-Caveat Lector- from: http://www.weu.int/institute/occasion/1andreat.htm <A HREF="http://www.weu.int/institute/occasion/1andreat.htm">The Bosnian War and the New World Order </A> --[2]-- Phase II: Incremental Adaptation The second phase was one of incremental adaptation and of increasing attempts to narrow the gap between ends and means. However, these attempts proved insufficient to radically alter the character of the war. On the one hand, enforcement became more stringent. In April, NATO was involved for the first time in the crisis in order to undertake operation Deny Flight to enforce the NFZ. The WEU was instead entrusted with enforcing the embargo against the FRY in the Adriatic and on the Danube. Meanwhile, the objectives became more realistic as the principle that some satisfaction should be given to all the three factions in their quest for autonomy was acknowledged. In September 1993, a package was presented to the parties on H.M.S. Invincible envisaging a union of three distinct republics endowed with contiguous territory. The Bosnian Serb share was 53% while the Muslims were to receive 30% of territory and access to the Sava river and to the Adriatic Sea. The plan was rejected by Sarajevo because it did not concede enough to the Muslim entity and because the "union" was equivalent to a disguised break up of the country. A further proposal was therefore introduced as the EU Action Plan at the end of the year which increased the Muslim share to 33%. A positive development of the plan was that it was negotiated, for the first time, directly by European foreign ministers who had the full backing of their countries behind them rather than by the ICFY. Despite considerable difficulties, the plan came very close to success as on the night of December 22nd, the parties failed to reach agreement over Bosnian Serb refusal to concede a mere 1% of territory. On the other hand, UNPROFOR's mandate became again overstretched with the establishment, in June 1993, of six safe areas for Muslim civilians -Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Srebenica, Gorazde and Zepa- which had to be defended by the blue helmets with insufficient reinforcements. For example, at one time Gorazde was "defended" by merely four peacekeepers. In August, NATO and the UN clashed when Mount Igman overlooking Sarajevo was occupied by Serb forces which threatened the survival of the capital. Much televised incidents as a shell on a crowd watching a football match and the bombing of a water queue in August had raised general expectations of an air strikes against the Serbs. However, the UN maintained that NATO could not launch punitive air strikes but that its June decision to allow air operations in Bosnia was limited to close support of UNPROFOR troops. In September, an unsatisfactory agreement between the two organizations was concluded establishing a cumbersome dual-key arrangement inhibiting prompt and effective responses. The situation degenerated when the referendum coalition broke down and open conflict erupted between Bosnian Croats, who had proclaimed their own independent entity of Herceg-Bosna the previous October, and the Bosnian government. Some of the most bitter fighting occurred in Southern and Central Bosnia between the armies of these two communities (the Bosnian Croat HVO and the Bosnian Government's BiH), symbolized by the destruction of the historic bridge in Mostar. At 12,37 PM on February 5th, 1994, a mortar shell hit the market in central Sarajevo killing 69 Muslims and profoundly shaking the confidence of the "international community" as TV reporting of the event symbolized its impotence in front of the two-years-old war. Although the responsibility for the bomb is still unclear, the event can retrospectively be considered as an important turning point because it mobilized international reaction.(29) Both of the diplomatic processes which had been in the making in the preceding few months -toward greater involvement of national governments and toward greater unity in their stance- were catalyzed in April with the creation of the five-nations ad hoc Contact Group. The two main external powers -the US and Russia- were finally and irrevocably locked into the negotiating process. On the military side, international action through NATO became more assertive. In the immediate aftermath of the bombing, an ultimatum was issued by Boutros-Boutros Ghali demanding that all heavy-weapons be eliminated or withdrawn from an exclusion zone of 20 kilometres around Sarajevo within 10 days. Western retaliation was only narrowly avoided by a Russian coup, when Churkin managed to convince the Bosnian Serbs to yield in exchange for the dispatch of Russian peacekeepers to Pale. On February 28th, NATO could still demonstrate its novel resolve when its planes downed four Bosnian Serb aircraft violating the NFZ. In April, an exclusion zone was imposed around Gorazde, which was also under Serb threat. In August, NATO air attacks were launched for the first time in retaliation for a Bosnian Serb violation of the exclusion zone, which