-Caveat Lector- an excerpt from: Inside The League Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson©1986 Dodd, Mead & Company 79 Madison Avenue New York, N.Y. 10016 ISBN 0-396-08517-2 322pps — out-of-print/one edition [re-print/first edition available from: W. Clement Stone, P M A Communications, Incorporated] --[4]-- FOUR The Taiwanese really insist on this ''war of organizations." if an infantry battalion isn't adequate to combat guerrillas, let us design an organization that works. -Roberto D'Aubuisson, death squad leader in El Salvador, 1983 IN THE 1960s, five Asians made major contributions to creating and promoting a movement that would spread to nearly one hundred nations on six continents. One was a ruthless dictator who had seen his vast domain reduced to a tiny island through corruption and a series of military blunders. Another was a former communist who had saved his own life by turning in hundreds of his comrades for execution. Two were gangsters, the fifth was an evangelist who planned to take over the world through the doctrine of "Heavenly Deception." They weren't what one would call a sterling assortment of characters- four of the five had spent time in prison, two for war crimes, one for anti-state activities, another on a morals charge. Yet if it weren't for the collective efforts of Chiang Kai-shek, Park Chung Hee, Ryoichi Sasakawa, Yoshio Kodama, and the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, there probably would not be a World Anti-Communist League today. The organization that Stetsko's Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations joined forces with in 1966 was dedicated to stemming the communist tide in Asia: the Asian People's Anti-Communist League (APACL). Formed in 1954, the Asian League was dedicated to uniting conservatives from all over the continent to battle the "Red hordes" that threatened them all. When the ABN, the APACL, and other groups merged in 1966 to form the World Anti-Communist League, it did not mean the end of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League, but its stature was reduced to regional affiliate of the larger organization. Although the Asian League was hailed in 1954 as a private formation of concerned citizens, parliamentarians, and clergy, it was actually a creation of South Korean intelligence agents and the Chinese government-in-exile of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In many respects, South Korea and Taiwan appeared to be natural allies. Chiang's Nationalists were isolated on the tiny island of Taiwan, or Formosa, and Korea was devastated and impoverished after the Korean War- both nations were desperately seeking anti-communist allies throughout the world. An organization in which conservative leaders from the United States and Europe could meet with their Asian counterparts seemed a good avenue for this. Chiang Kai-shek had waged a bloody and cruel twenty-year war in China against the Mandarin warlords, the occupying Japanese, and the communists led by Mao Tse-tung. Chiang's rule was corrupt, inept, and impotent, perhaps best illustrated by the speed with which he lost mainland China to Mao after World War II. Even the American military officials who advised him during World War II had no faith in him or in his Kuomintang (KMT) political party. As early as 1943, General Joseph Stilwell had disgustedly called the Chiang Kai-shek rule "a one party government supported by a Gestapo." Though the mainland was not completely conquered by Mao until 1949, Chiang had established his cronies on Formosa (named by the Portuguese, meaning "beautiful") four years earlier. The native Formosans chafed under the Kuomintang rule, which had quickly monopolized the island's economy and government. In 1947, the natives, ardently pro-American, rebelled against the "occupiers" and pushed for greater autonomy. If the Formosans were hoping for moderation from the Kuomintang or assistance from the Americans, they were soon disillusioned. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek may not have been able to defeat the communists, but the unarmed Formosans were a different story, under the cover of darkness, he rushed some twelve thousand of his Nationalist soldiers to the island. The massacres that ensued were indiscriminate and vast in scale. "From an upper window," George Kerr, a State Department official in Formosa, wrote, "we watched Nationalist soldiers in action in the alleys across the way. We saw Formosans bayoneted in the street without provocation. A man was robbed before our eyes-and then cut down and run through. Another ran into the street in pursuit of soldiers dragging a girl away from his house and we saw him, too, cut down. "This sickening spectacle was only the smallest sample of the slaughter then taking place throughout the city."[1] Dr. Ira Hirschy, the chief medical officer in Formosa for the United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Agency, was also a witness to the killings: In the city of Pintung where the inauguration of the brief people's rule was marked by the playing of the Star Spangled Banner on phonographs, the entire group of about 45 Formosans who were carrying on various phases of local government were taken out to a nearby airfield from which, later, a series of shots were heard. A Formosan, who, representing the families of these people, went to the military commander to intercede for their lives, was taken to the public square and, after his wife and children had been called to witness the event, he was beheaded as an example to the rest of the people not to meddle in affairs which did not concern them.