Germany, U.S., and the Yugoslav Crisis
By Sean Gervasi
Winter 1992-3 # 43
The Civil War As Lethal Shadow Play
The horrors in the Balkan region displayed daily on
television and in the newspapers show a country
apparently torn apart by civil war. But what lies behind
images of gaunt refugees, artillery duels,
blood-spattered walls, combat patrols and devastated
towns and villages? The only answer that most of us
can give is that it is the struggle of Yugoslav against
Yugoslav, of Croats against Slovenes and Serbs, of
Muslims against Serbs, and of Serbs against all of the
others.
That is what the mass media have been telling us, and
that is all they have been telling us. There are,
however, other forces at work in the Yugoslav crisis
beyond ethnic tensions. Yugoslavia has for some time
been the target of a covert policy waged by the West
and its allies, primarily Germany, the United States,
Britain, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, as well as by Iran, to
divide Yugoslavia into its ethnic components, dismantle
it, and eventually recolonize it. Not that, given hundreds
of years of hatred and tension, that is a particularly
difficult job. After all, the term Balkanization entered the
political vocabulary to define a process of national
fragmentation and fratricidal war. But while the internal
dynamics of the war are well documented, the external
forces of destabilization which were put into high gear
years ago have received scant attention.
The basic issues in Yugoslavia have always been
independence and economics. Yugoslavia has been at
the center of a tug of war. The Soviets sought its
incorporation into the USSR; the West has tried to pull
Yugoslavia--along with other countries of Eastern
Europe and the Balkans--"into Europe," that is, into the
capitalist world economy.
To this end, the West has promoted de-industrialization
and dependence and unleashed an arsenal of modern
power including threats and pressure, a U.N.-sanctioned
economic blockade, and covert arms shipments. Under
Marshall Josip Tito's leadership, Yugoslavia established
its independence from Moscow and formed a de facto
alliance with the West and NATO. By the end of 1990,
however, while Eastern Europe was well on the way to
European integration--and economic crisis--Yugoslavia
began to suspend the "reforms" to which it had initially
agreed. That resistance brought down the wrath of
certain Western powers, which then sought to break
Yugoslavia by promoting separatism and igniting the
ethnic tensions that had haunted the country for
centuries.
Yugoslavia and the Reagan Doctrine
Since World War II, Yugoslavia--prized by both
sides--has been molded by the forces of Cold War.
Early in the first Reagan administration, the U.S.
escalated the Cold War with an aggressive, secret
strategy to undercut the Soviet economy, destabilize
the USSR, and ultimately bring about the collapse of
Communism. (1) In 1985, then-Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick dubbed this new strategy, which went well
beyond containment, "the Reagan Doctrine." (2)
At about the same time, according to recently
declassified documents obtained by CovertAction, the
U.S. adopted a similar strategy toward the countries of
Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia. In September
1982, when the region seemed stable and the Berlin Wall
had seven years to stand, the U.S. drew up National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 54, "United States
Policy toward Eastern Europe." Labeled SECRET and
declassified with light censorship in 1990, (3) it called
for greatly expanded efforts to promote a "quiet
revolution" to overthrow Communist governments and
parties. While naming all the countries of Eastern
Europe, it omitted mention of Yugoslavia.
In March 1984, a separate document, NSDD 133, "United
States Policy toward Yugoslavia," was adopted and
given the even more restricted classification: SECRET
SENSITIVE. When finally declassified in 1990, NSDD 133
was still highly censored, with less than two-thirds of
the original text remaining. (4) Nonetheless, taken
together, the two documents reveal a consistent policy
logic.
The "primary long-term U.S. goal in Eastern Europe" as
described explicitly in NSDD 54 was "to [censored...]
facilitate its eventual re-integration into the European
community of nations." (5)
Since the Eastern European states could not have been
"reintegrated" into "the European community of nations"
as long as they remained under Communist rule, the
basic U.S. goal required removal of Communist
governments. The implication of ending Soviet influence
extends to the more cautiously worded remnants of
NSDD 133. The goal of "U.S. Policy [toward
Yugoslavia]," it states, "will be to promote the trend
toward an effective, market-oriented Yugoslav economic
structure...[and] to expand U.S. economic relations with
Yugoslavia in ways which benefit both countries and
which strengthen Yugoslavia's ties with the
industrialized democracies." (6)
Thus, the basic U.S. objective for Yugoslavia was much
the same as for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR,
Hungary, Poland and Romania: a capitalist
transformation. The list of policy instruments described
in NSDD 54 to promote change in Eastern Europe may
help fill in some gaps in the more highly censored
Yugoslavia-specific NSDD 133. The mechanisms included
most-favored-nation status, credit policy, IMF
stewardship, debt rescheduling, cultural and educational
exchanges, information programs, high-level visits, and
restrictions on diplomatic and consular personnel. (7)
Even in this document, some items were completely or
partially deleted in the declassified version.