was readily reestablished. The more unified international position paid its dividends also in terms of diplomatic alignments in the region. Firstly, thanks to the American-German rapprochement and to intense pressure from Washington, the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Croats signed first a cease-fire on February 23rd and then an agreement for a Federation in Washington on March 13th which ended the bitter conflict erupted a year earlier. Both parties could thus concentrate their forces on their common enemy. Secondly, the precarious relationship between Pale and Belgrade further deteriorated. Milosevic had pressed Karadzic to accept the Vance Owen Peace Plan, the Invincible Package and the European Union Action Plan, which had all failed inhibiting the withdrawal of Western sanctions on the FRY, costing approximately US$ 25 billion overall and reducing Belgrade's GNP by 27% in 1992 and by 30% in 1993. After the isolation following the February Market Massacre, Belgrade further distanced itself from the Bosnian Serbs. In the Summer, diplomatic relations were broken and an embargo was imposed on all supplies except humanitarian ones flowing from Serbia into the Republika Sprska. In an unprecedented step, the FRY even allowed 100 international monitors on its borders to make sure that the sanctions were effective. The Contact Group proceeded to draft its own plan, which was presented to the parties on July 5th. The map divided Bosnia between the Croat-Muslim Federation, which was to hold 51%, and the Bosnian Serbs, who would retain the remaining 49%. However, the plan still rested on the assumption that the parties could find an agreement between themselves even without actual enforcement from the outside. The Bosnian Serbs therefore did not face any direct retaliation when they rejected the plan on July 20th and then referred it to a referendum in August which overwhelmingly voted against it. Pale's counterproposals involved a larger corridor connecting Eastern and Central Bosnia, the division of Sarajevo in two parts and an exchange of territories in which the enclaves of Gorazde, Srebenica and Zepa would be absorbed by the Republika Sprska. The rejection of the Contact Group plan, like others before it, was followed by a deterioration of the situation. In September, the BiH 5th Army in Bihac begun a large scale offensive after having defeated Fikret Abdic's renegade forces, which had defected to the Bosnian Serbs. Although the Bosnian Serbs managed to turn back the attack and launched an effective counterattack which was stopped only thanks to two large NATO air strikes in November, it was increasingly clear that their military position was becoming more precarious. For the first time, Serb forces were forced to take UN hostages to protect themselves from NATO attacks. In November President Clinton announced, under intense domestic pressure, that the US would unilaterally allow arms to flow to Sarajevo soon in the future. In response to the American proposal, the Europeans threatened the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Russia was even more caustic as President Yeltsin warned the West in December that there was the possibility, if it went too far, of a "Cold Peace" between East and West. Meanwhile, NATO and the United Nations clashed again as the double-key arrangement was becoming clearly inadequate.(30) For three times, twice in March near Bihac and once in May around Sarajevo, local UNPROFOR commanders requested NATO air support which was then blocked -while planes were already flying to their targets- by UN civilian authorities concerned about possible Serb retaliation.(31) Against this confused background, the best result which could be obtained was a four-months truce signed at the end of the December under the good offices of former US President Jimmy Carter. This second low point, after the one which followed the collapse of the VOPP, represents the end of the second phase and the failure of the incremental attempts to close the gap between ends and means. Once Western credibility had been eroded in the first phase, incrementalism was no longer sufficient. By now however, some crucial developments pointed to a decisive resolution of the crisis. National governments were directly involved and were thus feeling all the pressure of public opinion's discontent for the impotence of the "international community". Their credibility a nd that of the most consolidated international organization -NATO- were irrevocably at stake. They were therefore perceiving a compelling incentive to elaborate a common position, to present the parties with credible threats and incentives and -in case of rebuke- to carry them through. Unlike the multilateral mediators which had preceded them, national governments also had direct access to military capabilities, which were proving to be -after the rejection of the Contact Group plan- a necessary elements of a final settlement. Phase III: The End of the War and the Dayton Peace The third and final phase of the war begun with a fluid and