(October 1999):  The 9.5 rating could apply if the Federal government
continues on its present course failing to acknowledge that we are in a
crisis and failing to take all the proactive measures that could still be
taken before the rollover to help minimize the impacts that can be expected.

Of greatest concern to me are nuclear weapons systems that remain on hair
trigger alert.  (I understand that even Stratcom has voiced concern regarding
this fact.  Whether or not the concern has reached the Secretary of Defense
or the President is a question.)  While nuclear weapons can only be launched
as a result of a human decision, if data is corrupted or if computer screens
go blank, there is the chance that human factors could lead to an unprovoked
launch.  While the Federal
government is to be lauded for taking initiatives aimed at minimizing the
risk of unprovoked weapons launches, much more needs to be done to help
ensure that no such launch occurs by any nuclear power.  A moratorium on the
use of nuclear weapons for at least a year would be a first step in that
direction.  Taking all weapons off hair trigger alert is essential with or
without a moratorium.

Nuclear power plant safety issues have not been fully acknowledged to date by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Nuclear Energy Institute.  NRC, NEI,
and the President's Council have failed to date to acknowledge the
recommendations offered by Mary Olson and Paul Gunter of the Nuclear
Information Resource Service and David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned
Scientists.  They have failed to respond to the very serious concerns raised
by these watchdog organizations.  The approaches that have been used to
ensure the safety of  nuclear power plants have
not included attention to all safety critical systems.  The focus has been
instead on mission critical systems.  The current inadequacy of backup diesel
generation capacity is a major concern.  If the Social Security
Administration has jet engines for use as sources for back up power
generation, why not use jet engines as back up power generation sources for
nuclear power plants?

If fuel shortages accompany the rollover as seems quite likely at present, it
will be difficult to guarantee safety in the shutting down of any plant,
should such actions become necessary.  Pre-positioned stocks of potassium
iodide or potassium iodate need to be stored in close proximity to all
nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel processing plants so that nearby
populations will have some safeguards in the event of an accident or
catastrophe. (To date only four states have taken such
initiatives according to a news report of October 1.)

(For a general critique of nuclear power plant safety issues, see a review by
Patrice Kaufman of a July 28, 1999 panel on nuclear power plant safety with
NRC, NEI, NIRS, and UCS participating.  The panel was sponsored by George
Washington University and held as a part of the GW Y2K Conference. See
      http://www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon/1999Conference.)
(Regarding potassium iodide and potassium iodate, see a recent discussion
thread at:
http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=000zXv.)

The chemical industry continues to place public health and safety and the
environment at risk.  On the plus side a number of plants have announced
their intentions to shut down over the rollover or take other extraordinary
measures to ensure safety.  Also on the plus side, the State of California is
leading the way in taking a proactive approach to address Y2K-related
chemical plant safety issues.  The approach taken by the State of California
should be vigorously promoted through out the country and the world.  To date
the Federal government has failed to take a vigorous and proactive role in
helping ensure the widespread adoption and adaptation of such approaches.

A press conference to release "the official consensus from the groups
represented at the August 30, 1999 Chemical Safety Roundtable" was held on
October 7.  The Roundtable itself was closed to the public and the press.
The Center for Y2k & Society were observers at the Roundtable. They have
issued a press release on October 7 entitled: Federal Government Fails to Act
"Despite Widely Acknowledged Y2K Risks", Experts Say: White House Urged to
Take Steps to Increase Safety of Chemical Plants.  See the Center's website
for further details:
      http://www.y2kcenter.org

To date the Federal government has not assumed responsibility for
spearheading truly comprehensive efforts that could be helpful to the public
and private sector in minimizing the impacts that can be expected in chemical
sector, let alone the other highest hazard sectors.  They should be promoting
the proactive, crisis-oriented approach that the State of California is
taking.  As regards the chemical sectory, the President's Council and the
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) have done little more
than to write a letter to each of the States urging action.