Today, the revelations in the two documents may seem
banal. It should be remembered, however, that for many
years, the government felt the need to keep secret
even the more overt means of pressuring for change.
Furthermore, significant parts of U.S. policy in the
region, particularly in Yugoslavia, remain secret even
today. Covert policies, which undoubtedly were
implemented, are not usually discussed at any length in
a National Security Decision Directive.
The U.S. and Yugoslavia's Internal Crisis
The existence of a separate document for Yugoslavia
reflects that nation's special relationship with the U.S.
After Yugoslavia left the Warsaw Pact in 1948 over
disagreements with Stalin, the West saw it as a buffer
state against Soviet expansionism. When the Soviet
Union made threats against it in the early 1950s,
Yugoslavia asked the U.S. for help and quietly undertook
"certain military obligations" towards the West in the
event of a conflict with the Soviet Union. (8) The
agreement included a commitment to "protect northern
Italy from penetration by Soviet troops based in
Hungary." (9) According to a knowledgeable Yugoslav
analyst, the "alliance with the West," along with
expanded educational, diplomatic and commercial ties,
"forced Yugoslavia Communists to open up to Western
cultural and political influences." (10)
During the post-war years, Western aid--amounting to
several hundred billions of dollars, most of which came
from the U.S.--helped to create a boom in Yugoslavia.
And, although Yugoslavia remained poorer than most of
the countries of the industrialized West, the relatively
equitable distribution of the fruits of industrialization
carried much of the country out of poverty. By the end
of the 1980s, Yugoslavs were better off than most
people in Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and parts of Greece.
That economic success was crucial in diminishing
regional and ethnic tensions.
Thus, the Yugoslav socialist experiment was generally
viewed as successful, even in the West, both for its
economic progress and for the unity which Marshall Tito
brought to an ethnically diverse state.
Yugoslav planners, however, strove to combine
structural change with rapid economic growth. And that
policy was costly; it created a large trade deficit and
weakened the country's currency. The oil crises of
1973-74 and 1979 exacerbated Yugoslavia's problems.
(11) By the early 1980s, the country faced serious
balance of payments problems and rising inflation. As
usual, the IMF, in the name of financial rectitude,
stepped in and prodded the Yugoslav authorities to slow
growth, restrict credit, cut social expenditures, and
devalue the dinar. Although the trade deficit was
reduced and the balance of payments showed a record
surplus by 1970, (12) the IMF "reforms" wreaked
economic and political havoc. Slower growth, the
accumulation of foreign debt--and especially the cost of
servicing it--as well as devaluation, led to a fall in the
standard of living of the average Yugoslav.
The economic crisis threatened political stability. Not
only did the declining standard of living undermine the
authority of the country's leaders, it also threatened to
aggravate simmering ethnic tensions.
The 1980 death of Marshall Tito--the one leader whose
authority could hold the country together--plunged
Yugoslavia into a dual crisis. And without leadership, the
economic crisis suddenly become more difficult to
resolve.
Moreover, since Yugoslavia was linked to the world
capitalist economy, it had suffered the same economic
stagnation that affected Western Europe and North
America during the 1970s. When the Reagan
administration's supply-side economic policies
precipitated a recession in 1981-83, the effects were
felt everywhere, not least in Yugoslavia.
It is hardly surprising that Yugoslav planners found it
difficult to arrest economic decline in their own country.
Some observers claimed that the inability of the
economic system to respond to the 1980s crisis
demonstrated the failure of the Yugoslav model of
socialism. While there is some truth to the charge that
the system was rigid, Yugoslavia's troubles were caused
first and foremost by the transmission of the Western
economic crisis to those countries on the edge of
Europe which were closely linked to the West by aid,
trade, capital flows, and emigration.
The uneasy U.S.-Yugoslav alliance persisted throughout
1980s. Because of Yugoslavia's unique "buffer" position,
the U.S. had a special stake in its stability. Despite
discomfort with its communist "ally," the new Reagan
administration preserved the relationship, hoping to
benefit from the developing instability in Yugoslavia in
order to install a more amenable government.
In the late 1980s, three factors suddenly altered the
dynamics of the U.S.-Yugoslav relationship. Yugoslavia
began to suspend its market-oriented "reforms." The
Cold War ended and Yugoslavia was no longer so useful.
And a newly united Germany, staking out a larger role
for itself in Europe, demanded that the Bush
administration adopt the German policy of working for
the "dissociation," that is, the dismantling, of
Yugoslavia.
