-Caveat Lector- <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/"> </A> -Cui Bono?- from: http://www.larouchecampaign.com/pages/usvlarouche2a.htm Click Here: <A HREF="http://www.larouchecampaign.com/pages/usvlarouche2a.htm"> New Page 6</A> ----- Crucial issues of the trial It has been established, on the record, that the unlawful Federal bankrupting of those entities had been undertaken for the aforethought purpose, of crafting otherwise untenable Federal indictments on loan-fraud charges. That had been the opinion shared among the members of the multi-jurisdictional prosecutorial team, that loan-fraud charges could not be brought against target LaRouche, unless the relevant entities were not only put into bankruptcy, but forced to cease ongoing repayments of loans, by the task-force’s shutting down the fraudulently bankrupted entities. That evidence demonstrates that the bankruptcy-action was taken as an intended, as well as merely objective fraud upon the bankruptcy court. Moreover, the systematic recruitment of prospective trial witnesses for a loan-fraud case, was not begun until after the bankruptcy proceeding launched fraudulently by the Department of Justice.43 The pretext for the charge of loan-fraud, was the use of the mails, by these firms, to send letters of confirmation of loan-status to the lenders, both as a matter of good accounting practice, and to reduce likelihood of misunderstanding in these matters. Hence, the prosecution’s irrational logic argued, this was “mail fraud.”44 The indictment, trial, and convictions in this case, hung entirely on the convoluted sophistry used to craft a mail-fraud charge in that fashion. The indictment in the latter case was handed down on October 14, 1988, two days after I had delivered an historic, and also prophetic Presidential candidate’s address in Berlin, Germany.45 The trial began on November 21, 1988; conviction was handed down on December 16, 1988. In fact, as distinct from sophistries of mere legal fiction, the only reason such a short trial on such complex issues could be arranged, was that none among the defendants was able, in fact, to testify in his own defense, although I, from the time of the indictment, had repeatedly instructed all relevant parties, including all of the defense attorneys, of my intention to do so. One of the co-defendants was also personally committed to testify, but was effectively prevented from doing so by his attorney’s failure to prepare him for trial. Since I was the person most frequently mentioned by the prosecution, the one principally accused by the indictment and in other ways, in a trial in which I was in fact innocent, but not permitted to respond to the mass of charges presented in the indictment and prosecution’s proceeding, that trial was, necessarily a farce in fact in its entirety. Indeed, it would be fairly estimated that my testimony alone, taking into account direct, cross, and redirect, would have required about two to three additional weeks in itself. The problems were, first of all, the fact that many of the defendants were not given sufficient time, at arraignment, to obtain attorneys to represent them at trial before the trial date was set. Second, more significant, was the fact that those attorneys, many hastily secured, were not in collective agreement on having me testify in my own defense, lest, in their opinion, that might pose an element of risk for some among the other defendants. Since most among those attorneys refused to agree on preparing themselves effectively for my testimony, I was, in point of fact, effectively denied the right to testify. Motions for severance, although made, were summarily denied. Otherwise, the trial would have had a different ultimate outcome. Later, it turned out, this denial of the effective possibility of testifying there, was largely the work of a relevant snake working from inside the defense’s preparation of the case, who exposed his true role most blatantly, on this and other counts, both during trial, and in post-trial developments. Legal sophistries put aside, in reality, the importance of my testimony in that case, is that there were numerous instances of crucial, blatantly false statements made, under oath, by certain key witnesses for the prosecution. These included many matters of which I had not only first-hand, but fully corroboratable knowledge. These were of crucial relevance for the jury’s hearing in that trial. Admittedly, as a practical matter, some of these issues, even the most important ones, were willfully, and wrongly precluded from trial by the judge’s pre-trial in limine rulings. Nonetheless, there were many matters which had been raised by the prosecution’s case, on which the facts, if presented, would expose the massive degree of lying by many prosecution witnesses, and willful fraud, in fact, in argument of the prosecutors. Unless those issues were forced into consideration by my personal direct and cross examination in court, those crucial issues would not be, in fact, considered by the jury panel, even though a significant number of them were either addressed or alluded to in the closing summaries of defense attorneys. The importance of this is underlined if one considers the sheer mass of false testimony, delivered under oath, by what existing evidence proves to have been corrupted