-Caveat Lector-

The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council
1 Northumberland Avenue
London
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England

Tel:    020 7872 5434
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Date of Publication: June 2001




THE 'SUDAN PEACE ACT':  PERPETUATING AFRICA'S LONGEST WAR


On 13 June 2001, the United States House of Representatives passed "An
Act to facilitate relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war
in Sudan", also referred to as the 'Sudan Peace Act'. A more explicit
example of confused, distorted and poorly-informed legislation would be
hard to find. It is an Act that while paying lip service to the need for
a "negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan" at the same time
provides one side to the conflict with millions of dollars worth of
logistical assistance. It is an Act that decries the manipulation of
food aid while ignoring the fact that the side it is supporting has been
accused of diverting two-thirds of food aid within the areas it
controls. It is also an act which decries the abuse of human rights
within Sudan but provides millions of dollars to those accused of
appalling human rights abuses in Sudan.

In so doing the United States seeks to continue foreign interference in
a conflict that has raged since 1955, fought, in its most recent phase,
since 1983 between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) led by John Garang. Even a brief examination of
attempts to achieve a comprehensive solution to the conflict in Sudan
and relief efforts within that country reveal the deep flaws within this
legislation.


A "negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan"

In any examination of the search for a "negotiated, peaceful settlement
to the war in Sudan", a little should be said first about those people
who drafted this Act. The Act was drafted by legislators such as
Representatives Tancredo, Wolf and Payne and Senators Frist, Brownback
and Feingold, whose previous involvement with Sudan had resulted in an
escalation in the Sudanese conflict and regional tensions. In April
2001, former United States President Carter, one of the most respected
and objective commentators on events within Sudan, said of this period:
"For the last eight years, the U.S. has had a policy which I strongly
disagree with in Sudan, supporting the revolutionary movement and not
working for an overall peace settlement." (1)  This echoed earlier
concerns voiced by Carter. In December 1999 he had observed:

"The people in Sudan want to resolve the conflict. The biggest obstacle
is US government policy. The US is committed to overthrowing the
government in Khartoum. Any sort of peace effort is aborted, basically
by policies of the United States...Instead of working for peace in
Sudan, the US government has basically promoted a continuation of the
war." (2)

It is clear, then, that these legislators are hardly the best qualified
group of people to talk about peace in Sudan. Far from working for peace
they have stood by while the United States militarily and economically
destabilised the largest country in Africa. They helped shape American
Sudan policy from 1993 onwards - precisely the period referred to by
Carter. While they publicly lament the numbers of deaths during this
conflict, they are themselves directly responsible for the deaths
through war, starvation or disease of thousands of Sudanese. Far from
taking Carter's concerns into consideration, the 'Sudan Peace Act'
merely perpetuates the Clinton Administration's failed and farcical
Sudan policies. The United States Congress has shown itself either
amazingly naïve or blatantly hypocritical in drafting the 'Sudan Peace
Act'. In either case this piece of legislation reflects very badly
indeed on Congress.

This American attitude is all the more regrettable since the Sudanese
government has repeatedly invited constructive United States involvement
within Sudan. (3)


A "comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan"?

While making for good rhetoric, Congressional calls for a comprehensive
solution illustrate either naivety or cynicism. For a solution there has
to be some sort of political objective on the part of those waging war
on the Sudanese government. The political complexion of the SPLA
movement has varied from professedly Marxist through to now politically
identifying with American Bible-belt Christian fundamentalists. Even on
such a fundamental issue as to whether the SPLA is fighting for a
separate south or a united Sudan, there continues to be confusion. (4)

The war has always been about the political status of southern Sudan.
While the SPLA appear to be confused, the Khartoum authorities' approach
would appear to be clear. If the SPLA are fighting for autonomy or even
separation this has already been offered by the government. In 1997,
having already introduced a federal system and exempted southern Sudan
from Sharia law, the Sudanese Government, in the Khartoum Peace
Agreement, also offered, amongst other things, the holding of a free and
fair, internationally-supervised, referendum in which the people of
southern Sudan could, for the first time ever, choose whether to remain
as a part of Sudan or to become independent. This offer has also been
written into the 1998 Constitution, and repeated on several occasions
(5), most recently during the June 2001 peace talks in Nairobi. (6)  It
is an offer that has also been acknowledged by the SPLA.(7)

The Sudanese government has repeatedly offered a comprehensive
ceasefire.(8) Throughout 2001, the Sudanese government once again called
for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In April and in mid-May 2000,
Khartoum once more declared its readiness to enter into "an immediate
and comprehensive ceasefire" and to restart negotiations for the
achievement of a comprehensive peace: it called upon the SPLA to do the
same. (9)  Khartoum appears to have sought out every possible peace
forum. (10)  The Sudanese government has also repeatedly requested
international assistance in securing a peaceful end to the conflict.(11)
It is difficult to see how much further towards a comprehensive solution
the Sudanese government can go. The SPLA's inability to articulate what
they are fighting for is echoed in its approach to the peace process. In
erratic shifts in position, the SPLA has both accepted and then refused
regional attempts at peace-making, sometimes within the space of 48
hours. (12)  Its commitment to a peaceful solution is questionable. John
Garang, for example, commenting on the November 1997 round of peace
talks in Nairobi, stated that "We intended not to reach an agreement
with the [Sudanese government]. This is what we did and we succeeded in
it because we did not reach an agreement."

