-Caveat Lector-
 
April 19, 2004

Call for bioweapons panel

Advisory panel needed to keep the bioweapons convention up to date, the Royal Society says | By Stephen Pincock


The United Kingdom's Royal Society is calling for the establishment of an international scientific advisory panel to ensure that the implementation of the United Nation's Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) keeps pace with advances in the life sciences.

The United Kingdom's top science academy made the recommendation in a paper presented today (April 19) at a meeting of the United Nations Foundation in Washington, DC. It points out that there is currently no life sciences equivalent to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which back up international agreements with access to cutting edge science.

“We believe that such support is essential, and the framework for providing this is through the formation of an international advisory panel that is able to keep up with the rapid pace of technological advance in the life sciences,” Brian Eyre, chair of the Royal Society committee on scientific aspects of international security, said in his presentation.

The BTWC has had a troubled existence, partly because verification procedures to ensure signatories stick to the rules are difficult. Moves to beef up the convention have been opposed by the United States.

The proposal to form an international advisory committee has the support of the US National Academies of Science, Eyre told The Scientist ahead of his presentation. “We feel, and the Americans feel, that we need a top-level advisory group that can advise the UN… to make sure that the very latest science is available,” he said. One idea is that national panels, such as the National Safety Advisory Committee on Biosafety in the United States, could feed into an international group under UN auspices, he suggested.

In its report, the Royal Society also broaches the difficult subject of vetting proposals for research to help prevent the development of biological weapons. The society feels science needs to regulate itself in this area or risk such government intervention.

“There is a need for the scientific community, governments, and relevant agencies to be fully aware of the potential of scientific advances both in enabling the illegal development of more lethal weapons and in developing more effective counter measures to the use of such weapons,” Eyre said.

Vetting may be appropriate in the case of proposals in which there is a tangible cause for concern, but this is best done on a case-by-case basis, and not by applying a process across the spectrum of basic research, the society says.

Filtering out basic research that may have potential, but unidentified, dual uses, would be “difficult and impose a burdensome layer of bureaucracy on the research enterprise,” it says.

Commenting on the Royal Society's report, Britain's Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) pointed out that research involving biological pathogens and toxins “will continue to be crucial in the fight to combat the diseases that these agents cause and to improve our ability to respond to bioterrorist attacks.”

Doug Yarrow, director of corporate science at BBSRC, told The Scientist, “BBSRC has in place a rigorous peer review process for research proposals, which we would expect to identify proposals where there is a tangible cause for concern in terms of harmful applications.”

The Royal Society's report also touches on the idea of establishing codes of ethics for scientists. It points out that such a move would be likely to generate red tape that could be difficult to manage and have little value. Late last year, a UK parliamentary science committee got a lukewarm response from the research community when it said an international ethical code for scientists should be developed to prevent the misuse of research by terrorists.

Links for this article
Royal Society
http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk 

United Nations Foundation: United Nations and Global Security
http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/events.htm 

A. Scott, “Bioweapons talks reopen,” The Scientist, November 17, 2003.
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20031117/05/ 

J.D. Miller, “US Biosecurity board reviewed,” The Scientist, March 8, 2004.
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20040308/01/ 

T. Agres, “Interpol pushes research controls,” The Scientist, July 21, 2003.
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20030721/03/ 

A. Fazackerly, “Antiterror ethics code urged,” The Scientist, November 6, 2003.
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20031106/04/ 



 
©2004, The Scientist Inc. in association with BioMed Central.
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