witnesses, and if one takes into account, from the verbatim record, the additional mass of what was in fact false testimony, which was introduced as argument from the mouths of the, factually, culpably witting prosecuting attorneys. The most crucial fact, which attorneys secured on such short notice, were often poorly qualified to address, is that any politically motivated prosecution is, first and foremost, a political trial by definition, whatever the proper or fraudulent pretexts for the indictment which have been crafted by the prosecution.46 Such trials are designed, either by prosecutor’s intentions, or by unavoidable implications of bringing a prominent political figure to trial, to bring about what are inevitably political ends by means of the criminal charges. In all cases, when the political implications of such a case are kept out of trial, the trial itself is a fraud, by virtue of fallacy of composition of the facts addressed. A person on trial is who they are; a notable political figure on trial is, by definition, a figure of political controversy. In this case, even the charges themselves alleged political motivation as the characteristic feature of the alleged mail fraud. I was a figure whose character had been subjected to a massive political attack, over a preceding period of years, by all of the leading mass media in that area affecting the selection of the jury pool. The mind of the population represented by the jury pool had been polluted over at least twelve preceding years, and most intensively during the preceding four years, by this politically motivated mass-media campaign. Judge Bryan’s pre-trial rulings, and his survey of the prospective jurors was not only wrongful, but clearly fraudulent, in light of these facts well known to him. Apart from that pollution of the jury selection-process, neither the jury, nor the court in general could cut through the chaff clouding any such case, unless the implicit issue of the political motivation behind the prosecution were brought clearly into view, thus to be judged, on related evidence, as relevant to the charges, or not. Sometimes, the indictment and trial of a political figure is justified in fact. Sometimes the charges against such a figure might involve a pure and simple offense under the criminal code; even in such cases, the issue of the possibility of reasonable separation of the charges from the political associations, must be fairly presented to the court and its jurors. In any variant, as in the Boston trial, or what would have been an honest trial in the Alexandria case, sorting out a case in which the criminal charges are fabricated for political purposes, from one in which the honestly charged defendant is a prominent political figure, is precisely the most important problem which the jury, and the jury alone, must be equipped to decide in any trial by jury of a political figure. In this case, the prosecution and also the trial judge applied their greatest efforts, including the judge’s in-fact fraudulent use of a Rule 403 exclusion of admittedly relevant evidence, to prevent the jury from hearing the actual case which was, in fact, being set before them. Thus, Judge Bryan perpetrated willful fraud on the court by virtue of fallacy of composition. This rule is most emphatically applied in the instance of a well-known political figure, especially one as violently and fraudulently vilified as the Washington Post and other scalawag mass-press had deliberately saturated the area of the jury-pool for that trial. The jury could not help but reach a trial decision highly colored by political considerations brought into the jury-room by a corrupt mass-media, over many years, prior to and during the time of trial.47 If the relevant political figure, as defendant, is fraudulently charged, as I was in that case, and if the court is rigged, as Judge Bryan rigged this trial, and if the mass-media has attempted to whip the jury-pool into a lynch-spirit, as in this case, and if that political figure does not take the stand in his own defense, under direct and cross-examination, he is fairly certain of conviction, no matter how innocent he may be in fact, or how much the other evidence presented should have persuaded an honest jury48 of the defendant’s innocence of the charges. On consideration of this trial and conviction, a leading international legal authority, Professor Friedrich-August von der Heydte, made two sets of observations. First, he compared the Alexandria LaRouche case to that of the celebrated Captain Alfred Dreyfus.49 It took five days longer to obtain a fraudulent conviction of Dreyfus, than in a far more complex case of trial of both me and my six co-defendants. The issue of law Top of Document Professor von der Heydte made a second, separate point, which I endorsed publicly at that time. The conduct of the trial judge in that case, reflected, and that most plainly, a specific, and rapidly worsening corruption of U.S. law, today, which is more ominous than even the horrid Nazi law associated with the legacy of Germany’s Carl Schmitt and Roland Freisler. This corruption, typified by the tendency of Federal courts to adopt the Lockean principle of shareholder value, is to be recognized as a combination of radical positivism and the specific, interchangeable conceptions of slaveholder