-Caveat Lector- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Progressive Response 19 May 1999 Vol. 3, No. 18 Editor: Tom Barry --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Progressive Response is a publication of Foreign Policy In Focus, a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. The project produces Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) briefs on various areas of current foreign policy debate. Electronic mail versions are available free of charge for subscribers. The Progressive Response is designed to keep the writers, contributors, and readers of the FPIF series informed about new issues and debates concerning U.S. foreign policy issues. We encourage comments to the FPIF briefs and to opinions expressed in PR. We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how we're doing, via email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post The Progressive Response elsewhere. We apologize for any duplicate copies of The Progressive Response you may receive. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents *** KOSOVO: A WAR MEASURED BY SORTIES AND CIVILIAN DEATHS *** *** TURKEY: ARMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS *** By Tamar Gabelnick, Federation of American Scientists *** RUSSIAN POLITICS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY *** By John Feffer --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *** KOSOVO: A WAR MEASURED BY SORTIES AND CIVILIAN DEATHS *** Ed. Note: The U.S. war in Southeast Asia--marked by unprecedented area bombing campaigns in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos--is now widely accepted by the movers and shakers in the U.S. foreign policy elite as a mistake. A quarter of a century later, war reporting has made some advances. Instead of waiting until the war is over, the Pentagon and NATO now routinely acknowledge their mistakes but blame those mistakes on errant bombs, bad maps, clouds, and just lousy luck. Like Vietnam, the bombing war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not just a series of mistakes, it was a mistake from the beginning. The Pentagon learned from its mistake in Vietnam and is now more reluctant to assign ground troops in an internal conflict, relying instead on its superior but sometimes unreliable technology. But like the war and accompanying carpet bombings in Southeast Asia, the bombing campaign in the Balkans should not simply be written off as a well-intentioned but mistaken venture. A! s the war has steadily expanded to include civilian targets (bridges, factories, railroads, airports, media centers, homes of political leaders, etc.) and as the "collateral damage" of civilian deaths has become routine, this war is no longer just a foreign policy blunder and a transgression of international law. It has assumed criminal dimensions. The U.S., counting on uncritical media reporting and a steady stream of aerial bombings, can no longer lay claim to the moral high ground. Like Kennedy, McNamara, and Johnson (liberals all) before him, Clinton is not just making a tragic mistake--he has blood on his hands. Russia and China have it right (although not for all the right reasons) as do a rising chorus of international peace activists: NATO's bombing should stop immediately. For more information see the FPIF Kosovo Crisis Page at: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/media/releases/crisis_eu99.html and Bombs Away, the FPIF policy brief (revised May 18, 1999) at: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol4/v4n13koso.html Notice: The International Action Center is organizing the Emergency Mobilization to Stop the War and a march to the Pentagon on June 5, which will demand "money for jobs and education, not for war in Yugoslavia." For details: International Action Center Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.iacenter.org Peace Action is spearheading a new coalition calling for an end to the U.S./NATO bombing of Yugoslavia; an end to the ethnically-targeted violence; and support for negotiations under institutions including the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The National Coalition for Peace in Yugoslavia was formed earlier this month by leaders of major U.S. peace organizations, including the American Friends Service Committee, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Pax Christi USA, Peace Action, War Resisters League, Women's Action for New Directions, and Women's International League for Peace & Freedom. Peace Action Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *** TURKEY: ARMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS *** (Ed. Note: The abundant contradictions and hypocrisies of U.S. foreign policy are readily evident in its policies in Turkey, where human rights violations, repression of an ethnic minority, and militarization are defining elements of government. In the interests of maintaining good relations with a stable ally, the Clinton administration conveniently overlooks a longtime pattern of gross abuses of human rights and the violent repression