dynamic military situation. Three months after the cease-fire, BiH forces launched multiple offensives along the confrontation line from Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihac. As usual, the Bosnian Serbs responded with an intensification of the bombing of Sarajevo and Tuzla. On May 7th, a shell killed eleven in the urban centre of the capital. The UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo, General Rupert Smith, asked for authorization to launch retaliatory air strikes to the UN authorities which, after an initial reluctance, agreed. On May 24th, a further bombardment prompted General Smith to issue an ultimatum to the Serbs, who did not comply and were accordingly hit twice by NATO aircraft. The Serb reaction was the taking of UN hostages, 300 by June 1st, which were then chained to potential targets. The international anger that this move provoked and Milosevic's pressures on Pale led to the release of all hostages by June 18th. The Western response to the hostage crisis was to reduce the vulnerabilities of UNPROFOR in preparation for a stand-off with the Serbs. UN troops were strengthened and withdrawn from Serb-controlled territory. The British government sent reinforcements as early as the end of May, whereas NATO decided to increase the UNPROFOR contingent by 12500 troops. This led to the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), composed of British, French and Dutch troops, which was heavily armed with attack helicopters, anti-tank weapons and artillery and which was not painted white like the other UNPROFOR troops, retaining its usual combat green. Contrary to some popular expectations at the time, the RRF was not the prelude to a ground offensive, but was designed to operate as a strategic reserve capable of rescuing UN troops in jeopardy. On July 7th, in an unprecedently bold step to be taken before the retaliatory power of the RRF was deployed, Serb forces attacked the enclave of Srebenica. It is still unclear whether the Bosnian Serbs launched the offensive, which marked another major turning point in the war, as a deliberate attempt to erase the Muslim pocket in anticipation of a future settlement in which they did not want enemy enclaves within their territory or as a tactical counterattack which simply went out of hand. In any case, Western reaction was limited to two air strikes on the 11th, given the presence of 55 Dutch peacekeepers which were briefly held hostage. After taking the city, the Serbs expelled the 40000 Muslim inhabitants and refugees and allegedly slaughtered 8000 men of fighting age. On July 25th, also the enclave of Zepa was overrun, despite the fact that the local Muslim garrison had unsuccessfully taken the British and Ukrainian UNPROFOR troops in the town hostage in order to press NATO to react. The outrage of these open violations of humanitarian law without any apparent major military advantage basically made a military confrontation between the West and the Republika Sprska eventually inevitable. On July 21st, NATO decided to threaten retaliation if also the Gorazde enclave was overrun. Operational command was transferred to the theatre commanders: Admiral Leighton Smith for NATO in Naples and General Janvier for UNPROFOR in Zagreb. In order to avoid a repetition of earlier episodes, the blue berets in Gorazde were quietly withdrawn. In the meantime, a Serbian offensive on Bihac spurred the Croat-Muslim alliance into action. After a meeting in Split on July 22nd between Tudjman and Izetbegovic, Croatian forces attacked the Bosnian Serbs near Bihac relieving the Muslim town and cutting the lines of communication between the Republika Sprska and the Krajna Serbs in Croatia. On August 4th, on the model of a previous successful attack in May on UNPA West, the Croatian Army launched a swift and decisive offensive against the Croatian Serbs, overrunning Knin in two days and driving 150000 Serbs from Croatian territory. The blow to Serb morale, which had rested until then on a feeling of military superiority was rapidly exploited diplomatically by the United States. The new American negotiator, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke engaged in frantic shuttle diplomacy. The United States seemed resolute to finally put an end to the war and -for the first time- acknowledged the Serb desire that their own Republika Sprska be treated on a par with the Federation and be allowed, after the peace, to engage in strict links with the FRY. In exchange, the Bosnian Serbs agreed that Milosevic should negotiate on their behalf. Washington was also prepared -for the first time- to pressurize the Bosnian Muslims into compromise. However, diplomacy was again suspended when yet another mortar bomb hit Sarajevo on August 28th. The attack led to a two-weeks massive NATO air campaign involving 3400 sorties, of which 750 were bombing sorties on 56 strategic targets and 350 aiming points. The air strikes were nominally geared to the enforcement of the Sarajevo exclusion zone but were really aimed at drastically reducing the war potential of the