or shareholder value, associated with both the doctrine of the Confederate States of America, and the current doctrine among a leading element of the U.S. Supreme Court, as typified by the frequent resort to sophistry by Justice Scalia, today. The result of such a union of Locke and radical positivist law, is to be compared with the standpoint in law represented by the most notorious fictionalized figure of Plato’s Republic , Thrasymachus, or with the perverted notions of law of real-life Roman Emperors such as Tiberius, Nero, Caligula, and Diocletian. In summary, under such positivist mode of sophistry in law, the table of justice is rigged, like a crooked gambling table, before the victim is seated. Then, the rules by which the trial is rigged, are invoked apologetically by such corrupt legal authorities, to purport to show that the trial was according to “the rule of law”: according to the “rules”; in this case, as corrupt Judge Bryan’s corrupt in limine rulings attest, the rules were the special, Kafkaesque rules which those sophists and their fellow-travellers had made up for that occasion. The apologists, affecting a pose of self-righteousness, and lacking any other kind of righteousness, insist that since the trial followed their rules, the proceedings were, in the mouth of one later-exposed mole inside the defense team, therefore “fair.” Under the conditions defined by those two observations of Professor von der Heydte, as in the conditions of the infamous trial of Socrates, the very name of justice is a contradiction in terms. Only fools will say, under such circumstances, “But didn’t he get a fair trial according to the rules?” Who sets the rules, and how are they set? How are the rules, and the rule-makers to be judged? Can judges be considered persons privileged to be acting as the members of an autonomous private club; or, must they be accountable to some higher, less capricious standard of rule-making? If the rules exclude relevant truth, then, as in the lynch-trial of Socrates, it is the members of the court, not the accused, who should be condemned, like England’s Chief Justice Lord George Jeffreys before them, and, perhaps, like him, imprisoned for what are in fact crimes representing the greatest danger to both the republic and the general welfare of its people. In fairness, on this point, the following qualifying observation should be included here. Admittedly, the U.S. Congress has enacted many bad statutes. Presidents have promoted legislation, or condoned it, which, by every moral standard conceivable, they should have opposed. Under our Constitutional form of self-government, the immediate functional remedy for such errors, is to be sought in the Federal Court, which must rule on such matters out of an informed and cultivated conscience, even in defiance of the contrary prevailing opinion of the other Federal branches. However, when the Federal Courts go sour, as their decadence has unfolded during the recent quarter-century to date, only the combined forces of the other two branches have the immediate authority to correct this. What if all three branches fail to resolve an error? Then, there are only two higher authorities to which to appeal. One is the carefully deliberated expression of the people’s own interest in promoting the national defense and general welfare, the expression of the general welfare from whose moral and other political authority of our Declaration of Independence and Federal Constitution were derived. If that fails, there is but one higher authority to which to appeal for justice. That latter is sometimes referred to as the judgment of history, according to which history punishes, or even weeds out nations and cultures which suffer a manifestly incurable want of the moral fitness to survive. The ultimate authority of the principle of the general welfare of the people on this account, is revolutionary, as the opening paragraphs of the Declaration of Independence affirm this. The power of the still higher authority, history itself, is of a more awesome quality. In the final analysis, the only true authority for man-made law is reason. The authority of government, even its right to exist, lies solely in the duty of government to effect the efficient promotion of the general welfare of all its population and their posterity, as this is echoed in the first four paragraphs of our Declaration of Independence, and also the Preamble of our Federal Constitution. The judgment to be passed upon either a system of law, or the willfully persisting maladministration of that system, must be considered on two successively higher levels. In its simpler aspect, is it to be compared, in first approximation, to the deductive model of a Euclidean classroom geometry, as the derivation of proofs according to a cultivated knowledge of an underlying set of both stated and implied definitions, axioms, and postulates. However, on a higher level, the process of lawmaking and judicial procedure must recognize that, in statecraft, as in physical science, all previously existing sets of definitions, axioms, and postulates are subject to change, that in the same manner that validated new universal physical principles are discovered in science. If what was rightly validated as true beforehand remains true, not only must false assumptions be