of the Kurdish population. As Turkey deepens its own involvement in NATO's war on Yugoslavia in the name of stopping ethnic cleansing, it pursues its own ethnic war with arms supplied by the United States. The following is an excerpt from a new FPIF policy brief, which will be posted in its entirety on the FPIF website.) Turkey: Arms and Human Rights By Tamar Gabelnick, Federation of American Scientists Considered a strategic NATO ally, Turkey has benefited from a U.S. policy that is long on military assistance and short on constructive criticism. Washington values close ties with Turkey both as a secular state with a predominately Muslim population and as a buffer between Europe and the Middle East and Caucasus regions. Once valued as a deterrent to the Soviet threat, Turkey is now considered a key ally in stopping terrorism, drug trafficking, and Islamic fundamentalism from seeping across the Bosporus Straits. Turkey also offers opportunities as an emerging market and a potential site for the Caspian Sea oil pipeline. Finally, Turkey won U.S. favor by supporting the Gulf War, participating in Bosnian peacekeeping, and providing a base for U.S. fighter planes monitoring the "no-fly-zone" in northern Iraq. The 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement reaffirmed the tight relationship between the U.S. and Turkey, which had been threatened after Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus and the subsequent U.S. arms embargo. This accord allowed U.S. military bases on Turkish soil in exchange for help modernizing Turkey's military, opening the door to a flood of U.S. arms transfers. Since 1980 the U.S. has shipped $9 billion worth of arms to Turkey and provided $6.5 billion in grant and loan military aid to purchase U.S. equipment. By fiscal year 1999, Congress phased out this type of military aid to both Greece and Turkey out of a recognition that these relatively well-off states could finance their own arms purchases. Before FY 1999, Turkey had been the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid. The U.S. government believes large quantities of arms sales buy political influence in addition to providing economic benefits. In reality, Washington has held little sway over Ankara's behavior in such key foreign policy areas as promoting human rights and democracy, preserving regional stability, keeping Turkey tied to Western Europe, and promoting economic growth. Additionally, Turkey has only reluctantly accepted the embargo against Iraq and is pursuing a natural gas pipeline deal with Iran in defiance of the U.S. embargo. U.S. arms sales actually undermine many U.S. foreign policy goals by providing physical and political support to the Turkish military at the expense of democratically elected leaders and civil society. The Turkish military's 15-year war against the rebel Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in southeast Turkey has involved severe violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force. The war has served as an excuse to repress political leaders, journalists, and human rights activists seeking greater rights for Kurds and a peaceful end to the war. Additionally, in the name of protecting a strictly secular society, the Turkish military uses its inordinate power to suppress religious expression and mild political Islamic activism. U.S. arms sales and continued conflict in Turkey also damage Turkey's economy and prospects for economic cooperation with the West. The 1998 CIA Factbook states that Turkey spends about $7 billion a year on the war with the PKK, which contributed to a 99% inflation rate for 1998 and a national debt equal to half the government's revenue. War-related political and financial instability has discouraged foreign investment. A U.S.-backed plan would route a Caspian Sea oil pipeline through territory where the PKK operates, leaving it susceptible to rebel attacks. An end to the war and improvements in human rights are also necessary preconditions for Turkey's entry into the European Union (EU), which the U.S. believes would draw Turkey closer to the West. Turkey's ceaseless provocation of Greece, again using U.S. arms, is another barrier to EU entry. The Turkish military is planning a massive modernization project, with over $30 billion budgeted over the next eight years. The first major acquisition will be 145 attack helicopters worth $3.5 billion, to be coproduced with the Turkish company TAI. As helicopters have figured prominently in the destruction of civilian targets, U.S. human rights and arms control groups protested vehemently when Boeing and Bell Textron requested marketing licenses for this sale. In response, the State Department approved marketing licenses, but stated that if a U.S. helicopter were selected, it would not issue an export license unless Turkey made significant progress on human rights and allowed the U.S. to monitor use of the equipment in Turkey. The specific criteria laid out included: decriminalization of free speech; release of journalists and parliamentarians; steps to end torture and