-Caveat Lector-
from:
http://ddi.digital.net/~kenaston/Patr/Traffic.html
<A HREF="http://ddi.digital.net/~kenaston/Patr/Traffic.html">Traffic in
Florida
</A>
--[1]--
>From Walter's Web World at ddi.digital.net/~kenaston.
Traffic in Florida
Compiled, with comments, by Walter Bunn Kenaston;
Made possible only with the help of IAUE Aleim (the Lord God).
This information is provided for educational purposes that the people of
Florida
might understand how they have been deceived and that they may learn how
to
start to reclaim their God given rights.
Permission is granted to reproduce and distribute as is, without
changes, and
only without charge except for the reasonable costs of reproduction.
Not completed, last update: 16 April, 1999
The following information on traffic laws in Florida was compiled using
the Florida Statutes (F.S.); Laws of Florida; Florida Juris Prudence 2nd
(Fla. Jur. 2d) articles "Automobiles and Other Vehicles", "Decedents'
Property", "Courts and Judges", "Highways, etc.", and "Statutes";
Florida Words and Phrases; Florida Law and Practice; Black Law
Dictionary, 3rd Edition (1933); Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition
(1950/1957); Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition (1990/11th
reprint,1997); and other materials noted where applicable. But three
different versions of Florida Juris Prudence 2nd were used so the cites
to those may not match the edition available to everyone; in that event
use the case index to find the Fla Jur 2d section.
Though much of this information focuses on Florida, most information and
case cites are applicable in every state.
I have tried to give direct quotes where applicable; such quotes are
"quoted" with the case cite following (in parentheses), with the source
where I found the information/quote/cite following [in brackets]. Since
most of the information has been the result of my research, I can vouch
for the accuracy of the most material - with possibly some typographical
errors; but some material has been taken from internet sources which I
cannot vouch for - these I have preceeded with an asterisk ("*"). This
compilation is also not properly organized nor complete: I make notes
using two asterisks ("**") to mark areas that need further
research/attention.
Definitions:
Applicant - Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (1983)
one who applies or makes application, as for employment, help, etc.; a
petitioner; as, an applicant for charity
Applicant - Webster's Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia, International
Illustrated Edition (1960)
One who applies.
Applicant - not defined in Bouvier's (1856)
Applicant - Black's 3rd
An applicant, as of letters of administration, is one who is entitled
thereto, and who files a petition asking that letters be granted.
Jerauld v. Chambers, 44 Cal. App. 771, 187 P. 33
Applicant - Black's 6th
An applicant, as of letters of administration, is one who is entitled
thereto, and who files a petition asking that letters be granted. For
purposes of letters of credit, the customer in the credit transaction.
Synonymous also with "account party."
Automobile - Webster's Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia,
International Illustrated Edition (1960)
A vehicle moved by power produced within it, and not limited to
operation on rails; a motor car.
Automobile, a vehicle propelled by an engine within itself or by any
other means of power in itself. It was formerly called horseless
carriage. ***
Automobile - Black's 3rd
A vehicle for the transportation of persons or property on the highways;
carrying its own motive power and not operated upon fixed tracks.
Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, vol. 1, c. 1, sec. 1.
A wheeled vehicle propelled by gasoline, steam, or electricity. Stanlet
v. Tomlin, 143 Va. 187, 129 S.E. 205, 208. A self-propelled vehicle
suitable for use on a street or roadway. State v. Freels, 136 Tenn. 483,
160 S.W. 454; American-La France Fire Engine Co. v. Riordan (D.C.) 294
F. 567, 571. A vehicle designed mainly for the transportation of
persons, equipped with an internal combustion, hydrocarbon vapor engine
furnishing the motive power and forming a structural portion thereof.
American-La France Fire Engine Co. v. Riordan (C.C.A.) 6 F.(2d) 964,
967.
Etymologically, the term might include any self-propelled vehicle, as an
electric street car, or a motor-boat, but in popular and legal usage it
is confined to a vehicle for the transportation or persons or property
on terrestrial highways, carrying its own motive power and not operated
upon fixed tracks. Bethlehem Motors Corporation v. Flynt, 178 N.C. 399,
100 S.E. 693, 694.
The term "automobile" is often defined to be synonymous with "motor
vehicle." State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus Co., 99 Wash. 64, 168 P. 893,
894.
Chauffeur - Compiled General Laws of Florida, s. 1280 (1927)
"Chauffeur" shall include any person operating any motor vehicle as an
employee of the owner thereof: Provided, the term "chauffeur" shall not
apply to a person using a motor driven vehicle as an incident to their
employment in some other capacity.
Chauffeur - Laws of Florida, c. 20451, s. 13 (g) (1941)
Every person who is employed for the principle purpose of operating a
motor vehicle, and every person who drives a motor vehicle when in use
as a public or common carrier of persons or property.
Chauffeur - F.S. 322.01(7) (1951)
Every person who is employed for the principle purpose of operating a
motor vehicle, and every person who drives a motor vehicle when in use
as a public or common carrier of persons or property.
Chauffeur - F.S. 322.01(7) (1961)
Any person who operates a motor truck or truck tractor with a gross
weight in excess of eight thousand pounds or width in excess of eighty
inches, except the registered owner of any motor truck or truck tractor
shall be exempted when transporting his own products. Any person who
operates any motor vehicle transporting passengers for hire, or operates
a bus transporting school children shall be required to hold a
chauffeur's license.
Commerce - 49 U.S.C. 5102(1)
"commerce" means trade or transportation in the jurisdiction of the
United States -
(A) between a place in a State and a place outside of the State; or
(B) that affects trade or transportation between a place in a State and
a place outside of the State.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Driver - Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (1983)
1. one who or that which drives. 2. One who drives an automobile, horse,
locomotive, etc. * * *
Driver - Webster's Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia, International
Illustrated Edition (1960)
One that drives; a chauffeur, coachmanm or the like; a mechanism for
imparting motion to other pieces of a machine; mallet or heavy hammer;
in golf, a wooden club used in driving from the tee.