Diplomatic Coercion and Reform in the East
The summer before the Berlin Wall fell, the major
Western powers decided in Paris to press the emerging
East European governments to establish "democracies"
and market economies. (13) This goal was advanced by
the 1990 elections throughout Eastern Europe, which
produced broad support for non-Communist governments
seeking to implement precisely the kinds of "reforms"
(14) which the U.S. and its European partners had
hoped for and worked toward.
In an exercise more in coercive diplomacy than in
persuasion, the Western powers determined to offer aid
and trade only to those countries that agreed to
market-oriented structural and policy changes.
Furthermore, noted Richard Portes, chief economic
adviser to the European Community (EC), the West must
"build in ways of committing the authorities not to
deviate from their basic policies." To this end, planners
demanded four major and irreversible "reforms" in
Eastern Europe: an opening to the world economy, i.e.,
to the Western system; the liberalization of prices;
privatization; and stabilization of of state finances and
national currencies. These "reforms," argued Portes,
should mark "a definitive exit from the socialist planned
economy." (15)
The governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland acceded almost completely, while Bulgaria and
Romania complied in part. Only two years later, the
northern tier countries of Eastern Europe were
"in the throes of a deep economic depression...[T]urmoil
and starvation stalk the Balkans, social crisis and wild
political swings plague Poland, nationalism threatens to
tear apart Czechoslovakia, and social discontent in
Hungary has led to a virtual boycott of existing political
parties. Quasi-fascist movements have emerged on the
far right, while the governments of the region have all
considered initiatives to restrict civil rights." (16)
Yugoslavia Steps Out of Line
A crucial change in Yugoslav relations with the West
occurred when Yugoslavia balked at carrying out the
reforms urged by the west. As Yugoslavia had initiated
market-oriented policies before any of the countries in
the former Eastern bloc--tasting some the the bitter
consequences--its halting of "reforms" in 1990
particularly rankled the U.S. The Bush administration set
out to farce the recalcitrant nation to accede to
Western demands for a "change in regime." (17)
In January 1989, when Ante Marcovic was named
federation premier, the U.S. had anticipated a
cooperative relationship. "Known to favor
market-oriented reforms," (18) the new Prime Minster
was described by the BBC correspondent as
"Washington's best ally in Yugoslavia." (19)
In Autumn 1989, just before the Berlin Wall fell,
Marcovic visited Bush in the White House. The
president, the New York Times reported, "welcomed Mr.
Marcovic's commitment to market-oriented economic
reform and to building democratic pluralism." In this
friendly atmosphere, Marcovic asked for "United States
assistance in making economic and political changes
opposed by hard-liners in the Communist Party." He
requested a substantial aid package from the U.S.,
including $1 billion to prop up the banking system and
more than $3 billion in loans from the World Bank. He
also tried to lure private investment to his country. In
exchange, Marcovic promised "reforms," but warned, as
the Times put it, that they "are bound to bring social
problems [including] an increase in unemployment to
about 20 percent and the threat of increased ethnic and
political tension among the country's six republics and
two autonomous provinces." (20)
Marcovic's new austerity plan, announced two months
later in Belgrade, deepened the Yugoslav crisis. The plan
called for a new devalued currency, a six-month wage
freeze, closure of "unprofitable" state enterprises, and
reduced government expenditure. Believing it would lead
to social unrest, Serbia, the largest republic,
immediately rejected it. Some 650,000 Serbian workers
staged a walkout in protest. (21)
Marcovic's proposal for some first steps toward political
democratization--a multi-party system and open
elections--fared a bit better and, in January 1990, was
accepted by the Central Committee of the Yugoslav
League of Communists. Not long afterward, however,
the Slovene League of Communists seceded from the
Yugoslav League. In April, Demos, the Slovene
opposition coalition, described in the U.S. as "an alliance
of pro-western parties," won a majority in parliamentary
elections in Slovenia.
Thus, as the unity of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia weakened, a pro-Western, pro-"reform (22)"
camp consolidated and pushed for separatism as the
only possible way to realize nationalist aims--which
would shatter the Yugoslav economy.
By June 1990, when Prime Minister Marcovic introduced
the second phase of his austerity program, industrial
output in Yugoslavia had already fallen some ten
percent since the beginning of the year, in part as a
result of the measures introduced the previous October.
Nonetheless, the second phase of the prime minister's
plan called for further reductions of 18 percent in public
spending, the wholesale privatization of state
enterprises, and the establishment of new private
property rights. To make the package more palatable,
Marcovic also proposed lowering interest rates and
conditionally lifting the wage freeze.