police impunity; reopening of NGOs closed by authorities; democratization and the expansion of political par! ticipation; lifting of the state of emergency in southeast Turkey; and the resettlement of internally displaced persons (estimated at 500,000 to 2.5 million people). Prime Minister Yilmaz pledged to make these improvements in a December 1997 meeting with President Clinton. While Turkey has yet to choose among five finalists (including the two U.S. competitors), it also remains far from meeting the agreed-upon conditions and has in fact regressed in key areas. Problems With Current U.S. Policy The December 1997 State Department agreement to link an export license to human rights improvements would signal--if implemented--respect for international human rights law. It would also bring U.S. policy in line with Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, which states that weapons may not be provided to any country "the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." The State Department's annual human rights reports have documented Turkey's flagrant human rights abuses year after year in a pattern that is clearly gross and consistent. Arms exports to Turkey also contravene President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 34, issued in February 1995, which directs the State Department to factor into arms export decisions the impact of an export on regional stability and on human rights and democracy in the recipient state. Turkey has also regressed or made little progress on the human rights criteria the State Department laid out for the attack helicopter sale. The cultural and linguistic rights of Kurds are still repressed, and the "state of emergency" continues in six of the nine southeast provinces. Torture continues with impunity, and Turkey has one of the world's highest numbers of imprisoned journalists. As the 1998 State Department Human Rights report for Turkey states: "Despite Prime Minister Yilmaz's stated commitment that human rights would be his government's highest priority in 1998, serious human rights abuses continued�.Extrajudicial killings, including deaths in detention from the excessive use of force, 'mystery killings,' and disappearances continued. Torture remained widespread�. Security forces continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy trials continued to be problems." According to an April 1999 Human Rights Watch report, journalists risk fines, imprisonment, bans, or violent attacks if they write about such subjects as "the role of Islam in politics and society, Turkey's ethnic Kurdish Minority, the conflict in southeastern Turkey, or the proper role of the military in government and society." At present, many journalists, prominent human rights leaders, and Kurdish and Islamic political leaders--including members of parliament--are in prison for violating ambiguous laws against inciting "racial" or "religious hatred" or for issuing "separatist" propaganda. The arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan provided an excuse to once again lash out against those calling for a peaceful end to the war. Intimidation tactics marred the April 1999 national and local elections, leaving interim Prime Minister Ecevit's nationalist Democratic Left Party (DSP) with the most seats in parliament. The only remaining legal Kurdish party, the Peoples' Democratic Party (HADEP), faced an imminent ban, and thousands of HADEP members--including its leader and several electoral candidates--were detained prior to the elections. Members of the Islamic Virtue party were also harassed and jailed. Turkey's chief prosecutor is now seeking to close the Virtue party after a newly elected female Virtue parliamentarian insisted on wearing a head scarf inside parliament chambers. U.S. weapons transfers not only provide tacit support for these repressive policies, but have also been used directly by military and police forces to commit human rights abuses, as documented by both Human Rights Watch and the U.S. State Department. In a campaign to root out local Kurdish support for the PKK, U.S.-supplied attack helicopters, jets, tanks, and armored personnel carriers have been used to destroy over 3,000 Kurdish villages. U.S.-origin small arms have been used in the extrajudicial killing of suspected PKK soldiers or sympathizers, and American-made utility helicopters have been used to transport soldiers on these missions. After the Ocalan arrest, the Turkish military heightened its attacks on the PKK, both in Turkey and across the border into northern Iraq. Turkey's renewed faith in the ability to win the war probably encourages the military to continue using indiscriminate and disproportionate force, though Turkish authorities have prevented U.S. officials ! and international human rights groups from monitoring their activities in the region. The war with the PKK also carries repercussions for stability in the region and within Turkey, both of which adversely affect U.S. security interests. The CIA's 1997 "State Failure Task Force" report identified Turkey as a nation in