Driver - Bouvier's (1856)
One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle,
with horses, mules, or other animals.
2. Frequent accidents occur in consequence of the neglect or want of
skill of drivers of public stage coaches, for which the employers are
responsible.
3. The law requires that a driver should possess reasonable skill and be
of good habits for the journey; if, therefore, he is not acquainted with
the road he undertakes to drive; 3 Bingh. Rep. 314, 321; drives with
reins so loose that he cannot govern his horses; 2 Esp. R. 533; does not
give notice of any serious danger on the road; 1 Camp. R. 67; takes the
wrong side of the road; 4 Esp. R. 273; incautiously comes in collision
with another carriage; 1 Stark. R. 423; 1 Campb. R. 167; or does not
exercise a sound and reasonable discretion in travelling on the road, to
avoid dangers and difficulties, and any accident happens by which any
passenger is injured, both the driver and his employers will be
responsible. 2 Stark. R. 37; 3 Engl. C. L. Rep. 233; 2 Esp. R. 533; 11.
Mass. 57; 6 T. R. 659; 1 East, R. 106; 4 B. & A. 590; 6 Eng. C. L. R.
528; 2 Mc Lean, R. 157. Vide Common carriers Negligence; Quasi Offence.
Driver - Black's 3rd
One employed in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon, or
other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle,
tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car. See Davis v.
Petrinovich, 112 Ala. 654, 21 So. 344, 36 L.R.A. 615; Isaacs v. Railroad
Co., 7 Am. Rep. 418, 47 N.Y. 122.
Driver - Black's 4th
One employed in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon, or
other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle,
tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car. A person
actually doing driving, whether employed by owner to drive or driving
his own vehicle. (Wallace v. Woods 340 Mo. 452, 102 S.W.2d 91,97)
Driver - Black's 6th
A person actually doing driving, whether employed by owner to drive or
driving his own vehicle.
Driver - F.S. 316.003(10)
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle on a
highway or who is exercising control of a vehicle or steering a vehicle
being towed by a motor vehicle.
Driver - Florida Words & Phrases
See Davis v. Petrinovich, 21 So. 344
"For hire" - Compiled General Laws of Florida, s. 1280 (1927)
"For hire" as defined in this Chapter shall include all motor driven
vehicles, or trailers hauled by a motor vehicle, in use for transporting
persons, commodities or materials for compensation, or such motor
vehicles as may be let or rented to another for consideration: Provided,
that motor vehicles temporarily used by farmers for the transportation
of agricultural or horticultural products from farms or grove to packing
houses or to points of shipment by transportation companies shall not be
held to be operating for hire: Provided, further, that motor vehicles
used for transporting school children to and from school under contract
with school officials shall not be deemed to be in use for hire.
"For hire" - Laws of Florida, c. 25418, s. 1(9)
"For Hire" means any auto transportation company engaged in the
transportation of persons or property over the public highways of this
state for compensation, which is not a common carrier or contract
carrier but transports such persons or property in single, casual and
non recurring trips. "For hire" carriage shall not be deemed to include
charter carriage as herein defined and no "for hire" carriage of
passengers shall be authorized by any permit as herein defined and
issued by the Commission under the provisions of this chapter in motor
vehicles of a greater passenger-carrying capacity than seven, including
the driver or chauffeur.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Infraction - F.S. 318.13(3)
"Infraction" means a noncriminal violation which is not punishable by
incarceration and for which there is no right to trial by jury or a
right to court appointed counsel.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motor vehicle - Laws of Florida c. 14764 (1931)
The term "motor vehicle" shall include all vehicles or machines
propelled by any power other than muscular used upon the public highways
(but not over fixed rails) for the transportation of persons or property
for compensation either as common carriers, private contract carriers or
for hire carriers.
Motor vehicle - Laws of Florida c. 20451 (1941)
Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is
propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but
not operated upon rails. [See definition of "vehicle" for c. 20451.]
Motor vehicle - F.S.316.003(21)
Any self-propelled vehicle not operated upon rails or guideway, but not
including any bicycle or moped. [See definition of "vehicle" for F.S.
316.]
Motor vehicle - F.S. 320.01(a)
An automobile, motorcycle, truck, trailer, semi-trailer, truck tractor
and semitrailer combination, or any other vehicle operated on the roads
of this state, used to transport persons or property, and propelled by
power other than muscular, but the term does not include traction
engines, road rollers, such vehicles as run only upon a track, bicycles,
or mopeds.
Motor vehicle - F.S. 322.01(26)
"Motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle, including a motor
vehicle combination, not operated upon rails or guideway, excluding
vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, and
motorized bicycles as defined in 316.003. [See definition of "vehicle"
for F.S. 322.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger - Black's 3rd
A person whom a common carrier has contracted to carry from one place to
another, and has, in the course of the performance of that contract,
received under his care either upon the means of conveyance, or at the
point of departure of that means of conveyance. (Cites omitted.)
The above definition is not exhaustive. For one who goes to a railroad
station to take the next train in a reasonable time before the time for
the arrival of the train is a passenger, though he has not purchased a
ticket, and the duties imposed by the relation of carrier and passenger
are obligatory on the railroad. (Cites omitted.)
And a child about nine months old, who accompanies her mother, who is a
passenger, is a passenger, though riding free. (Cites omitted.)
Railway mail clerks, required by Rev. St. U. U. § 4000 to be carried by
railroad without compensation, held to be "passengers." (Cites omitted.)
When a person ceases to be a passenger depends upon the particular facts
of each case. (Cites omitted.)