[2] After the initial wave of killings, which claimed the lives of most of Formosa's prominent businessmen, intellectuals, and political leaders, the Nationalists turned their attention to the younger generation. "We saw students tied together," Kerr reported, "being driven to the execution grounds, usually along the river banks and ditches about Taipei [the capital].... One foreigner counted more than thirty bodies—in student uniforms-lying along the roadside east of Taipei; they had had their noses and ears slit or hacked off, and many had been castrated. Two students were beheaded near my front gate." The March 1947 massacre took an estimated twenty thousand lives; the fledgling Formosan independence movement had been crushed and the way was paved for Chiang Kai-shek and his soldiers retreating from the mainland to establish a government-in-exile. The atrocity also proved the efficacy of total and unconventional warfare, a mode of combat the Nationalists would later teach to other anticommunists, often through the auspices of the World Anti-Communist League. By 1949, nearly a million Nationalists had flooded into Formosa. There they established the Republic of China and imposed a rigid dictatorship over the indigenous population, which outnumbered them fifteen to one. The Formosans, now called Taiwanese under Chiang's decree, were completely shut out of the governing process, which became the domain of the Kuomintang. Businesses and factories belonging to natives were taken away and given to Chiang's cronies. Taiwanese suspected of harboring communist sympathies or of opposing Chiang's rule (to the government, the two were virtually synonomous) were executed or exiled to the prison on Green Island on the slightest pretext- this effectively crushed any opposition that remained. Contrary to popular belief, and contrary to the pronouncements of the Kuomintang, the United States did not immediately support the new government in Taiwan. Throughout all branches of the American government, including the military, there was widespread contempt for Chiang Kai-shek and revulsion at the atrocities of his soldiers. Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, generally considered something of a rightist and certainly no friend of Mao's communists, wrote in 1949: The Central Government [the Kuomintang] lost a fine opportunity to indicate to the Chinese people and to the world at large its capability to provide honest and efficient administration.... [They] ruthlessly, corruptly and avariciously imposed their regime upon a happy and amenable population. The Army conducted themselves as conquerors. Secret police operated freely to intimidate and to facilitate exploitation by Central Government officials.[3] The man who would make the new regime in Taiwan palatable to the Americans was General Douglas MacArthur. One day in July 1950, while he was commander in chief of the United Nations forces fighting in Korea, MacArthur breezed into Taipei, met with Chiang Kai-shek, and promised him, in contradiction to President Truman's policy, that American expertise and weapons would soon be flowing to the island bastion. Appearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the general extolled the virtues of the Kuomintang government. I superficially went through Formosa. I was surprised by the contentment I found there. I found that the people were enjoying a standard of living which was quite comparable to what it was before the war.... I found representative government being practiced.... I went into their courts. I found a judicial system which I thought was better than a great many of the other countries in Asia. I went into their schools. I found that their primary instruction was fully on a standard with what was prevalent in the Far East.... I found many things I could criticize too, but I believe sincerely that the standard of government that he [Chiang] is setting in Formosa compares favorably with many democracies in the world.[4] That MacArthur had achieved such a firm grasp of the state of affairs in Taiwan during a single day's visit was not questioned by the American legislators. Indeed, his promises of American support were prophetic. As the Korean War turned against the United States, Chiang Kai-shek, with his dream of returning to the mainland and defeating the communists, was seen as a potential pressure point against Mao. With the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy and his "exposing" of communist sympathizers in the federal government, American officials muted or stopped their criticism of Chiang's rule. Suddenly the Kuomintang was respectable, and American aid began to pour in. The American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Taiwan grew from a handful of advisers in 1951 to 2,300 five years later. Economic aid and war materiel flowed in at a rate that the island could not possibly absorb. By 1961, military expenditures, nearly all provided by the American government, were three-quarters of the national budget. Throughout, Chiang Kai-shek performed his appointed role. Every October 10, he emerged onto a balcony in Taipei's main square and, before hundreds of thousands of soldiers, students, and workers standing at attention, proclaimed that the return to the mainland was imminent. At the end of World War II, Korea was a divided and shattered nation. The Soviets had seized the industrialized northern half of Korea and established a puppet state. The Americans, occupying the southern half, brought in Synghman Rhee, a right-wing strongman who hadn't lived in Korea