danger of collapse. The military's heavy-handed, destabilizing role in domestic politics can only be justified as long as the war continues. The conflict has also created entrenched governmental corruption, touching all central political actors in Ankara. By flooding the Aegean region with high-tech arms, the U.S. has also fueled an arms race between Turkey and Greece and exacerbated their fractious relationship. Time and time again, Turkey has provoked Greece by flying over its airspace and entering its territorial waters, and it has flown F-16s over southern Cyprus in violation of its licensing agreement with the U.S. government. Turkey has often threatened force against Greece and Cyprus, most recently in response both to Greece's role in harboring PKK leader Ocalan and to the Greek Cypriot government's planned purchase of Russian S-300 air-defense missiles. The U.S. has often had to intervene to prevent open conflict between the two NATO allies, whose tense relationship threatens to further undermine regional stability. (Tamar Gabelnick ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) is Acting Director of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project of the Federation of American of Scientists.) Sources for More Information Amnesty International Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.amnesty-usa.org/ Contact: Maureen Greenwood Federation of American Scientists Arms Sales Monitoring Project Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/turkey.htm Contact: Tamar Gabelnick Human Rights Watch Europe and Central Asia Division Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.hrw.org/ Contact: Betsy Anderson Lawyers Committee on Human Rights Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.lchr.org/ Contact: Jerry Fowler Washington Kurdish Institute Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.clark.net/kurd/ Contact: Mike Amitay World Policy Institute Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Contact: Bill Hartung Kurdish Worldwide Resources http://www.kurdish.com/ State Dept. Turkey Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/turkey.html U.S Military Equipment And Human Rights Violations http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/state/turkey_dos_USweapons.htm Violations of Free Expression in Turkey http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/turkey/index.htm --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *** RUSSIAN POLITICS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY *** (Ed. Note: Russia, a key player in the effort to resolve the Kosovo crisis, is battling crises of its own. The deeply unpopular Yeltsin successfully survived an impeachment challenge, fired his latest prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, and then successfully nominated a new one, a Yeltsin loyalist and former chief of security forces, Sergei Stepashin. Meanwhile, as politics continues its chaotic course in Moscow, Russia faces the tough choice of approving a new IMF package of economic policy reform (and thereby avoid default on its foreign loans) that will maintain the country on its path of privatization and economic liberalization or of defaulting on its debt--a move that would send new financial shock waves around the world. The following analysis comes from a FPIF essay written by John Feffer.) *** Russian Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy *** By John Feffer For the better part of the 20th century, U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union fluctuated between aggressive confrontation and brief attempts at d�tente. During their respective eras, Truman and Reagan were bent on containing the Soviet Union and, when possible, rolling back its influence in Eastern Europe and the third world. Nixon, without compromising his anticommunism, managed in the 1970s to ease tensions between East and West with a mixture of arms control measures and modest openings in the East for Western business. In the cold war period, confrontation and engagement often followed one another with little breathing room, as in Kennedy's near-apocalyptic showdown with Khrushchev over Cuba in 1962 followed by the negotiation of the first major arms control treaty with the Soviet Union in 1963. Whether in confrontation or detente mode, however, successive U.S. administrations sought (often unsuccessfully) to limit Soviet influence in the world and blunt the impact of commu! nism. Beginning in 1985, when the Soviet Union began a complex dance of reform and decline, the Reagan and Bush administrations did little to encourage the former and much to hasten the latter. True, Washington slowly came around to supporting glasnost and perestroika rhetorically. But during this period, the U.S. largely withheld economic support for perestroika while continuing to maintain high levels of military spending and provocative rhetoric. From 1989 to 1991, the Soviet Union's terminal stage, Washington switched to damage control mode in order to preserve the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe, pressure