Passenger - Black's 6th
In general, a person who gives compensation to another for
transportation. Shapiro v. Bookspan, 155 Cal.App.2d 353, 318 P.2d 123,
126. The word passenger has however various meanings, depending upon the
circumstances under which and in the context in which the word is used;
sometimes it is construed in a restricted legal sense as refering to one
who is being carried by another for hire; on other occasions, the word
is interpreted as meaning any occupant of a vehicle other than the
person operating it. American Mercury Ins. Co. v. Bifulco, 74 N.J.Super.
191, 181 A.2d 20, 22.
The essential elements of "passenger" as opposed to "guest" under guest
statute are that the driver must receive some benefit sufficiently real,
tangible, and substancial to serve as the inducing cause of the
transportation so as to completely overshadow mere hospitality or
friendship; it may be easier to find compensation where the trip has
commercial or business flavor. Friedhoff v. Engburg, 82 S.D. 522, 149
N.W.2d 759, 761, 762, 763.
A person whom a common carrier has contracted to carry from one place to
another, and has, in the course of the performance of that contract,
received under his care either upon means of conveyance, or at the point
of departure of that means of conveyance.
Straight truck - F.S. 316.003 (70)
Any truck on which the cargo unit and motive power unit are located on
the same frame so as to form a single, rigid unit.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Traffic - Webster's Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia, International
Illustrated Edition (1960)
1. Business or trade, commerce. 2. Transportation. 3. The movement of
vehicles on street or highway, as, the traffic is very heavy today.
Traffic - Bouvier's (1856)
Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money and the
like.
Traffic - Black's 3rd
Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, and the
like. The passing of goods or commodities from one person to another for
an equivalent in goods or money. Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St. 673,
11 N.E. 321; People v. Horan, 293 Ill. 314, 127 N.E. 673, 674; People v.
Dunford, 207 N.Y. 17, 100 N.E. 433, 434; Fine v. Morgan, 74 Fla. 417, 77
So. 533, 538; Bruno v. U. S. (C.C.A.) 289 F. 649, 655.
Traffic includes the ordinary uses of the streets and highways by
travelers. Stewart v. Hugh Nawn Contracting Co., 223 Mass. 525, 112 N.E.
218, 219; Withey v. Fowler Co., 164 Iowa, 377, 145 N.W. 923, 927.
Traffic - Black's 4th
Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, and the
like. The passing of goods or commodities from one person to another for
an equivalent in goods or money. Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St. 673,
11 N.E. 321; Fine v. Morgan, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533, 538; Bruno v. U.
S. C.C.A.Mass., 289 F. 649, 655; Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. v.
Schwer, 36 Ohio App. 512, 173 N.E. 633. The subjects of transportation
on a route, as persons or goods; the passing to and fro of persons,
animals, vehicles, or vessels, along a route of transportation, as along
a street, canal, etc. United States v. Golden Gate Bridge and Highway
Dist. Of California, D.C.Cal., 37 F. Supp. 505, 512.
Traffic -Black's 6th
Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, and the
like. The passing or exchange of goods or commodities from one person to
another for an equivalent in goods and money. The subjects of
transportation on a route, as persons or goods; the passing to and fro
of persons, animals, vegetables, or vessels, along a route of
transportation, as along a street, highway, etc.
Traffic - Florida Words & Phrases
(See Fine v. Moran, 77 So. 533, 538)
The word "traffic" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary
as follows: "To pass goods and commodities from one person to another
for an equivalent in goods or money; to buy or sell goods; to barter;
trade." The subjects of manufacturing; producing; storing; selling, and
handling any commodity are matters properly connected with the subject
or traffic or trade in that commodity.
Traffic ordinance - Florida Words & Phrases
See State ex rel. Szodomka v. Gruber et al., 10 So.2d 899, 901
Traffic regulations - Black's 6th
Prescribed rules of conduct to promote the orderly and safe flow of
traffic.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transportation - Webster's Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia,
International Illustrated Edition (1960)
1. The act or business of moving passengers and goods. 2. The means of
conveyance used. 3. Banishment, esp. of convicts to a penal colony.
Transportation - Bouvier's (1856)
punishment. In the English law, this punishment is inflicted by virtue
of sundry statutes; it was unknown to the common law. 2 H. Bl. 223. It
is a part of the judgment or sentence of the court, that the party shall
be transported or sent into exile. 1 Ch. Cr. Law, 789 to 796: Princ. of
Pen. Law, c. 42.
Transportation - Black's 3rd
The removal of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier.
See Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 133, 22 L.Ed. 827; Interstate
Commerce Com'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 Sup.Ct. 1125, 38 L.Ed. 1047;
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 5 Sup.Ct. 826, 29
L.Ed. 158.
Under Interstate Commerce Act, (49 USCA sec. 1 et seq.),
"transportation" includes the entire body of services rendered by a
carrier in connection with the receipt, handling, and delivery of
property transported, and includes the furnishing of cars. Pletcher v.
Chicago, R. L. & P. Ry. Co., 103 Kan. 834, 177 P. 1, 2.
In a general sense transportation means merely conveyance from one place
to another. People v. Martin, 235 Mich. 206, 209 N.W. 87.
In Criminal Law
A species of punishment consisting in removing the criminal from his own
country to another, (usually a penal colony), there to remain in exile
for a prescribed period. Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U.S. 698, 13
Sup.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905.
Transportation - Black's 4th
The removal of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier.
Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 133, 22 L.Ed. 827; Interstate Commerce
Com'n v. Brimson, 14 S.Ct. 1125, 154 U.S. 447, 38 L.Ed. 1047; Gloucester
Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 5 S.Ct. 826, 114 U.S. 196, 29 L.Ed. 158.
Transportation - Black's 6th
The movement of goods or persons from one place to another, by a
carrier.
Transportation - 49 U.S.C. § 5102(12)
"transports" or "transportation" means the movement of property and
loading, unloading, or storage incidental to the movement.