Bosnian Serbs. Taking advantage of the damage inflicted by NATO on Serb infrastructures, the Croat and Muslim forces launched a major offensive in North-Western Bosnia which soon threatened Banja Luka, the main Bosnian Serb centre. When the situation on the ground was approaching a sustainable state for both sides, the Croatian troops stopped while Mus lim forces were halted by the Serbs even with the use of air force, to which the West acquiesced because it did not wish the situation on the ground to be excessively destabilized. On September 12th, the United States and the other Western nations imposed a final cease-fire. After two months of tough negotiations between the three sides sponsored by the United States at the USAF base at Dayton, Ohio, peace was finally reached after 44 months of war and more than 200000 dead. Bosnia-Herzegovina was to become a single state with international legal personality composed of two distinct entities with equal rights and endowed with large autonomy: the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Sprska. Links of these two entities with outside states -Croatia for the Federation and the FRY for the Serb republic- were allowed short of secession. The essence of the agreement was the 51/49 division agreed upon as the basis for peace since 1993. Capping a process began after the rejection of the VOPP, the territorial provisions of the agreement were kept as close as possible to the map on the ground at the end of the fighting. Srebenica and Zepa were to be retained by the Bosnian Serbs while Gorazde was linked to the bulk of Federation territory by a land corridor. The injustice of accepting the results of ethnic cleansing in Eastern Bosnia was balanced with the increased stability that the new arrangement would have in terms of the viability of the two entities. Sarajevo was assigned to the Federation while the other two delicate issues of the Posavina corridor -which either grants Federation access to the Sava or Serb communications between the two main parts of their territory- and of Muslim access to the Adriatic were left to international arbitration. A series of annexes spelled out the details of the agreement. Military forces were to be disarmed and confined to barracks under the supervision of the 60000-strong NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), which was also responsible for securing the Inter-Ethnic Boundary Lines (IEBLs) and for monitoring the collection of heavy weapons at appropriate locations. Local, community and nation-wide elections were to reactivate the democratic process under the supervision of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Dayton accords -recuperating on earlier ambitions- also provided for the restoration of the pre-war interethnic character, pledging the freedom of movement for all citizens across the whole territory of Bosnia and for the return of refugees under the responsibility of UNHCR.(32) War criminals were subject to the jurisdiction of the ad hoc War Crimes Tribunal established in the Hague. Finally, the European Union, in concert with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, was made responsible for the efforts at civilian reconstruction and economic revitalization. Conclusion and Cautionary Tales The war in Bosnia demonstrates the difficulties for outside intervention into a full-blown ethnic conflict, especially when there are no vital interest affected justifying a large scale operation. In these instances, the temptation is high to let expectations rise to very ambitious objectives without having the possibility of deploying the necessary means for their achievement. A classic conflict between peace and justice ensues in which one is partially in contradiction with the other. In the Bosnian case, the "international community" dodged the choice, ending with the worst of both worlds in a situation in which peace was delayed for three years and was finally attained without justice, as defined by the London Conference's commitment to pre-war Bosnia. As this essay attempts to show, only when the gap was closed by more realistic objectives and a relatively more assertive posture, was peace finally reached in Bosnia. What would have been the alternatives? One possibility was to deploy -from the beginning of the hostilities- the sufficient resources for the attainment of a just peace, with a massive and decisive intervention to disarm the combatants. This would probably have entailed less force than was actually used in 1995, when the credibility of the "international community" had to be rebuilt after a series of humiliations. Nevertheless, a more proactive approach would have been needed to induce the parties to lay down their arms, involving an active use of force which contradicted the passive and impartial principles of traditional peacekeeping. This would probably have constituted more force than that which the "international community" was prepared to allocate when ho stilities broke out. Most public opinions do not easily support the risk of soldiers being killed in remote areas