for thirty-five years, to rule their sector. Since Rhee had no power base, the military and the government of South Korea were both filled largely with rightists who had fought on the side of the Japanese during the war and who could thus be trusted as anti-communists. One of these was Park Chung Hee. Although the Asian People's Anti-Communist League was established during Rhee's reign, it was Park who would make it an important instrument of South Korean foreign policy. When the Asian People's Anti-Communist League was formed in 1954, Taiwan and South Korea had much in common. Korea had lost half its territory, the most economically advanced part, to the communists, while Chiang's Nationalists had seen over 99 percent of theirs slip away. Both were in the front lines of the Cold War, completely exposed to their implacable enemies: the Korean capital was twenty miles away from the armies of North Korea, and Taiwan was ninety miles across the China Sea from the colossus of Communist China. Both harbored dreams of reunification through the defeat of communism, both were ruled by military dictatorships that kept order through perpetual martial law, and both were indebted to the United States for their survival and prosperity. The Asian People's Anti-Communist League was born out of the desire of these two nations to cement ties with potential friends in other parts of the world, as well as to justify their own dictatorships. Although the Asian League has expanded to include other Asian countries in the American sphere of influence, ultimate power has always remained with Korea and Taiwan; the chairmanship goes to Taipei and the secretariat is housed in Seoul. In the 1970s, when other countries criticized Korea's iron-fisted internal policies and dropped their recognition of Taiwan in favor of mainland China, the Asian League, as well as the World Anti-Communist League, became virtual foreign policy arms of these two countries desperate to make, or at least maintain, relations wherever and with whomever possible. >From the beginning, the task of forming and perpetuating the Asian People's Anti-Communist League was entrusted to Korean and Taiwanese intelligence agencies. The composition of their league delegations was largely drawn from the intelligence and military communities. For example, Ku Cheng-kang, president of the Taiwanese chapter and currently "honorary chairman-for-life," had been a member of Chiang Kai-shek's Supreme National Defense Council during World War II, minister of interior and of social affairs, national policy adviser, senior adviser to the president, and a member of the Central Standing Committee of the ruling Kuomintang. Armed with an impressive array of posts and honors, Ku was, technically at least, the fourth most important official in the KMT government. The Korean delegations, on the other hand, were composed mostly of active and retired army officers or, beginning in the 1960s, Korean CIA agents. The Chinese Nationalists established branches of the Asian League in ethnic Chinese communities in the United States. Korean CIA agents fanned out throughout Asia and the United States making contacts and arranging delegations for conferences, usually paying for the visitors' expenses. It was Park Chung Hee, Synghman Rhee's successor in South Korea, who was most responsible for this campaign of expansion and quiet influence. Park, a slight man by Korean standards, was a master in the game of political musical chairs; he nimbly leaped from the right to the left, in whatever direction was most advantageous to his pursuit of power. He had been not just a Japanese sympathizer during the war; he had been trained by them. He had graduated from their Manchukuo Military Academy in occupied Manchuria and fought with them in China. That background did not, however, deter him from secretly becoming a high official in the Communist Party of South Korea while he was teaching at a military academy in 1946. When he was arrested by the government in 1948 and sentenced to death, his future looked bleak; it was time for him to move back to the right, Park cut a deal with the Rhee government: Spare my life, and I'll tell you everything. "His actions resulted in the purge of hundreds of army officers and the death of many former friends."[5] Park's treachery kept him alive to lead the coup thirteen years later that would propel him to power as the strongman of a rightwing, anti-communist military dictatorship. At three o'clock on the night of May 16, 1961, the Korean army fanned out through the streets of Seoul. By the end of the day, the officers had formed a Military Revolutionary Committee, dissolved the National Assembly, closed all schools and newspapers, imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and declared martial law. Before the end of the year, they had created the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.