private 
Key so happens to reside in a Signing Service that they run. I think this is 
fine but want to ensure there’s agreement on this interpretation.



Thoughts?



Thanks,

Corey

From: Cscwg-public 
<cscwg-public-boun...@cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public-boun...@cabforum.org>> 
On Behalf Of Martijn Katerbarg via Cscwg-public
Sent: Friday, October 13, 2023 9:17 AM
To: Bruce Morton <bruce.mor...@entrust.com<mailto:bruce.mor...@entrust.com>>; 
cscwg-public@cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [Cscwg-public] Ballot CSC-21: Signing Service Update



Hi Bruce,



I have a concern with the “Signing Service” definition:

“**Signing Service**: An organization that generates the Key Pair and securely 
manages the Private Key associated with a Subscriber's Code Signing 
Certificate.”



For subscribers that generate their own private keys and use these for signing 
(i.e., they manage them) I’m inclined to say that this would define them as a 
Signing Service.



Should we reword this to “An organization other than the Subscriber or any of 
its Affiliates, that generates the Key Pair and securely manages the Private 
Key associated with a Subscriber's Code Signing Certificate”?



Regards,

Martijn





From: Cscwg-public 
<cscwg-public-boun...@cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public-boun...@cabforum.org>> 
on behalf of Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public 
<cscwg-public@cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org>>
Date: Thursday, 12 October 2023 at 21:59
To: cscwg-public@cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org> 
<cscwg-public@cabforum.org<mailto:cscwg-public@cabforum.org>>
Subject: [Cscwg-public] Ballot CSC-21: Signing Service Update

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Purpose of the Ballot

This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management 
of Publicly�\Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 3.4 in order to clarify 
language regarding Signing Service and signing requests. The main goals of this 
ballot are to:

  1.  Clarify the Signing Service definition and the expected deployment model.
  2.  Remove requirements for signing request.
  3.  Change text so Signing Service is not categorized as a Delegated Third 
Party.
  4.  Not allow Signing Service to transport Private Key to Subscriber.
  5.  Ensure Network Security Requirements are applicable to Signing Service.
  6.  State audit requirements for Signing Service.

The following motion has been proposed by Bruce Morton of Entrust and endorsed 
by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and Ian McMillan.



MOTION BEGINS



This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management 
of Publicly�\Trusted Code Signing Certificates” ("Code Signing Baseline 
Requirements") based on version 3.4. MODIFY the Code Signing Baseline 
Requirements as specified in the following redline: 
https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/93ee9976cdc4e1104952146e3556800459694874..701d195fa95fe49e8a02435fc40fb0a018686866<https://url.avanan.click/v2/___https:/urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/93ee9976cdc4e1104952146e3556800459694874..701d195fa95fe49e8a02435fc40fb0a018686866__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!ai_SiHTiSodTE_VWwZi8Z8QT_M2lCkP6nJYlFupqIB2vMo07Rcbx2E0bKw4GyZ1-pOj0h-PvD9Z5okpQ_IY$___.YXAzOmRpZ2ljZXJ0OmE6bzpiZjFlN2QwMWExMzg3MTlkZjRjMGM1ZTcyOGQwMzk5Nzo2Ojk3ZGE6MjI3ZTJmZTM1NjM2OTBlOGU0ZDIyMzAwZDYyNTc0YjY4NzM0OTEzM2FiZWU0ZDhhMTNhMDMxNmI4ZDBlMDA2MjpoOkY>



MOTION ENDS

The procedure for this ballot is as follows: Discussion (7 days)



・                 Start Time: 2023-10-12 20:00 UTC

・                 End Time: Not before 2023-10-19 20:00 UTC



Vote for approval (7 days)



・                 Start Time: TBD

・                 End Time: TBD

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