the Soviet Union to back German unification, and prevent conflict from flaring up over the secession of the Baltic states. In 1992, after the official collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin ushered in a "honeymoon" period with the United States. Yeltsin and his pro-Western foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, proceeded to follow the U.S. lead on arms control, economic reform, and global politics. The other leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)--notably Ukraine's Leonid Kravchuk, Georgia's Eduard Shevardnadze, and Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbaev--largely followed suit, each competing for the affections and favors of the United States. In return, the U.S. promised to help Russia and the other CIS nations integrate into the global economy and later, through the Partnership for Peace, into European security structures. The honeymoon did not last long. Russia never received the Marshall Plan it had hoped for. Nor did the U.S. government make room at the world's table for the new Russian entity (the seven largest economic powers, G-7, extended membership to Russia, but this was largely a symbolic gesture). As a result, the pro-Western faction in the Russian foreign policy establishment lost influence and Russian national interest became the new organizing principle for the Yeltsin team. The disastrous 1994 invasion of Chechnya, the refusal to ratify the latest strategic arms reduction treaty, and the elevating of relations with Serbia, Iran, and Iraq signified a change in Russian policy. For its part, the United States maintained support for Yeltsin personally, but gradually withdrew from close bilateral relations. Washington strengthened relations with the other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nations to cover its bets and to balance Russian power in the region. >From Washington's perspective, Boris Yeltsin has been the leader who could do no >wrong. He concentrated power in his own hands through the 1993 constitution, ruled by >decree, bombed his own parliament, effectively stole the 1996 presidential election, >brutalized the entire nation of Chechnya, presided over a monumental and largely >opaque transfer of public wealth into private hands, and still the United States has >stood by him. For, despite his liabilities and chronic illnesses, Yeltsin has >actually been quite compliant. He can, for example, be influenced on personnel >decisions. (Clinton pressured him to retain the corrupt Chubais.) More critically, as >Dimitri Simes has argued, Yeltsin "was prepared to subordinate Russian foreign policy >interests to Western, and especially American, preferences to a much greater extent >than the parliament or the Russian public at large." (It is only recently--with >Yeltsin's mind wandering, his grip on politics weakening, his critics pushing fo! r impeachment--that the Clinton administration has finally stepped back to consider the political alternatives for president of Russia). Yeltsin's antidemocratic tendencies have taken a heavy toll on the Russian body politic. Weak political parties, a weak civil society, and a weak judiciary all characterize the Russian political scene. The press, while nominally free, is increasingly controlled by business interests. Assassination of public figures and journalists is an all too frequent expression of political opposition. On the bright side, Yeltsin's poor health and Russia's financial crisis have both heralded a shift of power away from the presidency and toward the parliament, the government, and the regions. One reason for both the Yeltsin and Clinton administrations' lack of enthusiasm for democracy in Russia today is the enduring strength of the Russian Communist Party. Communists are frontrunners in several polls, and party leader Gennady Zyuganov is a strong candidate to succeed Yeltsin as president. Elections to the Duma will be held by the end of 1999, and left-wing parties will probably do well. Public dissatisfaction both with market reforms and with Yeltsin's leadership has been high for many years, though it hasn't found a viable political outlet. Entire sectors of the work force have gone out on strike, including miners and teachers. Although the Communist Party expected a larger turnout for its anti-Yeltsin crusade in October 1998, a million people did take to the streets. The Communist Party, if it can figure out how to mobilize its nationalist, progressive, and stalinist factions, might very well return to power--democratically. In the wake of the August 1998 financial crisis, the new Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, managed within a short period to secure a rough political consensus. He appointed a communist deputy, Yuri Maslyukov, to be chief deputy minister for economics and thus received the Communist Party's support for an austere economic recovery plan. Primakov was well-positioned to maintain a middle ground between pro-Western and nationalist voices as well as between statist and radical reform positions on the economy. His