where no national interest is involved. An effective preventive strategy was in fact ruled out by the lack of available resources. It is also important to recognize that once the use of force is already involved, even promising and "rational" measures short of war such as economic sanctions may not reach the desired effect. Sanctions in the Yugoslav case were much more effective with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and Montenegro, who was not an active combatant, than with the Bosnian Serbs, who were fighting for what they perceived as their survival and were therefore prepared to "unreasonable" sacrifices. An alternative strategy would have been to recognize that since justice was unattainable short of the imposition of superior force -given the fact that the three communities preferred to fight rather than to live together- certain compromises should have been made with the situation on the ground. In practice, this would have meant to abandon, for the time being, the London Conference commitment to a pre-war Bosnia, and concentrating at least on obtaining a cease-fire as soon as possible. Some of the most brutal violations of human rights -like the Srebenica massacre- occurred at the end of the war and could therefore have been avoided by a rapid cease-fire. After all, once the principle of a united Yugoslavia had been abandoned, there was no intrinsic reason to rigidly maintain the notion of a united Bosnia once the sizeable Serb minority had expressed its radical opposition to the idea. In any event, the goal of a multi-ethnic Bosnia could have been postponed to a more distant future and upheld with long-term instruments like diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions, which would have been most effective when the tension would have cooled down. Probably, also this strategy would have entailed the active use of force on the part of the "international community", but it would have probably been more circumscribed as it would not have clashed with the fundamental interests of any of the parties and it would have had to be exercised only against the most recalcitrant faction. Either of these strategies would have been better than the one which was actually employed, because of the wide gap between ends and means that it involved. The EU representative, Carl Bildt, bitterly remarked in 1995 that "there has been a tendency to say things that at the end of the day we are not prepared to do. We should either do what we say or only say what we are prepared to do".(33) Yet, although there were no structural reasons for failure, both the domestic and the international characteristics of the post Cold War world militated against a rational strategy. While democratic public opinions demand swift interventions to terminate regional conflicts, they have also entered a post-heroic age -in Eduard Luttwak's expression- which does not easily allow for large-scale interventions in remote areas.(34) At the international level, multipolarity has altered the standard operating procedures of traditional Cold War institutions and -in the absence of a compelling threat- it requires a special effort to avoid competitive free riding. It would therefore have been very difficult that governments employed a different strategy without previous failures justifying a process of soul searching. The same reasoning was applied to post-IFOR scenarios. The Dayton agreement maintained a certain ambiguity between its military component, which simply involved a cease-fire between distinct entities, and its civilian ones, which ambitiously proclaimed the objective of reestablishing the pre-war multiethnic character of Bosnia. The ambiguity was allowed by the full-scale commitment of the United States at the end of 1995, when Washington perceived its own credibility, as well as that of NATO, to be on the line. If that commitment cannot be taken for granted for the future, the "international community" will still have to choose between the preservation of peace or the imposition of justice at a price which it will likely be unwilling to pay. In this light, the solution was that of a follow-on to IFOR -SFOR- entrusted with the rigid implementation of the cease-fire -including the implementation of disputed and unresolved territorial terms at Neum on the Adriatic and on Brcko- but which does not seek to substitute the willingness to compromise of the parties involved, by imposing a certain frame of mind from the outside. If this equates to a disguised and unofficial partition, it will still be preferable to a resumption of the hostilities in a region in which not only Bosnian Serbs, but also Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats may no longer be willing to live under the same roof after three years of war.(35) On the other hand, spectacular but sporadic gestures in the direction of imposing a unified state from the outside would be useless or even counterproductive if not supported by a massive and indefinite commitment.