Transportation - Words and Phrases
See State v. Western Trans Co. (1950, Iowa) 43 N.W.2d 739 [The judge,
after giving his conclusion, goes on to give examples of
"transportation" - all involving the movement of persons or goods for
hire.]
Traveler - Blacks 3rd
One who passes from place to place, whether for pleasure, instruction,
business or health. Lockett v. State, 47 Ala. 45; 10 C.B.N.S. 429. The
term is used to designate those who patronize inns; the distance which
they travel is not material. Walling v. Potter, 35 Con. 185.
Traveler - Blacks 6th
One who passes from place to place, whether for pleasure, instruction,
business or health.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle - Laws of Florida c. 20451 (1941)
Every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a public highway, excepting devices moved by
human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
Vehicle - F.S. 316.003(75)
Every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively
upon stationary rails or tracks.
Vehicle - F.S. 322.01(42)
"Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway or operated
upon rails or guideway, except a bicycle, motorized wheelchair, or
motorized bicycle.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes on Laws & Amending
"Each law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and
matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly
expressed in the title; and no law shall be amended or revised by
reference to its title only; but in such case the act, as revised, or
section, as amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length."
(Florida Constitution, Art. 3, s. 16) [Fine v. Moran, 77 So. 533, 538]
This constitutional provision "was designed to prevent the surprise or
fraud on the legislators and on the people that might result from
provisions hidden in the body of the statute and not indicated by its
title. * * * Thus, where provisions in a statute constitute a broader or
essentially different subject that is not properly connected with the
stated subject of the act, such provisions are inoperative as violative
of the constitution." (Fla. Jur. 2d, Statutes, s. 62)
"The constitutional provision that statutes must embrace a single
subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject must be
expressed in the title, applies to * * * all forms of legislative
enactment". (Fla. Jur. 2d, Statutes, s. 65)
"Two subjects of legislation cannot be germane where it is necessary to
change the meaning of words to place them in the same class or category,
and where provisions applicable to the one are incongruous when applied
to the other." (Beary v. Narrau, 37 So. 961, 962)
"But such amendment should be limited in its scope to the subject-matter
of the section proposed to be amended. "In such case the introduction of
any new substantive matter not germane or pertinent to that contained in
the original sections cannot be regarded as an amendment thereto, but
must be regarded as independent legislation upon a matter not expressed
in the title of the act, and therefore void. The amendment of an act in
general, or a particular section of an act, ex vi termini implies merely
a change of its provisions upon the same subject to which the act or
section relates." State v. Sugar Refining Co., 106 La. 565, 31 South.
181." (Beary v. Narrau, supra.)
"If, in legislating to amend sections expressed in the title, the
lawmakers cannot alter the subject-matter of other sections not
expressed therein, for a stronger reason they cannot ingraft in the
sections to be amended provisos on a subject-matter not embraced in any
section of the prior act." (Beary v. Narrau, supra.)
"Where a court is confronted with a statute, a literal construction of
which would render it unconstitutional, the court must adopt such a
construction, when reasonably possible, as will save the statute and at
the same time save every savable provision or term in it." (Teche Lines,
Inc. v. Danforth et al., 12 So. 2d 784, hn. 5)
"Where the words used have a definite and precise meaning, the courts
have no power to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to
restrict or extend the meaning. Black on Interpretation of Laws, 37.
Courts cannot correct supposed errors, omissions, or defects in
legislation. 'The object of interpretation is to bring sense out of the
words used, and not to bring a sense into them.' Black on Interpretation
of Laws, supra." (Fine v. Moran, supra, 536)
"All laws should receive a sensible application. It will always,
therefore, be presumed that the Legislature intended exceptions to its
language, which would avoid results of this character [technical
violation]. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its
letter. * * * It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." (Teche Lines, Inc.
v. Danforth et al., 12 So.2d 784, 786, quoting Boyd v. Coleman, 146
Miss. 449, 111 So. 600)
Titles of laws cannot be "so worded as to mislead an ordinary mind as to
the real purpose and scope of the enactment." (Butler v. Perry, 66 So.
150, 240 US 328)
"The test of whether a title misleads is whether it would deceive the
mind of an ordinary person used to the common meaning of language, not
the mind of a precisionist used to technical refinements of terms. (Ison
v. Zimmerman, 372 So. 2d 431)" [Fla. Jur. 2d, Statutes, s. 63]
The Right to Travel on Public Highways
The right of a citizen to use the highways, including the streets of the
city or town, for travel and to transport his goods, is an inherent
right which cannot be taken from him. Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Ward,
137 So. 163 [Fla Jur 2d, Highways, s. 121]
"The right of a citizen to travel on public highway is a common right
which he has under his right to enjoy "life, liberty, and pursuit of
happiness", and the right to "travel", which means the right to go from
one place to another, includes the right to start, to go forward on the
way, and to stop when the traveler's destination has been reached, and
also the right to stop on the way, temporarily, for a legitimate or
necessary purpose when that purpose is an immediate incident to travel."
(Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth et al., 12 So. 2d 784, hn. 3)
"The right of the citizen to use the highways, including the streets of
the city or town, for travel and to transport his goods, is an inherent
right which cannot be taken from him, but it is subject to reasonable
regulations in the interest of the public good. In degree this right of
the citizen is superior to that of the common carrier by motorbus, dray,
coach, taxi, or other device, the latter being controlled by legislative
grant, or franchise which may be regulated or denied, and may be given
to some and denied to others." Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Ward, 137
So. 163, hn. 7
"The constitutional right of citizen to travel on public highways may be
reasonably regulated by legislative acts in pursuance of police power of
state, but the police power cannot justify the enactment of any statute
which amounts to an arbitrary and unwarranted interference with or
unreasonable restriction on those rights of citizens which are
fundamental." (Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth et al., 12 So. 2d 784, hn.
4)
"Statutes regulatory of highway traffic must have a practical or
workable interpretation and not an arbitrary or unreasonable
construction." (Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth et al., 12 So. 2d 784, hn.