[*][ *Despite the similarity of names, there is no evidence that the American CIA was involved in the creation of the Korean CIA in 1961. In fact, American authorities were reportedly angered by the South Korean government's adoption of the identical title.] While he was the unbridled ruler of South Korea, Park transformed the Asian League. He replaced the Korean chapter leaders: High-ranking generals, admirals, and personal advisers to the president began attending its conferences. Through the League, the new ruling elite of South Korea could meet, confer, and negotiate informally with influential military officers and parliamentarians from throughout the world. In time, both the Asian People's Anti-Communist League and the World Anti-Communist League became instruments of the Park government's campaign to gain influence in other countries through the bestowing of gifts, money, or favors. The eventual revelations of this campaign culminated in the 1976-78 Koreagate scandal in the United States. Just how important a foreign policy instrument Park considered Korea's League chapter to be, especially when directed at the United States, is illustrated by the fact that it was an American professor, David Rowe, who rebuilt it for him, "With the financial support of an American foundation," Rowe wrote in 1970, "and on the invitation of a Korean who is still today probably the second most powerful man in Korea [an apparent reference to former KCIA director Kim Jong Pil], I spent the summer of 1965 in the Korean Chapter of the APACL. I worked to establish training organizations and procedures for the anti-Communist struggle in Korea.... I accomplished almost single-handed the following: the then-head of the Korean Chapter was sacked and a younger and highly capable man took the job, albeit only for a limited time. The organization was thoroughly cleansed of its left-oriented infiltrators.... When I finally got to the President of the Republic of Korea, and outlined the rotten state of affairs then current in the Chapter and told him what had to be done, I can simply state for the record that within six months every one of my specific recommendations for the Chapter had been put into effect."[6] The Korean president who acted on Rowe's recommendations, Park Chung Hee, ruled South Korea with an iron fist until 1979. One evening in October of that year he was dining at the Kungjong, a government restaurant, with the KCIA director, Kim Jae Kyu. Sitting on the floor in traditional Korean style, the two men began quarrelling over the repressive methods that had been used recently to silence the oppositon. The climax of this "accidental argument" came when Kim Jae Kyu produced a gun, aimed it at the president's head five feet away, and pulled the trigger. Kim put two bullets into Park, then gunned down five other occupants of the room. (How the KCIA director fired at least seven bullets from a six-chamber revolver is a ballistic mystery that Korean authorities have never fully explained.) Park Chung Hee was dead, but by that time the League could survive without him. Although the U.S. government has denied the authors access to the pertinent records, it appears clear that the United States was largely behind the formation of both the Asian People's and the World Anti-Communist Leagues. Because the United States propped up the regimes of Synghman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek, these rulers naturally initiated programs and pursued policies that their American advisers favored. Conversely, they could not easily embark on a project that the United States did not desire. Given the political realities of the time, it would be hard to believe that the Leagues were established without American assistance- after all, their stated objectivesto actively fight communism-were very much in keeping with American foreign policy objectives. It is equally doubtful that the Taiwanese and South Korean governments footed the bills for the Leagues. Taiwan was still woefully poor in the 1950s, while Korea 7 devastated by the Korean War, was suffering famine in some provinces. Without enough money to feed their own people, where did the money come from to launch an international organization? The obvious answer is that it came from the United States. If this is so, the financial assistance program was not overt; no bill was ever introduced in Congress for U.S. funding of the Leagues. Former intelligence officers suggest that the funds most likely came out of money already designated for economic or military assistance, CIA discretionary funds, or U.S. Embassy Counterpart Funds, and that it was done not out of Korea but out of Taiwan. Since the Chinese Nationalists were in no position to repay the American assistance in the 1950s 7 an arrangement was made whereby the United States was given "credits" in the Taiwanese currency (NT) for its debts. Using this method, the Taiwanese then embarked on various programs dictated by the Americans as a means to lower their debt. Thus the much-hailed Taiwanese missions to Africa to teach farmers better agricultural practices were actually an American program, paid for by Counterpart Funds in the American Embassy. These funds were not just numbers in a ledger book. They were actual sacks of money that sat in a safe in the American Embassy in Taipei. From the little-scrutinized Counterpart Funds account may have come the initial financing for the Asian People's Anti-Communist League in 1954 and the preparatory meeting of the World AntiCommunist League in 1958. The most likely American conduit for the latter operation was a flamboyant Harvard graduate named Ray Cline. Having served as an intelligence officer for the U.S. Navy and for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Asia during World War II, Cline was CIA station chief in Taiwan from 1958 to 1962. As such he had access to the Counterpart Funds account at the time when the first preparatory meetings were being held toward the establishment of the World League.