primary challenge was to maintain sufficient political consensus to pull the Russian economy out of its hole. Yeltsin, facing an impeachment challenge in the Duma, fired Primakov and his cabinet last week, adding to the political instability in Russia. Fearing yet more instability, Russia's parliament turned back the impeachment initiative, although displeasure with Yeltsin is widespread. Part of the challenge facing a new prime minister will be to enlist the support of Russia's regions. Russia is a country of 89 regions. At present, Moscow has power-sharing arrangements with more than half of Russia's regions. Only ten of the 89 regions are net donors; the rest are dependent on subsidies. The federal government has an informal arrangement with the regions--the center will ignore human rights violations and corruption on the periphery if the periphery promises not to secede and acknowledges, if only rhetorically, the validity of federal policy. Primakov's task will be to figure out how to persuade (rather than force) Russians and non-Russians outside the center to contribute to the federal strategy of reconstruction. Belying the notion of a harmonious, multiethnic Russia has been a profusion of extreme nationalist, racist, and anti-Semitic organizations. Quasi-fascist groups such as the Russian National Unity movement (RNE) have thrived in an atmosphere of lawlessness and antigovernment sentiment. Not only has the Yeltsin administration (until recently) neglected this worrisome phenomenon, but the Ministry of Internal Affairs, local authorities, and military units have occasionally acted in concert with the RNE. The influence of these extremist groups is difficult to measure--they receive a good deal of attention in the Russian press, but the actual number of followers remains low. Because of the recent rise in anti-Semitism (as well as the general economic crisis), Jewish emigration has increased. Meanwhile, in Moscow, the level of racist violence--both by skinheads and by the police--has increased. The U.S. government spoke out on this issue only when a U.S. Marine was the victim of assa! ult. Toward A New U.S. Policy in Russia The Clinton administration has responded to the prolonged Russian crisis with some good initiatives: it has provided a measure of humanitarian assistance, has helped support the free press, and has devoted a considerable amount of money to help Russia decommission its nuclear weapons. It has also developed useful projects such as the Congressional Research Service program to train library and research staff for newly created legislatures. But these are small points of light in an otherwise dismal picture. NATO remains a key sticking point in U.S.-Russian relations at the moment. Particularly destabilizing from Moscow's viewpoint is NATO's interest in preparing the Baltic states for admission as well as efforts to absorb Ukraine into the alliance. Russia has drawn its version of a line in the sand--a "red line"--which it warns NATO not to cross or risk "destruction of the existing world order." Given Russia's consistent opposition as well as the sheer number of actual and potential crises on Russia's border, the U.S. must consider whether admission to NATO will render the petitioning states more secure or less secure. Meanwhile, the U.S. must make a commitment to the Permanent Joint Council and actively engage Russia on the broadest range of security issues, including arms limitation. NATO, for all its efforts to redefine its mission, has not spent much time on arms control. Indeed, the 1999 Washington Summit focused on the Defense Capabilities Initiative, a modernization effort! . For conventional arms control to proceed, NATO must concentrate more on the contraction of its forces than on the expansion of its influence. To address Russian concerns about the asymmetry of nuclear arms control, the Clinton administration should consider the proposal by Jonathan Dean of the Union of Concerned Scientists to add a protocol to the current START II treaty that would limit total deployed warheads to 1,000 and then proceed with START III negotiations (concerning data exchange, warhead dismantling, tactical warheads, and sea-launched cruise missiles). This disarmament process will cost money, of course, but every dollar spent neutralizing nuclear weapons on both sides is money well spent. Although the Clinton administration must challenge Russia's residual hegemonic impulses, it must also be careful to recognize Russia's interests in Central Asia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. This is not an easy balancing act. On the issue of Caspian Sea oil, for instance, the U.S. should work with Russia rather than against it in developing a sustainable approach to oil extraction and delivery to foreign markets. Through its largely rhetorical support for Russians in the "near abroad" and by maintaining influence in the CIS, Russia has retained a weak "imperial" identity. As Anatol Lieven warns, if the U.S. tries to destroy this weak imperialism by completely isolating Russia, virulent nationalism