1)
*"The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is
not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the public
and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived." Chicago Motor Coach v.
Chicago, 169 NE 221.
*"The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is
not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a
common law right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness." Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579.
*"The right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment." Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116, 125.
*"The right to travel is a well-established common right that does not
owe its existence to the federal government. It is recognized by the
courts as a natural right." Schactman v. Dulles 96 App DC 287, 225 F2d
938, at 941.
*"The state cannot diminish rights of the people." Hertado v.
California, 110 US 516*"Statutes that violate the plain and obvious
principles of common right and common reason are null and void." Bennett
v. Boggs, 1 Baldw 60
*"The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is
not to be defeated under the name of local practice." Davis v. Wechsler,
263 US 22, at 24
*"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no
rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 US 436, 491.
*"The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted
into a crime." Miller v. US, 230 F 486, at 489.
*"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this
exercise of constitutional rights." Sherer v. Cullen, 481 F 946
*"The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted
into a crime." Miller v. US, 230 F 486, 489.
"The power of the sovereign over the streets of a city is limited. He
cannot alien them or deprive the inhabitants of their use, because such
use is essential to the enjoyment of urban property." New Orleans v
United States, 10 Pet 662, 9 L Ed 573. [8 U.S.Dig., Highways § 8.]
Any temporary use of a highway or street that is rendered absolutely
necessary from the necessities of trade or erection of buildings, that
does not unnecessarily or unreasonably obstruct the same, is lawful.
Indiana R. Co. v. Calvert, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 780, 168 Ind. 321, 80 N. E.
961. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 64.)
The streets and highways belong to the public. Hadfield v. Lundin,
L.R.A.1918B, 909, 98 Wash. 657, 168 Pac. 516. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918,
Highways and Streets, 65.)
The title to the streets being in the city as trustee for the public, no
grant or permission can be legally given which will interfere with their
public use. The right of the public to the use of the streets is
absolute and paramount to any other. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. New
York, L.R.A. 1915F, 1009, 210 N. Y. 34, 103 N. E. 768. (L.R.A. Digest
1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 65.)
The citizens of a municipality have the right to the reasonable use of
the streets not only on the surface but above the surface. Temple v.
McComb City Electric Light & P. Co., 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 449, 89 Miss. 1,
42 So. 874. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 65.)
The dedication of land for a street creates an easement which allows the
municipality to make any legitimate public use of it which does not
impair the right of passage or the right of ingress and egress to and
from the adjoining property. Hobbs v. Long Distance Teleph. & Teleg.
Co., 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 87, 147 Ala. 393, 41 So. 1003. (L.R.A. Digest
1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 65.)
The ownership by a city of the fee of land in the street is impressed
with a trust for the benefit of the whole people of the state, to keep
them open for use as such. New York v. Rice, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 375, 198
N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets,
65.)
A municipality holds its streets and its power to regulate and control
them in trust for the public, and cannot put them to any use
inconsistent with street purposes. McIllhinny v. Trenton, 10 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 623, 148 Mich. 380, 111 N. W. 1083. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918,
Highways and Streets, 65.)
A traveler lawfully using a public highway has the same rights to enjoy
such use undisturbed as if he were the owner in fee simple. Smethurst v.
Independent Cong. Church, 2 L.R.A. 695, 148 Mass. 261, 19 N. E. 387.
(L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 65.)
Any and all of the public have an equal right to the reasonable use of a
highway. Harold v. Jones, 3 L.R.A. 406, 86 Ala. 274, 5 So. 438. (L.R.A.
Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 66.)
Public streets are for the use and benefit of all and no one has any
exclusive right to privileges therein. Theobold v. Louisville, N. O. &
T. R. Co., 4 L.R.A. 735, 66 Miss. 279, 6 So. 230. (L.R.A. Digest
1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 66.)
The right of parties upon the public ways and streets is a public right
in which the whole community have an equal interest, with an equal right
to complain of any infringement upon any such rights. Charlotte v.
Pembroke Iron Works, 8 L.R.A. 828, 82 Me. 391, 19 Atl. 902. (L.R.A.
Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 66.)
All members of the general public without regard to the place or
position they occupy or the business they are engaged in, are entitled
to the equal use and enjoyment of the public streets and places.
Louiville R. Co. v. Louiville F. & Life Protective Asso. 43 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 600, 151 Ky. 644, 152 S. W. 799. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918,
Highways and Streets, 66.)
Highways are constructed and maintained at public expense, for public
use by all persons alike, without limitation or restriction, save only
that the use must conform to the well-established rules and regulations
prescribed by law. Deputy v. Kimmell, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 989, 73 W. Va.
595, 80 S. E. 919. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 66.)
Every person whether an owner of the land or not, whether a citizen or
stranger, has the right in common with the rest of the public, to travel
all of the public highways. Hyde v. Minnesota, D. & P. R. Co., 40 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 48, 29 S. D. 220, 136 N. W. 92. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918,
Highways and Streets, 66.)
All persons have equal right to use the public streets and highways for
purposes of travel by proper means, with due regard to the corresponding
rights of others. Butler v. Cabe, L.R.A.1915C, 702, 116 Ark. 26, 171 S.
W. 1190. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 66.)
Every citizen has a right to use public highways. Swift v. Topeka, 8
L.R.A. 772, 43 Kan. 671, 23 Pac. 1075. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918,
Highways and Streets, 66.)
The premanent use of a public street for a private purpose cannot be
authorized by a city. Hibbard S. B. & Co. v. Chicago, 40 L.R.A. 621, 173
Ill. 91, 50 N. E. 256. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets,
66.)
No individual or corporation can acquire any portion of a public street,
for exclusive private use, to the exclusion of the public. Hibbard S. B.
& Co. v. Chicago, 40 L.R.A. 621, 173 Ill. 91, 50 N. E. 256. (L.R.A.
Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 66.)
A public street in a city is a public highway and its uses belong to the
public generally and it cannot be said that such uses are limited to the
municipality or to its citizens alone. Alabama Western R. Co. v. State
ex rel. Garber, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1173, 155 Ala. 491, 46 So. 468. (L.R.A.
Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 66.)
The right of the public to use a street for purposes of travel extends
to the portion set apart or used for sidewalks, as well as to the way
for carriages, and, in short, to the entire width of the street upon
which the land of the lot owner abuts. Chase v. Oshkosh, 15 L.R.A. 553,
81 Wis. 313, 51 N. W. 560. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and
Streets, 67.)
The public is entitled to the free and unobstructed use of the entire
street and sidewalk for purposes of travel, subject only to the
reasonable and proper control of the municipality. Vanderhurst v.
Tholcke, 35 L.R.A. 267, 113 Cal. 147, 45 Pac. 266. (L.R.A. Digest
1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 67.)
The public has the right to the use of the entire sidewalk, in a public
street, for the purposes of passage and other public purposes. Costello
v. State, 35 L.R.A. 303, 108 Ala. 45, 18 So. 820. (L.R.A. Digest
1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 67.)
The public roads, free from any obstructions to travel, are solely, and
from fence to fence, for the use of the traveling public. Lebanon Light,
Heat & P. Co. v. Leap, 29 L.R.A. 342, 139 Ind. 443, 39 N. E. 57. (L.R.A.
Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 67.)
The public is entitled to the full and free use of all the territory
embraced within the limits of a highway, not only for actual passage,
but for all purposes that are legitimately incident thereto. State v.
Kean, 48 L.R.A. 102, 69 N. H. 122, 45 Atl. 256. (L.R.A. Digest
1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 67.)
A traveler may make use of any portion of the highway he chooses.
Hubbard v. Bartholomew, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 443, 163 Iowa 58, 144 N. W. 13.
(L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets, 67.)
"Even the legislature has no power to deny a citizen the right to travel
upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of
his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in
accordance with the public interest and convenience." (Chicago Motor
Coach Company et al. v. Chicago, 66 A.L.R. 834,838, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.
E. 22.)
"All persons, in the absence of legislative edict, are vested with the
right to the use of the streets and highways for travel from one place
to another in connection with their business, when such use is
incidental to that business. This is an ordinary use of the streets and
highways, and is frequently characterized as an inherent or natural
right." "Even the legislature has no power to deny a citizen the right
to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary
course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated
in accordance with the public interest and convenience." (Chicago Motor
Coach Company et al. v. Chicago, 66 A.L.R. 834,842, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.
E. 22.)
"The distinction between ordinary use of the highways, which may not be
denied, and extraordinary use thereof, which may be permitted or denied,
has been shown in numerous opinions of this court, and by them it has
become well-settled in this state that a city may, under the power of
exclusive control granted to it by the Legislature, allow or deny any
use of them which is not inconsistent with the public objects for which
they are held, and may regluate such use and fix reasonable compensation
to be paid therefor." (Chicago Motor Coach Company et al. v. Chicago, 66
A.L.R. 834,843, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N. E. 22.)
"The ordinary use of a city's streets by a citizen is an inherent right
which cannot be taken from him by the city, and may only be controlled
by reasonable regulation, but the right to use the streets for
conducting thereon a private business is not inherent or vested, and can
only be acquired by permission or license from the city, whose power to
withhold such permission or license is an essential and necessary
prerogative of municipal government." (State v. Quigg, hn. 5, 114 So.
859.)
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his
property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs
radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highways his
place of business and uses it for private gain, in the running of a
stagecoach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of a
citizen, a common right, a right common to all, while the latter is
special, unusual, and extraordinary. As to the former, the extent of
legislative power is that of regulation; but, as to the latter, its
power is broader. The right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted
to some and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature."
(State v. Quigg, hn. 7, 114 So. 859.)
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, either by horse-drawn carriage or wagon
or automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or
prohibit at will, but a common right which he has under his right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." (Thompson v. Smith, hn 7,
71 A.L.R. 604, 154 S. E. 579)
"A city may, under its police power, regulate the right of a citizen to
travel upon the public highways, but it may not arbitrarily or
unreasonably prohibit or restrict such right, nor may it permit one and
refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions
and circumstances, to exercise such right." (Thompson v. Smith, hn 8, 71
A.L.R. 604, 154 S. E. 579)
"Neither a petition for mandamus to compel the restoration of an
automobile driver's permit, revoked under an invalid ordinance, not the
setting up of the invalidity of such ordinance as a defence to a charge
of driving without a permit, is as complete and adequate as a suit for
injunction against interference, under the color of such ordinance, with
the lawful exercise of the right to drive an automobile on a city's
streets." (Thompson v. Smith, hn 18, 71 A.L.R. 604, 154 S. E. 579)
The doctrine that "when the state or a city has the power to prohibit
the doing of an act altogether, it has the power to permit the doing of
the act upon any condition, or subject to any regulation, however
arbitrary or capricious it may be; and it may lawfully delegate to
executive or administrative officers an uncontrolled and arbitrary
discretion as to granting and revoking permits or licenses to do such
acts." "But this doctrine has no application to permits issued for the
purpose or regulating the exercise of the common right to operate a
private automobile on the streets of a city in the usual and ordinary
way to transport the driver's person and property." (Thompson v. Smith,
71 A.L.R. 604,610-611, 154 S. E. 579)
"Statute requiring contract carriers by motor to obtain permits, held
not construable as prohibiting casual use for hire of roads by
individuals not in business of carriage for hire. (Vernon's Ann. Civ.
St. Tex. Art. 911b.)" (Stephenson v. Binford, hn. 8, 53 F.(2d) 509.)