[*][ *Cline went on to become deputy director of intelligence for the CIA and is now a senior associate of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University in Washington and president of the National Intelligence Study Center.] Whatever the validity of this theory, Cline continues to have a close relationship with the League. Not only has he attended several conferences, including those of 1980, 1983, and 1984 7 but he is also a close friend of retired Major General John Singlaub; their relationship dates back to the 1940s, when both served with the OSS in China. Singlaub is currently chairman of the World Anti-Communist League. Cline has contributed to the flourishing of the international ultraright in ways more verifiable than his possible early work with the League. Despite his local notoriety in Taiwan for having built the gaudiest home on the island (dubbed "the Pink Palace"), Cline developed a deep and lasting friendship there with a man named Chiang Ching-kuo, who at the time was head of the obscure Retired Serviceman's Organization. Cline's friend and hunting partner was not just a low-level Kuomintang bureaucrat, however; he was the son of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and heir-apparent to the Taiwan dictatorship. He had an intelligence background similar in some respects to Cline's, except that he had the added advantage of having been trained by the enemy. Chiang Ching-kuo had graduated from the Sun Yat-Sen University in Moscow in 1927. Deemed a "revolutionary cadre" by his communist instructors, he was appointed as an alternate member of the Communist Party. He had also attended the Whampoa Academy, a Soviet-run school in China that instructed its pupils, both communist and Nationalist, in the art of political warfare. The generalissimo's son put his instruction to good use- by the time of his affiliation with Cline, he had already been in control of the Kuomintang's secret police (or "Gestapo," according to General Stilwell) for at least a decade and had personally overseen purges in which dozens of Kuomintang officers were executed. Throughout his subsequent rise to the top, from defense minister to premier and, finally, to president, Chiang Ching-kuo had a steadfast ally in Ray Cline. In the late 1950s they joined forces to create an instrument of war that continues to have a hidden impact on events throughout the world: the Political Warfare Cadres Academy. Today, much of the international recruitment for this academy is coordinated through the World Anti-Communist League. Although the regime describes political warfare as a system "to remove obstacles to national unity within and to resist aggression from without,"[7] political warfare is actually the ideological base that the Kuomintang has used to maintain Taiwan as a police state and to infiltrate, expose, and liquidate any opposition that may be suspected to exist at any level of society, even down to the family level. Through the use of political warfare, armed with the fiat of permanent martial law, the Nationalists have built what is probably one of the most pervasive internal security and spying networks in existence. Fully one-fifth of the population is believed to be involved in this warfare, in activities ranging from lecturing soldiers and workers in political "correctness" to surveilling one's own children, parents, and neighbors for the authorities. The tool used to perpetuate this system is the Political Warfare Cadres Academy, housed on a hillside in Peitou, just outside the capital. Patterned after the Soviet model of political officers, commissars, and informants, the academy is the training ground for the General Political Warfare Department, a branch of the Ministry of National Defense. Its primary function, as with the Soviet model, is to ensure party (in this case, Kuomintang) control of the military through political incloctrination. Kuomintang cells, called "political departments" and composed of graduates of the academy, are established in every military unit down to company size. These political commissars watch over troops as well as the non-academy officers, test their political awareness, and submit regular status reports to the General Political Warfare Department on each person. "The surveillance or inspection function of the company political officer is by far his most ominous duty. Each member of the unit has the responsibility to report on dissidence and deviant political attitudes which may be observed on the part of his comrades."[8] The commissars' primary loyalty is not to the military but to the Party, and according to former American advisers in Taiwan, in disputes between army and political officers, the latter always win. The General Political Warfare Department conducts a vast array of operations. It runs radio stations, publishing houses, and even movie studios. It also has counterintelligence units to locate subversives and psychological warfare units to supervise political warfare campaigns and promulgate propaganda, as well as civic affairs units for the purpose of infiltrating behind enemy lines during an invasion to generate support for the Kuomintang. All of these different units undergo training at the academy. Although it was created in the early 1950s, the academy took on new importance when Chiang Ching-kuo became director of the General Political Warfare Department and reorganized it in 1959, a move facilitated by American assistance. In fact, American military personnel, drawn largely from the Military Assistance Advisory Group stationed in Taiwan, taught at the academy. One Taiwanese, a former Kuomintang Party member now living in exile, was selected from his university class to attend a two-month training course at the academy. "We were taught that to defeat communism, we had to be cruel. We were told to watch our commander, that if he showed weakness or indecision in combat, we were to kill him. They also had us watch fellow classmates who, of course, were watching us."