Economic "reform" was the crucial issue in 1990
multi-party elections held throughout Yugoslavia. In
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, separatist
coalitions ousted the League of Communists. In Serbia
and Montenegro, the ruling party--renamed the Socialist
Party in Serbia--won. The federal government, including
Prime Minister Marcovic, denounced the separatist
tendencies to the two northern republics. President
Borisav Jovic resigned as federal president when his
proposal for a national state of emergency was
rejected. (23)
The line was drawn. The new separatist governments in
the north wished--at least in the flush of their electoral
victories--to join Europe and the parade toward
capitalism. The federal government and some of the
republics, including Serbia, balked. One European scholar
summarized the West's view:
"With the ending of the Cold War...Yugoslavia was no
longer [a] problem of global importance for the two
super-powers...The important factor was the pace of
reforms in the East. What lasted nine months in Poland,
took only nine weeks in the GDR and only nine days in
Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia lagged enormously behind
[in] this process of democratic transformations. " (24)
In an ideal world, there would have been a long national
debate on the way forward, and the separatist
republics, if still bent on secession, would have
proceeded through the complex process provided for in
the Federal Constitution.
That was not to be.
Germany's New Expansionism
The years following the general adoption of the Reagan
Doctrine saw the pace of change accelerate in all the
countries of the Socialist bloc. Developments were
carrying them toward the "quiet revolutions" the West
desired.
By the end of 1989, moreover, an equally important
change--the third major one in Yugoslavia's relationship
to its emergence as the giant of Europe would prove
decisive for the fate of Yugoslavia.
As Yugoslavia continued in crisis, a much-strengthened
industrial and political leadership in Germany looked east.
Its influence was rapidly becoming "pervasive, in
personal contacts, business investments, and
intellectual life." (25) In the post-Cold War era the
means for expansion are economic, political, and
cultural, rather than military. In Eastern Europe, German
trade groups and banks suddenly became very active
and German firms sought lower costs, especially lower
wages and taxes. By 1991, one third of the trade
between Eastern and Western Europe was based in
Germany, according to a U.N. study, (26) and Germany
became the major foreign investor in Eastern Europe,
especially in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
German firms now have 1,500 joint ventures in Poland
and 1,000 in Hungary.
But it was not just economics that drove Germany
eastward. Form many Germans, the expansion also made
historical sense. Their firms were reviving ties to the
East which went back to the pre-Communist era and
even to the time of the Austria-Hungarian Empire.
And perhaps even more disquieting for partially
recolonized Eastern Europe were the cultural campaigns
which accompanied economic expansion. These promote
the use of the German language, German books, and
German culture in general. The German foreign
broadcasting service recently announced "a media and
cultural offensive in Central, Eastern and Southern
Europe." Its director called the new Germany "the most
important media and cultural bridgehead between East
and West." (27)
The aims and scope of Germany's drive east were
summed up by the Chair of The East Committee, the
industrial group promoting business in the East: "it is our
natural market...[I]n the end this market will perhaps
bring us to the same position we were in before World
War I. Why not?" (28)
German expansion has been accompanied by a rising tide
of nationalism and xenophobia, igniting old Yugoslav
fears. These have been fed by evidence that Germany
has been energetically seeking a free hand among its
allies "to pursue economic dominance in the whole of
Mitteleuropa." (29)
In 1990, Yugoslavia lay in the path of that gathering
German drive. Given Germany's economic and political
power, and its aid and trade ties with Yugoslavia, many
expected Bonn to try to draw the region into its orbit.
The most obvious beginning would be in the northern
republics which had historically been considered part
Europe, and especially in Croatia, which had strong
German links.
During the Second World War, Nazi Germany had
installed a clerical-fascist state in Croatia. (30) After
the war, more than half a million Croatian �migr�s moved
to the Fatherland, where their organizations had
considerable political influence.
Milovan Djilas may have had these considerations in
mind, when, more than a year before the secession
crises of 1991, he warned:
"It is definitely in the interests of the majority of other
nations--for example, the Unites States, Great Britain,
the USSR--to support the unity of Yugoslavia. ...But I
doubt that Yugoslavia's neighbors...are so
well-intentioned. I also suspect that in some states, for
example, in Germany and Austria, there are influential
groups who would like to see Yugoslavia
disintegrate--from traditional hatred, from expansionist
tendencies, and vague, unrealistic desires for revenge.
(31)
Europe Intervenes
Yugoslavia walked a tightrope through the 1980s until
economic and political crisis, particularly the fall in the
standard of living, broke its balance. As rival ethnic
groups shook the rope and the state teetered, European
Community (EC) intervention helped push Yugoslavia
into the abyss of disintegration and horrific civil war.