"A distinction must be observed between the regulation of an activity
which may be engaged in as a matter of right, and one carried on by
government sufferance or permission, since in the latter case the power
to exclude altogether generally includes the lesser power to impose
conditions, and may justify a degree of regulation not admissible in the
former." (Packard v. Banton, hn. 8, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup.Ct. 257.)
New Uses or Methods of Use
A highway established for the general benefit of passage and traffic
must admit of new methods of use whenever it is found that the general
benefit requires them. Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.)
238, 165 Ind. 465, 74 N. E. 615. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and
Streets, 68.)
The general power to regulte the use of streets is not confined to
public uses known at the time of its dedication, but extends to new uses
as they spring into existence. State ex rel. St. Louis Underground
Service Co. v. Murphy, 34 L.R.A. 369, 134 Mo. 548, 31 S. W. 784, 34 S.
w. 51, 35 S. W. 1132. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets,
68.)
(1911). Owners and operators of automobiles have the same right to use
the streets and highways that owners and operators of other vehicles
possess, and all alike must exercise reasonable care and caution for the
safety of others. Farnsworth v. Tampa Electric Co., 62 Fla. 166, 57 So.
233. (2 Fla Dig, Highways, 10.)
"Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal
rights upon the streets with horses and carriages. (Chicago Motor Coach
Company et al. v. Chicago, 66 A.L.R. 834,838, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N. E.
22.)
"Power conferred upon municipalities to regulate the use of the streets
by motor vehicles does not include power to prohibit the use of the
streets by them." (Chicago Motor Coach Company et al. v. Chicago, hn. 6,
66 A.L.R. 834, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N. E. 22.) "regulation is inconsistent
with prohibition or exclusion." (66 A.L.R. 838).
Constitutional Right to Travel
[5 U.S.Dig, Constitutional Law, § 101.5, Right of interstate or
international travel.]
"Although not explicitly mentioned in the Federal Constitution, the
right freely to travel from one state to another, and to use the
highways and other instrumentalities of the interstate commerce in doing
so, is a basic right under the constitution." United States v Guest, 383
US 745, 86 S Ct 1170, 16 L Ed 2d 239.
"The nature of the Federal Union and constitutional concepts of personal
liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout
the length and breadth of the United States uninhibited by statutes,
rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this
movement." Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 89 S Ct 1322, 22 L Ed 2d 600.
"The right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected, does not
necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against
private as well as governmental interference." Griffen v Breckenridge,
403 US 88, 91 S Ct 1790, 29 L Ed 2d 338.
"Freedom to travel throughout the United States, which includes the
freedom to enter and abide in any state in the Union, is a basic right
under the Constitution." Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 92 S Ct 995, 31 L
Ed 2d 274.
"Whereas the Constitution inhibits every state's power to restrict
travel across its own borders, Congress has power to exercise such type
of control over travel across the borders of the United States." Mathews
v Diaz, 425 US 67, 96 S Ct 1883, 48 L Ed 2d 478.
"The right to travel is an unconditional personal right whose exercise
may not be conditioned." Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 92 S Ct 995, 31 L
Ed 2d 274.
"The constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually
unqualified." Califano v Torres, 435 US 1, 98 S Ct 906, 55 L Ed 2d 65.
[5 U.S.Dig, Constitutional Law, § 528.2 Right of travel.]
"The constitutionally protected right to travel within the United States
does not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire, or pestilence cannot be
quarantined when it can be demonstrated that unlimited travel to the
area would directly and materially interfere with the safety and welfare
of the area or the nation as a whole; the same is true of international
travel." Zemel v Rusk, 381 US 1, 85 S Ct 1271, 14 L Ed 2d 179.
What is "Regulation"?
"The department of transportation is directed to conduct an
investigation and to determine, as provided under the applicable
statute, safe speed limits on the state highway and the state park road
system. And the department may, as provided under applicable statutes,
limit the use of state highways and state park road systems as to the
weight, load and size of vehicles, and enforce such limitations." "The
state road board is directed to prescribe, for municipal connecting
roads, regulations for traffic thereon, including traffic signal
lighting, minimum and maximum speed, and parking. Such regulations, when
made and published or posted in the manner prescribed supercede all
regulation relating to traffic made by the city or town. They also
supercede any laws regulating traffic on such roads. They have the force
and effect of law, their violation constituting a misdemeanor. And they
are enforced by all law enforcement officers. (FS 335.05(5)" [Fla Jur
2d, Highways, sec. 126]
FS 355.05 was repealed in 1984, by Laws 1984, c. 84-309, s. 36.
There appears to have been no enactment to replace 335.05. If we rely on
the authority of Florida Juris Prudence 2nd [that the authors would have
noted a law and statute which replaced the repealed 335.05(5) had there
been one], we can reasonably conclude there is no such new enactment and
that enforcement of traffic laws comes only through the authority
granted with the driver license.
Also, the provision that traffic signs should "have the force and effect
of law, their violation constituting a misdemeanor", was enacted by ch.
29965, titled "AN ACT to clarify and codify the Laws of the State
relating to roads; * * *". It appears to me this act could have violated
the requirement that amendments to laws cannot broaden the scope of the
legislation to include previously excluded subjects. Also, as it appears
it only applied to those under the "Laws of the State", as opposed to
the "Laws of Florida"; it seems to have only applied to government
employees.
"Municipalities may lawfully regulate the conduct of those keeping them
open and available for movement of people and property, so long as
legislation to this end does not abidge the constitutional liberty of
one rightfully upon the street to impart information through speech or
the distribution of literature." Schneider v Irvington, 308 US 147, 60 S
Ct 146, 84 L Ed 155. [8 U.S.Rep., Highways § 13.]
"Where a restriction of the use of highways is designed to promote the
public convenience and the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by
the attempted exercise of some civil right, which in other circumstances
would be entitled to protection under the Constitution." Cox v New
Hampshire, 312 US 569, 61 S Ct 762, 133 ALR 1396, 85 L Ed 1049. [8
U.S.Rep., Highways § 13.]