Less than ten states have responded to the letter.  While the President's
Council and CSB have brought attention to California's efforts, the Federal
government has not to date funded efforts aimed at adoption or adaptation of
similar efforts throughout the nation.  They have acknowledged the tool kit
developed by the State:  The Y2K Hazardous Material Project Implementation
Tool Kit" available at:
      http://www.oes.ca.gov

There seems to be little recognition or appreciation on the part of Federal
officials and the chemical industry that simply making people aware of
informational resources has limited effectiveness.  In the majority of cases,
according to research on innovation diffusion, technology transfer, and
knowledge application, such information dissemination efforts must be joined
to technical assistance and
education and training efforts if they are to be successfully adopted or
adapted.  Innovative and interactive approaches to large scale education and
training efforts should be considered.  These could be along the lines that
have been employed by the World Bank; the Bank's African Virtual University
Program is a prime example.  The Bank has used live satellite transmission of
workshops to multiple sites in Africa simultaneously.  The programming has
been coupled with the use of the
internet, fax, and phone, allowing for maximum discussion and interactive
exchange.  This would be an excellent means of getting information and
assistance out to a large number of sites nationally or globally
simultaneously.  Such an approach would also be an excellent way of
maximizing scarce expertise.  Such an approach could be designed to raise
awareness levels of the seriousness of the threats and challenges while also
assisting those taking part taking steps to
address these threats and challenges locally, regionally, nationally, or
globally.

As regards the chemical sector in the United states, substantial funding
needs to be provided to the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, and the Chemical Manufacturers
Association to accomplish these objectives nationally.Also of great concern
is the fact that some oil and gas pipeline companies are taking a fix on
failure approach.  The possibility of explosions and other problems have been
raised.  The malfunctioning of embedded systems that control valves could in
and of itself lead to cascading impacts that could affect the functioning of
pipelines.  The dysfunctioning of oil and gas pipelines could create highly
hazardous situations in communities as well as in individual residences.  The
potential for major environmental impacts is also great.  Should massive
problems occur, the potential for disruption in the flow of oil and gas
throughout the nation is also great.

Great concern remains regarding the compliance of water purification
plants and waste disposal plants. One of the most outstanding spokesman
in this area has been Erik Olson of the Natural Resources Defense Fund.
As has been the case in so many of the other high hazard, high risk
sectors, the Federal government has not assumed responsibility for
spearheading comprehensive efforts that could be helpful to the public
and private sector in minimizing the impacts that can be expected in
this sector.  EPA hosted a three hour meeting on September 28, 1999.
According to one attendee, discussion during this meeting focused in
part on "some problems a few utilities faced in doing their audits and
patches".  According to this same individual, there was also "some
airing of concerns by some EPA officials and even some utilities".  "At
worst 10%" of the U.S population is served by utilities MAY not be Y2K
compliant.  The AWWA representative reportedly said that "the only thing
we have to fear is, fear itself".  According to the same attendee,
thinking seemed to be that we have "to avoid panicking the gullible &
skitish public".

According to another individual who attended a closed door meeting of
mostly Federal officials in February or March of 1999, a high ranking
Federal official expressed the view that five million people without
water would be an acceptable number!  The absence of a concern for the
public good evident in this statement is appalling.

The absence of concern for the public's right to know in keeping such a
possibility from the public also has no place in a free and open
society. Surely if the public were aware of such a possibility, they
would have pressured the Congress and the President to take steps to
avert such a catastrophe.

The citizens of this nation are being treated like children.  If this
continues, their anger may be without bounds when they come to realize
how much has been kept from them.

Unlike some other developed countries and even some developing
countries, the U.S.'s approach to Y2K preparedness has failed to be
action-oriented and has focused instead information gathering and
assessment and public and private sector efforts to share information.
With few exceptions, the results of the assessments have not provided
the basis for recommendations for action and have not led to initiatives
aimed at actually minimizing the impacts now during the pre-rollover period.

The focus on information gathering and assessments efforts has in a way
taken the attention away from the need for commonsense action: we know
that there will be a convergence of problem threads.  We have no idea
what the consequences of that convergence of problem threads might be.
Even if one's home, business, organizations, community, state, region,
and even national government were to be 100% compliant, there are any
number of other interdependency and supply change factors, nationally or
globally, that could impact locality, regionally, or nationally.  In
light of this fact, commonsense dictates that we not only do everything
we can to minimize possible disruptions and disasters, it dictates that
we prepare for the possibility of such disruptions and disasters.
Setting aside a stock of food and water is an essential first step.
Having adequate prescription medicine and medical supplies is another.
Taking steps to ensure that one is ready to withstand climatic conditions is
also crucial.  Having a radio that will work without electricity is another.