After World War II, Yugoslavia brought together
communities which had historically been at odds:
Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Muslims (the descendants of
converted Slavs), Albanians, Hungarians, etc. At the
same time , the federal government made enormous
efforts after World War II to create a state which gave
full play to "national identities" and entrenched the
rights of minorities.
Since there was, however, no way to draw the map of
Yugoslavia to enclose each group in its own republic or
autonomous region, large minorities would always exist
within any republic or region. Thus, for instance, large
numbers of Serbs--more than two million--found
themselves living in Croatia or Bosnia or elsewhere
where the boundaries of Serbia were drawn in 1945.
Within the Balkan tinderbox, two specific actions set off
the current war in Yugoslavia: the secessions of
Slovenia and Croatia and the intervention of the EC. The
former might not have occurred without the intervention
of the latter. Continuous EC intervention from early 1991
could not have been more likely to set off a war if it had
been deliberately designed to do so. It turned a
manageable internal conflict into appalling fratricide.
Slovenia and Croatia were clearly driving toward
independence well before widespread fighting broke out
between the Yugoslav National Army and Slovene
territorial forces in the spring of 1991. Their separatist
aspirations received quiet encouragement and
assistance from several European powers, particularly
Germany and Austria, for some time prior to the
outbreak of hostilities.
In early February 1991, he Council of Europe stated
that, to join Europe (as some Yugoslav leaders wanted),
Yugoslavia would have to resolve its crisis peacefully
and hold multi-party elections for the Federal
Parliament. (32) This bland-sounding precondition was,
in effect, an invitation to Slovenia and Croatia to push
towards secession, for it linked economic advantages to
"restraint' in federal dealings with those republics.
By March, when its was clear that Croatia intended to
secede, Croates and the Serb minorities began to clash.
Croatian nationalists organized violent demonstrations in
Split, besieged a military base in Gospic, and generally
intensified their national campaign. On May 5, the
federal government authorized the Army to intervene in
Croatia (33) and two days later, the military began
calling up reserves and deploying units in western
Yugoslavia. "Yugoslavia," said Defense Secretary Gen. V.
Kadijevic, "has entered a state of civil war." (34)
The EC then began openly to apply pressure on
Yugoslavia. In June, the EC foreign ministers gathered in
Dresden and warned that future assistance would
depend on "respect for minority rights," "economic
reforms," etc. The EC was no longer posing conditions
for Yugoslavia's entry into Europe, but simply for normal
economic relations. (35)
When Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on
June 25, 1991, the EC openly intervened again, and
again its actions prompted separatism. Within three
days after the Yugoslav Army deployed units in both
republics, the EC threatened the "cut-off of $1 billion in
scheduled aid" unless Yugoslavia accepted mediation by
three EC foreign ministers. (36) Slovenia and Croatia
would otherwise have been occupied by Yugoslav troops
and the secession halted.
The foreign ministers imposed a cease-fire which called
for a three-month suspension of the Slovene and
Croatian independence declarations; withdrawal to
barracks of all federal troops; and acceptance by Serbia
of Stipe Mesic, a Croat, as federal president. (37) There
was no settlement of the federal dispute with Croatia,
and federal troops remained in parts of that
republic--those inhabited primarily by Serbs. The
Yugoslav Army ordered the withdrawal of its troops from
Slovenia shortly thereafter.
Although the EC intervention halted the secession
temporarily, by preventing Yugoslavia from defending its
own unity and territorial integrity, it worked to the
advantage of Slovenia and Croatia. (How would
President Lincoln have treated a similar foreign
intervention in the U.S. Civil War?)
In October 1991, the EC called a Conference on
Yugoslavia in The Hague. The aim, in theory, was to end
the crisis and negotiate a new federal structure for the
Balkan nation. The Draft Convention on Yugoslavia
prepared by the EC announced that the republics "are
sovereign and independent, with [as] international
identity." (38) Thus, while the Conference adopted
seemingly reasonable principles for resolving the conflict,
at the same time, in effect, it abolished Yugoslavia as a
unitary state. Within a short time, and upon expiration
of the three-month delay imposed in July, both Croatia
and Slovenia formally seceded from Yugoslavia.