purged, but previously omitted, newly validated principles incorporated within a multiply-connected manifold of verifiable universal principles. The most important consideration to bear in mind, is to distinguish what is subject to such change, from that which is not. What can never change, under a sane rule of law, is the definition of the human being as being of a different nature than all the lower species. The adherence to that enduring principle, defines absolutely the distinction between civilized forms of society and the bestiality of slavery, cannibalism, serfdom, and other forms of inhuman barbarism.50 We human beings are each unique, relative to all other species, in our power, not merely to learn, but to discover new validated universal physical and other principles, by means of which our species is enabled to increase its per-capita power in and over the universe. In this respect, we are all made equally distinct from the beasts, and, in this respect and degree, made equally in the image of the Creator of this universe. It is upon the recognition of, and service to this principle, that all decent law-making proceeds. This principle, as the Declaration of Independence and Preamble of our Constitution variously acknowledge, and otherwise reflect it, this principle of the promotion of the general welfare represents the only legitimate basis in law for the existence of government, and is the underlying, unchanging cornerstone of all good law and justice. Thus, in honest law, the issues posed by the existence of this, and also certain additional underlying axiomatic assumptions, are always lurking. Conclusions must not only be proven, but we must always keep those underlying axiomatic considerations in mind. In each matter before us, the always lurking issue is: what is the axiomatic standpoint of the respective parties, and of the court itself? Are any among these axiomatic assumptions false, relative to the matters at issue? In a positivist doctrine of law, these crucial considerations are excluded axiomatically; rather, the case is tried as Rabelais’ famous justices Kissbreech and Suckfist would prefer, or in some equally scurrilous, irrational mode. In an honest trial, the underlying axiomatic assumptions of contending parties, and of the court itself, are always issues implicitly to be considered, and to be treated actively as axiomatic issues whenever the evidence relevant to that point of axiomatic controversy, might be a manifest issue of the matters actively at trial. Therefore, according to that single, supreme principle of natural law, the cognitive power of reason, through which mankind discovers those true universal principles, by means of which mankind increases our species’ power within and over the universe, is in itself the highest authority in making and application of law of, and among nations. Thus, in those means by which we discover how to cooperate in increasing mankind’s power in and over nature, we find the proof of what we rightly call reason. It is from those powers of reason, so cultivated, that we may adduce those rules of law by which we ought to be governed, and also govern ourselves. If our notion of “rule of law” becomes as perverted in practice as it has tended to become, especially in the degree we have experienced during the recent thirty years or so, and if the people do not change this, then the higher power of reason will act in response to the fact, that we have shown ourselves a people which has mislain, or perhaps even lost the moral fitness of a nation efficiently to survive. I mention that very important, and relevant point here. I shall return to it at an appropriate point, in the concluding section of this report. At this point, the immediately following point, bearing upon that, is to be considered. In contrast, the fact that much of the legislation, judicial practice, and public opinion encountered today, is essentially irrational, represents a special quality of lunacy from which our nation must free itself, if this nati on itself is to survive. Among such lunacies, the worst is the violation, or neglect of our government’s duty to promote the general welfare efficiently; on that, the very legitimacy of government and courts depends absolutely. The submission of President Clinton to the pressure of Vice-President Al Gore, in adapting to the bestial so-called “welfare reform” proposed by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, or the actions of the Democratic National Committee, in supporting the racist motion which attorney John Keeney continues to argue on its behalf,51 typify those kinds of actions, by which a government, a political party, or even an entire nation, undermines its moral authority to continue to rule and exist. The “LaRouche case,” thus, has the associated special importance, of showing what sorts of disoriented persons, even often lunatics, or worse, rule so many of the institutions of power and great influence in our nation today. The naked and persisting travesty of justice in this case, should be taken as an ominous warning to us, of what we must change, if this nation itself is even merely to survive. --[cont]-- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soap-boxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. 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