]Where possible prepayment of some monthly financial obligations
(mortgage payments, rent, insurance, utilities, etc.) could help give
people a sense of security.

Regarding disasters, the public needs to be acquainted with steps that
would need to be taken.  See the thread on "Chemical Plants Still a
Concern.." at
      http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=001Xiu
for an example of the guidance that one state is recommending.

While one of the greatest risks that we face is not being ready to deal
with infrastructure disruptions, another great risk arises out of the
failure of public officials to alert the public to even the possibility
of technological disasters.  Beyond these concerns there is yet another:
there appears to be no comprehension on the part of many of those in
roles of responsibility at the Federal level of what actions they might
be taking now to help hold the social fabric together.  To date, the
efforts of these individuals have been marked by an evident absence of
understanding of the full scope and nature of the threats and challenges
that face us.  In addition to that their efforts have been marked by an
apparent conviction that the American public would panic if they knew
that impacts might be as severe as a 3 to 5 on the impact scale, let
alone higher on the impact scale.  Owing to this conviction, those in
roles of responsibility have determined that every effort must be made
to "quell" panic and they have tried to do this through keeping even
their limited understanding of the possible severity of the impacts from
the public.  They have also not listened attentively to persons who have
greater comprehension of the impacts.  For instance, they have not
listened to Ed Yourdon.  They have not listened to Howard Rubin.
My lower level rating of a 5 on the impact scale would apply if the
government were to do everything that could be done beginning now in the
eighty or so days remaining to minimize the impacts of the Y2K and
embedded systems crisis here and abroad before the rollover.  Government
actions would need to be along the lines described in Parts 3 and 5 of
my White Paper at http://www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon.  Actions
would involve establishment of a crisis-oriented, proactive Office in
the Executive Office of the President that would have several hundred
full time employees who have responsibility for taking action and
facilitating action PRIOR to the rollover and continuing as long as need
be after that.  (The Information Coordination Center ~ the ICC ~ does
not have such a mission.  Instead the ICC focuses on gathering
information and doing assessments that will help guide actions that will
need to be taken AFTER the rollover.  The ICC as presently configured
does not focus on taking actions before the rollover that would be aimed
at minimizing impacts and averting disasters that can be expected after
the rollover.  Conceivably it could be reconfigured to encompass both
pre- and post- rollover concerns.  It would also need to be reoriented
to along proactive, crisis-oriented lines.)

In Part 5 of my White Paper posted in September, I introduced two
versions of a best case scenario, one that involves the Federal
government assuming its proper role of responsibility in addressing Y2K,
and failing that, an alternative scenario that would involve the rest of
the public sector in collaboration with the non-profit and private
sector.  In this case the rest of the public sector and the non-profit
and private sector would step into the vacuum left by an absence of
decisive Federal leadership and action.  In this version of the best
case scenario, everything that can be done would be done to minimize
impacts and avert disasters before the rollover.

Part 4 of my White Paper was posted at
      http://www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon
on August 18.  It goes into detail concerning the strategy that the President
has apparently adopted.  It discusses the President's absence of
understanding
concerning the nature of the threats and challenges posed by the Y2K and
embedded systems crisis. Apparently the President is privately somewhere
between a 3 and a 5 on the impact scale, while publicly acting as if he
believes that the impact will be less than a 3. (See Part 1 of my White
Paper for an description of the impact scale I am using here.)  It seems
obvious that the President has decided to wait to tell the American
public about the fact that we are facing a problem of at least a 3 - 5
magnitude.  He apparently feels that if he were to let the public know
how serious the impacts could be, that his statements would trigger an
immediate downturn in financial markets, something that could have major
ramifications, including profound political repercussions. Indeed, his
legacy could be shattered beyond repair.

Part 4 of my White Paper should help jar some people who have been
asleep or who have been lulled into inaction by the Administration's
absence of evident concern regarding the seriousness of the problem and
by the Administration's failure to recognize and openly acknowledge that
we are in a crisis.

In the Appendix to Part 4, Congressman Dennis Kucinich's views are
quoted from a transcript of an exchange that took place at the GW Y2K
Conference July 26 - 30. All parts of the White Paper can be accessed
from my home page at http://www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon.  The
Congressman's statements support the explanations that I offer
concerning the President's strategic approach to the crisis.