One is left to wonder whether the EC wanted a unified
Yugoslavia and acted consistently and stupidly to
defeat this goal, or whether other factors were quietly
at work. The key to the seeming contradiction between
stated goals and actual consequences may be found in
the behind the scenes maneuvering of an expansionist
Germany. As William Zimmerman, former U.S.
ambassador to Yugoslavia, noted:
"We discovered later that [German foreign minister]
Genscher had been in daily contact with the Croatian
Foreign Minister. He was encouraging the Croats to
leave the federation and declare independence, while
we and our allies, including the Germans [sic], were
trying to fashion a joint approach." (39)
In fact, reunited Germany has been throwing its weight
around for some time, and not just on Yugoslavia. (40)
"The Germans," said a U.S. State Department official,
"are now so much more stable and so much more
powerful than anyone else in Europe that they can get
away with almost anything." (41)
From 1990, Germany was forcing the pace of
international diplomacy on the question of secession. In
December, within a few months of the de facto
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia at the Hague
Conference, Germany itself recognized their
independence. "Germany virtually forced its allies to
reverse themselves and grant recognition to Slovenia
and Croatia." (42)
Not Just a Civil War
Just as foreign intervention helped foment the war in
Yugoslavia, (43) outside forces have also helped sustain
and exacerbate the conflict. Croatian political
organizations in the Diaspora--especially in Germany,
Canada, the U.S., and Australia--often espouse
extremist, right-wing, and sometimes openly anti-semitic
views. Through the generation which left Yugoslavia
after World War II, they have maintained close ties to
the Nazi-sponsored Croatian independent state led by
Ante Pavelic and Archbishop Alois Stepinac. (44)
Since 1945, Croatian �migr�s and �migr� organizations
have actively and consistently supported the cause of
Croatian independence. "These separatists," said a
prominent Slovak �migr�, "want to prove that they were
right 50 years ago, and they try to pass the mythology
on to their kids...that things will be perfect when
independence comes." (45)
International �migr� support has been financial as well
as political. According to the Los Angeles Times,
overseas Croatians were largely responsible for funding
Croatian President Franju Tudjman's victorious
presidential election campaign in 1990. (46) After he
won, the money continued to flow. "Canadians," said
Toronto businessman Dick Bezic, "bankrolled [Tudjman's]
new state and its army." (47) In December, Tudjman
acknowledged the importance of the �migr�s' role.
"Croatians, in Canada," he told the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation, "have helped a great deal in
the establishment of a democratic Croatia." (48)
In addition to cash, overseas Croatians have sent arms.
Croatian and Bosnian Croatians claim that Bosnian Serbs
possess large amounts of modern weapons and
munitions. While the charge is true, it must be
remembered that the arms factories in Bosnia are still
producing, and the Yugoslav army left behind large
stocks of weapons which were grabbed up by all sides in
the conflict. Furthermore, in addition to their own
supplies, the breakaway states are covertly receiving
large amounts of arms from the Western powers despite
the U.N. arms embargo. (49) Recently, overseas
Croatians established an extensive network designed to
evade the Untied States embargo on arms shipments to
former Yugoslavia. (50) Documents indicate that
weapons were moving to Croatia from Austria and
Slovenia or Hungary, and senior U.N. officials
acknowledge that "the Croatians are armed to the
teeth." (51)
The network existed well before Croatia declared
independence. More than a year ago, a U.S. Customs
official blocked a large, illegal shipment of weapons from
Croatian activists to Yugoslavia. It included $12 million
worth Stinger and Red Eye missiles, as well as
thousands of M-16 assault rifles. The arms smugglers, a
clandestine military organization known as OTPOR, had
an alternative plan to ship weapons through a German
front company. (52)
OTPOR members had also requested Nigeria to supply
end-user certificates for large quantities of weapons,
including low-altitude surface-to-air missiles, armored
Czech Tatra trucks mounted with launching frames for
122 mm rockets, and 5,000 122 mm rockets. (53)
It was reported in England last year, that there was "a
booming trade in arms [supplied by]...Austria, Belgium
and Hungary" to the Serbian and Croatian militias. (54)
As none of the source countries named, with the
possible exception of Belgium, was likely to be shipping
arms to Serbian irregulars, the supplies were most likely
going to Croatia.
Political contributions and arms shipments on such a
scale cannot take place without the knowledge of
intelligence agencies, in this case, especially those of
Germany, Austria, Canada, and the U.S. In countries
actively seeking to destabilize Yugoslavia, these
services are likely to have had official sanction to assist
the transfers. There have also been repeated reports of
foreigners--including British, U.S., and German nationals
with extensive military experience--serving in the
Croatian forces or militia. (55) Reportedly, some are
absent-without-leave from active military units. In what
amounts to an officially sanctioned policy of covert
military assistance, active-duty soldiers (indulging some
form the U.S.) sometimes leave undated letters of
resignation with a commander and take official leave to
serve as "mercenaries" in foreign wars.