[9] The cadres are also instructed in how to spot potential communist or pro-Taiwanese-independence sympathizers and how to open letters with a pencil so that their tampering is undetectable to the casual observer. As the students progress and win the trust of the teachers, they are advanced to classes in psychological warfare and techniques of interrogation. In keeping with the department's campaign to "resist aggression from without," graduates of the academy have also been active away from the island. "The political warfare system was involved in a wide range of international operations: personnel security- investigations, censorship, agent infiltration, front organizations, suppression of Taiwanese independence groups, and exploitation of overseas Chinese communities. These activities were carried out by a wide variety of agencies but overall planning and control was theoretically the responsibility of 'the intelligence agency of the nation's highest military organization/" the Political Warfare Department.[10] The most convenient cover for this international campaign of "organizational warfare" was, of course, the same cause that had gained the Kuomintang recognition in the first place: anti-communism. For this program, the Asian People's Anti-Communist League and, later, the World Anti-Communist League, were perfect vehicles. Eventually, the Nationalists expanded their political warfare campaign into another sector. As nations dropped their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor of mainland China in the early 1970s, the Kuomintang looked to their few remaining friends as the last threads connecting the island to the rest of the world. To the right-wing dictatorships in South and Central America, which represented most of the few real allies they had left, the Taiwanese could offer something more than trade; they could also offer political warfare training at their academy in Peitou. The legacy of the training at the academy, which the Americans in general and Ray Cline in particular helped to establish, can be found today in the "unconventional warfare" employed throughout Latin America. This transfer of expertise is, in large part, conducted through the offices of the World Anti-Communist League. In the 1950s and 1960s the Asian People's Anti-Communist League remained a rather home-grown affair. While the preponderance of Taiwanese and Korean military and intelligence officers within its ranks may have caused some to take pause, as well as its of some of the most severe governments in the world, representation it was hardly the well-financed, nation-linking organization of the extreme right that it is today. Although it was able to get conservative American congressmen and senators to attend its meetings, it remained a rather benign and regional "paper tiger." Other Asian nations placed varying degrees of importance on the League. In the capitalist bastions of Asia-Hong Kong', Macao, Singapore-League delegations consisted mostly of conservative businessmen and bankers. In Thailand, the military was represented at the League by General Prapham Kulapichtir. The Philippines chapter was filled with cronies of dictator Ferdinand Marcos and those drawn from his rubber-stamp National Assembly. Australia was represented largely by conservative members of Parliament (in 1978 one called the "international ecology movement" a communist ruse), interspersed with neo-Nazis, racists, and Eastern European immigrants whose roots lay in the fascist collaborationist armies of World War 11. In Southeast Asia, the chapters were headed by members of the ruling elite like Prince Sopasaino of the Laotian royal family, or by the military, like Colonel Do Dang Cong, a military aide to South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. Although the League began to come of age during Park Chung Hee's reign, a much bigger boost occurred later in the 1960s, when it tapped into three Asians with powerful political connections and a lot of money. The League's benefactors were two former Japanese war criminals who controlled Japan's underworld and a Korean evangelist who thought he was God. pps.46-59 FOUR 1. George Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 292-93. 2. Ira D. Hirschy, M.D. (chief medical officer, UNRRA, Taiwan) to Edward E. Paine (UNRRA reports officer). Quoted by Kerr, Formosa, pp. 305-6. 3. Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, U.S Relations with China (Washington: Division of Publications Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, 1949), p. 308. 4. General Douglas MacArthur, "Military Situation in the Far East," Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, 82nd Cong. 1st sess., 1951 (Washington: Congressional Record, 1951), p. 23. 5. Robert Boettcher, Gifts of Deceit (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1980), p. 16. 6. David Rowe, The WACL: What Should ACWF Do About It? (memorandum to American Council for World Freedom, October 23, 1970), pp, 6-7. 7. Republic of China, Briefing on the Political Establishment in Government of Republic of China Forces (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 1957), p. 16. 8. Joseph J. Heinlein, Jr., "Political Warfare: The Nationalist Chinese Model" (Ph.D. diss., American University, 1974), p. 578. 9. Coauthor interview with former KMT official, January 1985. 10. Heinlein, "Political Warfare," p. 535. --[cont]-- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. 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