Some of the videotapes of the four and a half day conference, including
the exchange involving the Congressman Kucinich should be available soon
at http://www.y2kapproaches.com/real/pgordon.htm.  A grant from the
Nathan Cummings Foundation made the videotaping of the conference
possible.  The overall focus of the conference was on actions to address
Y2K and the embedded systems crisis that are yet needed at the local,
national, and global levels.  Papers and commentary focusing on the
converend can be found at
      http://www.gwu.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon/1999conference

Parts 1 - 4 of my White Paper provide a basic analysis of the current
status of efforts.  Part 5 includes a description of the basic
differences in three possible scenarios that could unfold, the status
quo scenario and two alternative best case scenarios.  I hope that
public officials and the media here and abroad will read Part 4 and 5
and go back and read Parts 1 -3.  If they were to do so, I think that
they would begin to understand that political games are being played
with the Y2K and embedded systems crisis at the highest levels of
government in the United States.  (By all means, they should also review
the videotapes of the July 26 - 30, 1999 George Washington Univerity Y2K
Conference to be posted soon at
      http://www.y2kapproaches.com/real/pgordon.htm
That four and a half day conference was on "Y2K: Local, National, and Global
Concerns ~ What Further Actions are Needed?"  A briefing by Ed Yourdon and
myself on related issues is already available for viewing on this realvideo
website.)

As a result of the inadequacy of U.S. government efforts, international
efforts that have been strongly influenced by the U.S. government, have
also failed to address the threats and challenges posed by the Y2K and
embedded systems crisis. Not only are the Administration's efforts
ill-serving the nation, they are ill-serving the world as well.   We all
stand to suffer as a result of these failings.  Key questions are as follows:

~ Can we yet rise to the occasion and educate and support those in roles
of public and private sector responsibility to do what can be done in
the little time remaining?

~ Will individuals and organizations from other parts of the public
sector and from the non-profit and private sectors step forward to fill
the vacuum if the Federal government continues to focus so little
attention on protecting and preserving the public good?

I am still hopeful that the President will accept responsibility in the
days remaining and do all that can be done to minimize the impacts that
we can expect.  Failing that our other institutions and leaders must
come to our rescue.

In order to expedite the dialogue concerning what remains to be done, I
am appending a list of individuals based in Washington, who are well
prepared to speak to various aspects of the crisis that we are in:
Health Issues:

(EXCELLENT, FORMERLY A PRINCIPAL AT BOOZ-ALLEN HAMILTON)
Margaret Anderson, Director of Policy, Center for Y2K & Society
202 775 3267

Community Preparedness Issues and Social and Psychological Aspects of Y2K
(PARTICULARLY OUTSTANDING IN BOTH SUBJECT AREAS)
Philip Bogdonoff
202 775 3157

Community Preparedness and Organizing Issues
Lois Saboe
Center for Y2K & Society
202 775 3157

Environmental, Public Health and Safety Issues Relating to Y2K
Fred Millar
Director of Environmental and Public Safety Policy
Center for Y2K & Society
202 775 3162

Chemical Sector Impacts
Jerry Poje  (Dr. Gerald V. Poje)
Member, Chemical Safety and Hazards Investigation Board
202 261 7617

Embedded Systems, General Overview,
National and Global Impacts
Financial Sector Impacts:
Stuart Umpleby
(Professor Umpleby has an extraordinary aptitude for explaining the
complexities of Y2K and embedded systems to people who have no technical
background.)
Professor of Management Science
Director
Research Program in Social and Organizational Learning
George Washington University
202 994 5219

Water-related Issues
Erik Olson
Natural Resources Defense Fund
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

Pipeline Issues
Lois Epstein
Environmental Defense Fund
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

Y2K and Nuclear Power Plant Issues:
(All excellent and well spoken)
Paul Gunther
Nuclear Information & Resource Service
202 328 0002
Mary Olson
Nuclear Information & Resource Service
202 328 0002
David Lochbaum
Union of Concerned Scientists
202 332 0900

I hope you will watch my George Washington University website for Part 6 of
my White Paper.  A new feature will also be added to that website that will
include updates of this rating and other commentary.


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