The movement of weapons in the region appears to be
massive. German customs officials claim they have
evidence of large military convoys of up to 1,500 military
vehicles moving out of Eastern Germany bound for
Croatia. In April 1992, east German military vehicles
bound for Croatia were seized by Customs officials on
the German-Austrian border. (56) Recently, there have
been reports that Croatia has used German Leopard
tanks and MIG-21 fighters in its invasion of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although Germany denies these
reports, (57) reliable Yugoslav sources state that a
number of Leopard tanks were put out of commission by
Serb irregulars at Kupres in Bosnia in May 1992. These
sources also claim that a number of MIG fighters from
the former GDR have been shot down over Bosnia.
The use of MIGs has been confirmed by senior United
Nations officials and supported by Croatia's air force
commander. In February, he boasted that "within a
month...[Croatia] would take delivery of fighter aircraft
from unnamed European governments." (58)
The Bosnian government has also reportedly received
arms and troops from abroad, notably from Islamic
countries seeking to assist fellow Muslims. The London
Guardian has reported major arms shipments from
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. A Bosnian government
adviser admitted in Zagreb at the the end of August
that Bosnian officials had traveled to the Croatian coast
to take delivery of arms shipments from the Middle East.
(59)
Islamic countries have also sent trainers and
"volunteers" to assist and fight with Muslim forces in
Bosnia and have established secret training camps
there. The soldiers came from Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
Pakistan, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria. (60)
Again, such large-scale activity cannot easily be
organized by private individuals or organizations. The
facts therefore strongly suggest the extensive
involvement of foreign intelligence agencies and military
personnel in what is still being called a purely internal
conflict.
During the past 18 months, the Western media have
steadily hammered home the idea that Yugoslavia is in
the middle of a civil war brought about the "aggressor"
Serbia's attempt to "conquer" Slovenia and parts of
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the internal
factors of nationalism and ethnic strife are real, they are
not sufficient to explain the bloody dynamic. External
forces must also be considered. This more complex
analysis does not deny that Yugoslavs are killing another
and dying, nor does it dismiss the suffering of the
hundreds of thousands who have been affected. Rather
it recognizes the clear indications that the secessions of
Croatia and Slovenia--which were crucial in the
development of the Yugoslav conflict--were prepared
with the assistance of foreign power. These powers also
sustained and extended the conflict by sending arms,
money, and personnel to Croatia and, more recently, to
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
During the 1980s, the West followed a dual policy. First,
it pushed Yugoslavia toward a gradual political and
economic transformation. The struggle to force changes
in Yugoslavia was driven less by tensions between
socialism and capitalism than by those between
independence and recolonizaiton. In a central Europe
dominated by Germany, the policies urged by the West
will lead to de-industrialization and dependence as they
have already in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
The other edge of the West's policy sword was the
promotion of separatism in the northern republics. When
Yugoslavia balked at "reforms" that had exacerbated
economic conditions and ethnic strife, some Western
governments turned up the pressure. Germany,
strengthened by reunification and expanding its
influence throughout Europe, was impatient with
Yugoslavia. Its push for quick recognition of Slovenia
and Croatia set off a violent chain reaction. The U.S.
and other nations faced a fait accompli and accepted
Germany's demands that the west support German
policies. Nonetheless, they saw Germany's strategy as a
useful way to ensure that Yugoslavia carry out the
political and economic changes they wanted.
After World War II, the Yugoslav people struggled to
achieve independence and a decent standard of living.
The war in former Yugoslavia has shattered the nation
and its many peoples. It is an unnecessary tragedy
which can only be stopped if its real causes are
understood.
Footnotes
1. See Sean Gervasi, "The Destabilization of the Soviet
Union," CovertAction, Number 35 (Fall 1990) and Sean
Gervasi, "Western Intervention in the USSR,"
CovertAction, Number 39 (Winter 1991-92).
2. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "The Reagan Doctrine and U.S.
Foreign Policy," The Heritage Foundation, Washington,
D.C., 1985, p. 5.
3. National Security Decision Directive 54, "United
States Policy Toward Eastern Europe," SECRET, the
White House, Washington, September 2, 1982.
4. National Security Decision Directive 133, "United
States Policy Toward Yugoslavia," SECRET SENSITIVE,
the White House, Washington, March 14, 1984. The
SECRET SENSITIVE classification indicates that a
significant amount of the information was based on
intercepted communications or revealed the existence of
confidential relationships with Yugoslav citizens or
organizations.
5. NSDD 54, p. 1.
6. NSDD 133, p. 1.
7. NSDD 54, pp. 3-4.
8. Predrag Simic, "Yugoslavia: Origins of the Crisis,"
Southeastern European Yearbook 1991, Hellenic
Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, 1992, p. 109.
9. Ibid, p. 120.
10. Ibid., p. 109.
11. "Eastern Europe and the USSR," Economist
Intelligence Unit, London, June 1990, p. 212.