(36) It is for this reason that both the pursuit of war-criminals and the implementation of the most ambitious provisos regarding the return of refugees have not been a top priority. The same sober and realistic line has prevailed in the debate over the follow-on to IFOR -the Stabilization Force or SFOR- and the future in general of the international presence in Bosnia, showing that some of the lessons have been learnt.(37) In particular, calls from the International Tribunal in the Hague and, more recently, from the State Department in Washington for a tougher stance on the war criminals and return of refugees issues have not involved proposals for the active use of military force for the pursuit of these goals.(38) The instruments suggested are in fact appropriately restricted to economic and diplomatic pressure, also because of the resistance of defence ministries on both sides of the Atlantic which are concerned about the safety of their troops in a dangerous zone which is increasingly losing its appeal and salience with public opinion. Once the hot war has turned into a cold peace, the effectiveness of these non-military measures should increase, given the desire of the populations of switching back to "normal" life. Similarly, the need for keeping transatlantic unity has also been reaffirmed. The initial American decision to attach a rigid deadline to its participation in IFOR and SFOR had raised the possibility that post-IFOR-SFOR intervention would be implemented solely by the Europeans, perhaps in a WEU framework. However, general and specific circumstances have decreased the prospects for such a contingency and point to a continuation of the NATO effort instead. On the one hand, the introduction of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept at the Berlin Summit last year provides the intellectual framework for NATO flexibility and -by creating a wide range of possible options- has defused the choice between a US-led NATO and a European-only intervention. On the other hand, European unwillingness to shoulder, again, the main bulk of the burden of the West's military presence in the region has led the Clinton administration to soften IFOR's and SFOR's deadlines.(39) The lesson of the Bosnian war is that peace can be preserved in the post-Cold War world only if governments agree on a rational strategy gauging the ends with the available means. If governments cannot mobilize support for outside intervention, they should at least be skillful enough to explain to public opinion the limits of their power so that expectations do not run wild. Otherwise, the ensuing delusion could even undermine the consensus for the principle of multilateral cooperation itself. It is therefore important to understand the role of international institutions in the post-Cold War world. Institutions are especially useful in a multipolar world in which there are few reference points. However, institutions cannot substitute for the lack of strategy on the part of their member states. As the Bosnian episode shows, they still depend on the capacity of governments to commit resources and on finding an agreement on how to use them. Without either of these factors, institutions will become not only a scapegoat for failure but also a recipe for it, as they can even fuel counterproductive processes. In this light, it is essential that public opinions understand that more international institutionalization is a necessary element but, given that only governments still have the democratic legitimacy to decide upon matters involving the use of force, not yet a sufficient one for peace. 1. Adjunct Professor of Advanced Theory of International Relations, University of Bologna. This article was written while I was visiting research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union in Paris in the Summer of 1996. The views expressed are my own and in no way reflect the opinion of the WEU or of the Institute. I wish to express my gratitude to Guido Lenzi for invaluable comments and support and to Pierre Hassner, Alessandro Politi, Sophia Clément and Monika Wohlfeld for useful advice and encouragement. 2. Quoted in Richard N. Gardner: Collective Security and the New World Order: What Role for the United Nations?, Working Paper, September 1991. For a characteristically more cynical view, cfr. Christopher Coker: Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990's, International Affairs, V. 68, N. 3, July 1992, pp. 407-21 3. Anthony Lake: Yes to an American Role in Peacekeeping, but with Conditions, International Herald Tribune, February 7th, 1994. 4. On this point and on the war in general, see the excellent collection of essays edited by Ulman, Richard H. Ulman, ed.: The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996 5. Cfr. Christopher Hill: The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role, Journal of Common Market Studies, V. 31, 1993, pp. 305-328 6. Carl Von Clausewitz: On War, [1832], London, Penguin, 1968, p. 125 7. David Owen: Balkan Odyssey, Victor Gollancz, London, 1995, pp. 1, 45 8. Clausewitz: op. cit., p. 149 9. Where there were analogies, as in the territories of the former Soviet Union, the "example effect" raised in fact considerable preoccupations. 