"Although a statute may be enacted which prevents serious interference
with normal usage of streets and parks, licensing systems which vest in
an administrative official discretion to grant or withhold a permit upon
broad criteria unrelated to proper regulation of public places are to be
condemned." Shuttlesworth v Birmingham, 394 US 147, 89 S Ct 935, 22 L Ed
2d 162. [8 U.S.Rep., Highways § 13.]
"The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and
parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated
in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and
in consonance with peace and good order, but it must not be abridged or
denied." Shuttlesworth v Birmingham, 394 US 147, 89 S Ct 935, 22 L Ed 2d
162. [8 U.S.Rep., Highways § 13.]
"Vehicles and pedestrians have equal rights in the use of public
streets, and each must exercise reasonable care to prevent collisions."
(Brown v. City of Wilmington, hn. 1, 4 Boyce 492, 90 Atl. 44).
"A distinction must be observed between the regulation of an activity
which may be engaged in as a matter of right, and one carried on by
government sufferance or permission, since in the latter case the power
to exclude altogether generally includes the lesser power to impose
conditions, and may justify a degree of regulation not admissible in the
former." Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup.Ct. 257
Privilege of Using Highways for Business
"Primarily the vehicular highways of the state are designed for the
general public transportation and not for conducting thereon the
business of transporting persons or property for compensation." (Florida
Motor Lines, Inc. v. State Railroad Commission, 132 So. 851, hn. 1)
"The statute regulating motor vehicles carriers for hire was designed
merely to regulate those who operate motor vehicles for compensation and
was not intended to apply to persons, firms, or corporations engaged in
transporting their own goods over the public highways as a mere incident
to their mercantile or private business. Acts 1931, c. 14764." State ex
rel. Fohl v. Karel, Sherrif, 180 So. 3, hn. 6
"Under statute providing for regulation of motor vehicle carriers, basis
of regulation is not the character or tenure of ownership of vehicle,
but the peculiar nature of the business conducted upon and over the
public highways. Acts 1931, c. 14764." State ex rel. Fohl v. Karel,
Sherrif, 180 So. 3, hn. 9
"The right of a citizen to travel over the public highway and to
transport his property in the ordinary course of life and business
differs radically from the use of the public highway for profit. The
latter is not an inherent right. It is a privilege which can be granted
or withheld by the state, or, when granted, can be subjected to
regulation and control by the state." Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. et al.
V. Wells et al., Railroad Comrs 130 So. 587, hn 1 [Fla Jur 2d, Highways.
S. 121] Therefore, a business conducted primarily on the public
highways, not merely incidental use, is regulated.
"The state may permit, limit, and regulate the use of its public roads
for transportation thereon for hire, whether intra or inter state,
provided no unjust discrimination is practiced and no undue burden or
interference is put on interstate commerce, and federal
instrumentalities are not interfered with." (Florida Motor Lines, Inc.
v. State Railroad Commission, 132 So. 851, hn. 3)
"We are of the opinion that the plaintiff was not liable to this tax
[internal revenue, 3% duty on gross], because he did not carry on or do
an express business, within the meaning of the statute. * * * He did not
run regular trips or over regular routes or ferries. * * * The words
'express business,' in the statute, must have the meaning given them in
the common acceptation. An 'express business' involves the idea of
regularity, as to route or time or both." (Retzer v. Wood, Collector of
Internal Revenue (1883) 109 U.S. 900, 901.)
*"...For while a citizen has the right to travel upon the public
highways and to transport his property thereon, that right does not
extend to the use of the highways...as a place for private gain. For the
latter purpose, no person has a vested right to use the highways of this
state, but it is a privilege...which the (state) may grant or withhold
at its discretion..." State v. Johnson, 245 P 1073.
"The use of highways and streets for gain is special and extraordinary,
and generally may be prohibited or conditioned, as the legislature deems
proper." Packard v Banton, 264 US 140, 44 S Ct 257, 68 L Ed 596;
Stephenson v Binford, 287 US 251, 53 S Ct 181, 87 ALR 721, 77 L Ed 288.
[8 U.S.Rep., Highways § 14.]
"The state has power to prohibit the use of public highways in proper
cases." Frost v Railroad Commission of California, 271 US 583, 46 S Ct
605, 47 ALR 457, 70 L Ed 1101. [8 U.S.Rep., Highways § 14.]
The privilege of using a public street is always to be regulated so as
to protect the equal rights of others. Des Moines v. Keller, 57 L.R.A.
243, 116 Iowa 648, 88 N. W. 827. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and
Streets, 66.)
No person can acquire a right to make a special or exceptional use of a
public highway, not common to all the citizens of the state, except by
grant from the sovereign power. Dickey v. Davis, L.R.A.1915F, 840, 76 W.
Va. 576, 85 S. E. 781. (L.R.A. Digest 1888-1918, Highways and Streets,
66.)
"No person has an inherent or natural right, however, to make the
streets or highways his place of business. Such a use is generally
characterized as an extraordinary use." "Even the legislature has no
power to deny a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and
transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or
pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the
public interest and convenience." (Chicago Motor Coach Company et al. v.
Chicago, 66 A.L.R. 834,842, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N. E. 22.)
"The use of the streets for purely private gain may not be given, even
by the legislature, unless there be also in such use a public service."
"Even the legislature has no power to deny a citizen the right to travel
upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of
his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in
accordance with the public interest and convenience." (Chicago Motor
Coach Company et al. v. Chicago, 66 A.L.R. 834,843, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.
E. 22.)
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER
==========
CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic
screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! These are sordid matters
and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright
frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects
spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL
gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers;
be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and
nazi's need not apply.
Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector.
========================================================================
Archives Available at:
http://home.ease.lsoft.com/archives/CTRL.html
http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/
========================================================================
To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Om