12. Ibid, pp. 109-10.
13. See Peter Gowan, "Old Medicine in New Bottles:
Western Policy Toward East Central Europe," World
Policy Journal, Winter 1991-92, p. 4.
14. Ibid., pp. 1-33.
15. Ibid., p. 5.
16. Ibid., p. 1.
17. Academics and bureaucrats concerned with
developments in the former Socialist bloc use this term
to describe fundamental political change. In practice, it
refers to the capitalist transformation of Communist
societies.
18. Facts on File, January 27, 1989, p. 57.
19. Misha Glenny, "The Massacre of Yugoslavia," New
York Review of Books, January 30, 1992, p. 34.
20. "Yugoslav Premier Seeks U.S. Aid," New York Times,
October 14, 1989.
21. Facts on File, December 31, 1989, p. 985.
22. Facts on File, April 20, 1990, p. 291.
23. Facts on File, March 21, 1991, p. 197.
24. Jens Reuter, "Yugoslavia's Role in Changing Europe,"
in D. Muller et al., eds., Veranderungen in
Europa--Vereinigung Deutchlands: Perspektiven der 90er
Jahre, Institute of International Politics and Economics,
Belgrade, 1991, pp. 115-16. Cited in Simic, op. cit.
25. Marc Fisher, "Eastern Europe Swept by German
Influence," Washington Post, February 16, 1992.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Lanxin Xiang, "Is Germany in the West or in Central
Europe?", Orbis, Summer 1992, p. 422.
30. Some 600,000 Serbs and 70,000 Jews and Gypsies
died in camps run by the Croatian fascist regime. See
Jonathan Steinberg, The Roman Catholic Church and
Genocide in Croatia, 1941-1945, unpublished, Trinity
Hall, Cambridge, U.K.
31. Argyrios Pisiotis, "Peace Prospects for Yugoslavia,"
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Summer 1992, p.
97, quoting from an articles by Djilas.
32. Predrag Simic, Chronology of the Yugoslav Crisis,
January 1990 - May 1992, Institute of International
Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 1992, p. 1.
33. Facts on File, May 9, 1991, p. 342.
34. Ibid.
35. Branislava Alendar, European Community and the
Yugoslav Crisis, Institute of International Politics and
Economics, Belgrade, 1992, p. 8.
36. Facts on File, July 4, 1991, p. 489.
37. Ibid.
38. Alendar, op. cit. p. 10.
39. John Newhouse, "The Diplomatic Round," The New
Yorker, August 24, 1992, p. 64.
40. See Marc Fisher, "Germany's Role Stirs Some
Concern in the U.S.," Washington Post, January 23,
1992. The decision by Germany to raise interest rates
also caused concern, as did Kohl's reneging on this
promise to produce a compromise on agricultural
supports in the GATT talks.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. There have been three wars: 1) the war in Slovenia
between the YNA and Sloven territorial forces (very
brief); 2) the war in Croatia between Croatian military
forces and Serb irregulars (many of them local
inhabitants); 3) the war in Bosnia between Croatian
forces, Bosnian and Croat irregulars and Bosnian
Muslims, on the one hand, and Bosnian Serb irregulars,
on the other.
44. Hitler characterized the Croats in the wartime
puppet state as "genuine converts national Socialism."
(H.R. Trevor-Roper, ed., Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944
(London: Weidenfiled & Nicholson, 1973), p 95.
45. Robert Toth, "�migr�s Fuel Old Hatreds," Los Angeles
Times, February 19, 1992.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. See, for example, International Defense Reports,
Army Quarterly and Defense Journal (London), July 1991,
p. 363.
50. Christopher Bellamy, "Croatia Built Web of Contacts
to Evade Weapons Embargo," The Independent
(London), October 10, 1992.
51. Ibid.
52. Edward Lucas, "U.S. Sting Uncovers Croatian Arms
Deal," The Independent (London), August 14, 1991.
53. Bellamy, op. cit.
54. Army Quarterly and Defense Journal, op. cit.
55. "German magazine delves deep among the killers,"
Searchlight (London), November 1992, p. 23; and Michel
Faci, "National Socialists Fight in Croatia," The New
Order (Lincoln, Nebraska), January-February 1993, p. 1.
56. Christopher Bellamy, op. cit.
57. Anna Tomforde, "Germany: Government Officials
Deny Croatia Is Using Their Tanks," Guardian (London),
August 5, 1992.
58. Blaine Harden, "Croatia Acquiring Warplanes from
European Countries, Air Force Chief Says," Washington
Post, February 11, 1992.
59. Blaine Harden, "Bosnia: Middle East Muslims Send
Charity and Weapons," Guardian (London), August 28,
1992.
60. "Help from Holy Warriors," Newsweek, October 5,
1992, pp. 52-53.
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