10. V.P. Gagnon: Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia, International Security, V. 19, N. 3, 1994/5; David Gompert: How to Defeat Serbia, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994 11. Charles G. Boyd: Making Peace with the Guilty, Foreign Affairs, V. 74, N. 5, September 1995, p. 31 12. Barry R. Posen: The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, Survival, V. 35, N. 1, Spring 1993, P. 31 13. Nicole Gnesotto: Lessons of Yugoslavia, Chaillot Paper 14, p. 6 14. Rosalyn Higgins: The New United Nations and the Former Yugoslavia, 18th Martin Wight memorial Lecture, University of Sussex, March 1st, 1993 15. Michael Brenner: The United States Policy in Yugoslavia, Ridgeway Papers 6, p. 16 16. Walter Lippmann: The Public Philosophy, Boston, 1955, p. 24. 17. Owen, op. cit., pp. 55-6 18. Karl Deutsch and David J. Singer: Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability, World Politics, V. 16, N. 3, 1964, p. 396 19. Glenn H. Snyder: The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics, World Politics, V. 36, 1984, pp. 461-95 20. International Herald Tribune, December 5th, 1995 21. Jacques Santer: The EU's Security and Defence Policy. How to Avoid Missing the 1996 rendez-vous, NATO Review, November 1995, p. 6. Cfr. also Andreas G. Kinitis: The EU's Foreign Policy and the War in Former Yugoslavia, unpublished manuscript, 1996 22. Robert J. Art: Why Western Europe Needs the United States and Nato, Political Science Quarterly, V. 111, N. 1, pp. 1-39 23. Richard K. Betts: Delusions of Impartiality, Foreign Affairs, November 1994; Adam Roberts: The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, Survival, V. 36, N. 2, 1994; Thomas G. Weiss: The United Nations and Civil Wars, The Washington Quarterly, V. 17, N. 4, 1994 24. Adam Roberts: From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force, Survival, V. 37, N. 4, pp. 21-2 25. Owen, op. cit., p. 46 26. "The EC mediation for Slovenia therefore opened the door to actual ethnic conflict. It set up the end of the state by declaring the actions of the army aggressive and requiring its return to barracks without discussing implications for Croatia or the rest of the country". Susan Woodward: Redrawing Borders in a Period of Systemic Transition, in Milton J Esman and Shibley Telhami, eds.: International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1995, p. 210. Cfr. also Susan L. Woodward: Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Washington, Brookings, 1995 and Warren Zimmermann: The Last Ambassador, Foreign Affairs, V. 74, N. 2, March 1995, p. 16 27. An example of the first argument is Owen, op. cit., while an example of the second is V.P. Gagnon: Historical Roots of the Yugoslav Conflict, in Esman and Talhami, op. cit., p. 179 28. Owen, op. cit., p. 33 29. Mario Zucconi: The Former Yugoslavia: Lessons of War and Diplomacy, SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments Disarmament and International Security, p. 215 30. Zucconi, op. cit., pp. 224-229 31. In October, a precarious agreement was reached between the two organizations which spelled out that, although the authorization was to be previously provided by both organizations, the UN left to NATO the tactical control of the operation. 32. Tony Barber: Dayton Deal Holds Seeds of Own Destruction, The Independent, 23 November 1995 33. The Guardian, 19 July 1995 34. Eduard Luttwak: A Post Heroic Military Policy, Foreign Affairs, V. 75, N. 4, 1996; idem: Where Are the Great Powers? Foreign Affairs, V. 73, N. 4, 1994 35. For example, an official report states that: "this difficult situation casts doubts on the likelihood of economic activity being resumed and of the refugees returning and civilians being allowed complete freedom of movement-all key elements of the peace agreements". Report on The Peace Process in the Balkans-Implementation of the Dayton Accords to the 41st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Western European Union, submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr Roseta, Doc. 1526, 14 May 1996, p. 5. Cfr. also Leonard J. Cohen: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fragile Peace in a Segmented State, Current History, March 1996, p. 112; and Editorial: Victoire peu gloriuse en Bosnie, Le Monde, 21-22 July 1996 36. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera: Partition is the Inevitable Solution for Bosnia, International Herald Tribune, September 25th, 1996. For a more optimistic but still preoccupied assessment, cfr. Christopher Civic: Running Late: But Is Dayton still on Track?, The World Today, June 1996 37. A Sarajevo, l'apartheid ou la guerre, Le Monde, May 7th, 1997 38. Albright Sets in Motion a New US Policy for Bosnia, International Herald Tribune, May 22nd, 1997 39. US Renews Goals in Bosnia, International Herald Tribune, May 30th, 1997. 10/16/97 SDS&EGH,Paris for WEU/ISS ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! 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