of the fascist and anti-Semitic variety is likely to fill the vacuum. On economic issues, Washington must start with humanitarian aid and debt forgiveness. The Clinton administration has offered 1.5 million tons of wheat plus a $600 million credit to finance imports. This is a good basis to build on. Where possible, the aid program should buy within Russia (or the CIS or Eastern Europe) and distribute to the neediest regions in order not to undercut local agricultural production. The U.S. should also lead the way in calling for debt forgiveness, particularly of the $70 billion debt that was inherited from the Soviet Union. In other words, the international community should apply the same standard to Russia that it did to Poland. Grzegorz Kolodko, former Polish minister of economics, recommends that the West forgive 80 percent of the inherited debt and 50 percent of the post-Soviet debt--a sensible proposal coming from a border country very concerned with the future viability of the Russian economy. Once these emergency situations are addressed, the U.S. should support a mixed economy in Russia (and the rest of the CIS). This option should permit the Russian government to pursue an "infant industries" approach to remaking the economy--picking likely economic winners and nurturing their growth. Even free-market champion, Business Week, has criticized the Clinton administration for undercutting Russia's capacity to rebuild itself. Foreign direct investment can play a modest role, but the revival of Russian industry and agriculture must benefit Russians, not the owners and stockholders of multinational corporations. Meanwhile, the U.S. and Russia should take advantage of the environmental opportunity that the collapse of industrial production has inadvertently provided--Russian industry now generates 35 percent less air pollution than in 1991 and 15-18 percent less water and other pollution. The Clinton administration should consider a large environmental package for Russia that would ensure that new production facilities and sewage treatment plants meet international standards. The administration should also come through with sufficient funds to clean up Russia's decommissioned nuclear submarines, an ecological disaster in the making. The U.S. and the West must not simply call for environmental protection in Russia; they must pay for it. Otherwise, economic need will continue to induce Russia to undertake disastrous policies, such as the Atomic Energy Ministry's recent attempts to import nuclear waste from around the world--including the United States. On the political front, the Clinton administration should stop interfering in Russia's elite politics in a vain attempt to find the right mix of pliant reformers. Instead, the U.S. should concentrate on strengthening popular institutions--the judiciary, research institutes, and grassroots organizations. For economic reform to proceed fairly and openly, Russia will need stronger watchdog agencies and citizens' monitoring groups. Russia, economically weak and militarily weakening, hasn't put up much of a fight against U.S. policy. It recalled its ambassador from Washington after the December 1998 bombings of Iraq; it has tried to outmaneuver the U.S. and its allies for the prize of Caspian oil; it has courted Iran and has largely repaired its relationship with North Korea. In an attempt to form an "Asian triangle," Russia has even sought common cause with India and China (the former angry with Washington about NATO expansion and the latter incensed over the U.S. theater missile defense program). These are perhaps improbable bedfellows given their historic tensions, yet aggressive U.S. policies are practically forcing them into a menage a trois. These are cautious maneuvers. For the time being, Russia is treading very tentatively, careful not to antagonize its chief economic patron, the United States. But Russia will not always be so dependent on U.S. aid or on money from multilateral institutions largely controlled by the United States. Russia is rich in history, in resources, in resourcefulness. It is rich, too, in strains of intolerance and anti-Western sentiment that are only strengthened by adversity and isolation. The Clinton administration (as well as its more anti-Russian critics on the Right) should think twice about capitalizing on Russia's current dependency, for short-term gain may lead to negative consequences in the long-term. (John Feffer is the author of Shock Waves: Eastern Europe After the Revolutions (South End, 1992), Beyond Detente: Soviet Foreign Policy and U.S. Options (Hill and Wang, 1990), and several In Focus briefs (on NATO, U.S.-Russian Relations, Eastern European economic reform, and the situation in former Yugoslavia). He is also co-editor of Europe's New Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 1996).) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Progressive Response, go to: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/progresp.html and follow the instructions. 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