The 'Sudan Peace Act' has exacerbated an already critical situation.
While professing to wish to see an end to war in Sudan, the 'Sudan Peace
Act' actually authorised the release of $10 million dollars in
assistance to what they called the National Democratic Alliance. This
followed an earlier payment of three million dollars. (13)  All this
funding will be channelled to the Sudan People's Liberation Army. As
prominent American Sudan specialist Stephen Morrison, the head of the
Sudan project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington-DC, has pointed out: "The NDA is a bit of a phantom. It is
basically the SPLA and a few elements." (14)  Commenting on the release
of American funds for the SPLA, Morrison also stated: "This package
feeds false hopes and expectation on the part of the southerners and
sustains excessive paranoia in Khartoum." (15)

For all the immediate implications of such clear American assistance, of
even deeper concern is the fact that such aid serves to encourage the
SPLA, already patently without any clear political objective, to
continue with what is an unwinnable war. Shortly after the announcement
of American assistance, for example, the SPLA launched a concerted
offensive in the Bahr al-Ghazal region of southern Sudan in May 2001.
The offensive continued during a regional peace summit in Nairobi in
early June, with the rebels ignoring further calls for a peaceful
solution to the conflict. (16)

It was thus particularly ironic that Congress passed this Act at the
time it did given that amongst the "findings" of the Act was the claim
that "[t]he Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution of the
war against areas outside of its control".(17)  The Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels had themselves launched this offensive in
the Bahr al-Ghazal region of southern Sudan in late May and June which
had certainly intensified the civil war in that country. In so doing
they had ignored repeated offers of ceasefires by the government.

This SPLA offensive has resulted in massive displacement of southern
Sudanese civilians. On 8 June, the International Committee of the Red
Cross stated that the offensive had led to the displacement of at least
20,000 civilians. The Sudanese Catholic Information Office reported that
most activities within the region had been halted by the offensive:
"locations from Tonj northwards remain no go areas forcing both church
and humanitarian agencies to suspend their flights to the region."  (18)
By 11 June, the United Nations estimated that 30,000 civilians had been
displaced within Bahr al-Ghazal. (19)  Two days later, the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Rumbek, Bishop Mazzolari, reported that just under
60,000 civilians had been displaced by the offensive, and that these
civilians were in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. (20)  The
very humanitarian access spoken of repeatedly in the 'Sudan Peace Act'
has been disrupted by the SPLA.

History would appear to be repeating itself. Former President Carter has
in the past stated that the millions of dollars of assistance to the
rebels previously provided by the Clinton Administration had a negative
effect on the SPLA's interest in negotiating a political settlement.
(21)  The Bush Administration's financial support for the SPLA has also
clearly encouraged the SPLA to once again ignore calls for a negotiated
settlement of the conflict and to continue with what can only be
described as a no-win war.

Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail accuses the United States
of pursuing a policy that prolongs the Sudanese war: "Your [i.e. the US]
policy will not lead to peace. It will lead to the continuation of war,
the suffering of the people, the loss of lives in the south ... This
war, this problem, will not be settled by fighting. It has to be settled
by political means. The government of Sudan is ready for that". (22)
America's provocative acts take place at a time when the there have been
significant positive political changes within Sudan itself. The former
Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, himself ousted in 1989 by the present
government, and a pivotal rebel leader, was quoted by an April 2001
American fact-finding mission as saying that: "the United States has
been an obstacle to peace in Sudan and also to unity among the
opposition. The United States' policy has been a problem. He said that
Sudan is like a pregnant woman that is about to deliver and needs a
midwife to help the delivery. They all believe that the United States
could act as a midwife. They all accept this. But, the United States,
instead of helping deliver the baby, killed it..." The former prime
minister has also declared that: "There are now circumstances and
developments which could favour an agreement on a comprehensive
political solution."  (23)


Congressional Support for Sudanese "War Criminals"

What then is the nature of the organisation so enthusiastically embraced
by the United States Congress? Simply put, the 'Sudan Peace Act' links
the United States to a group with an appalling human rights record. A
previous attempt by the American government in late 1999 to provide
assistance to the SPLA had resulted in considerable concern
domestically. In November 1999, for example, eight reputable US-based
humanitarian organisations working in Sudan, groups such as CARE, World
Vision, Church World Service and Save the Children, no friends of the
Sudanese government, publicly stated that the SPLA has: "engaged for
years in the most serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial
killings, beatings, arbitrary detention, slavery, etc." (24)  In
December 1999, Human Rights Watch stated that: "The SPLA has a history
of gross abuses of human rights and has not made any effort to establish
accountability. Its abuses today remain serious". (25)

'The New York Times', another outspoken critic of the Khartoum
government, was also unambiguously critical of any assistance to the
SPLA:

"[C]hanneling assistance to southern rebels would ally Washington with a
brutal and predatory guerrilla army. One of the tragedies of Sudan's war
is that John Garang's S.P.L.A. has squandered a sympathetic cause.
Though its members claim to be "Christians resisting Islamization, they
have behaved like an occupying army, killing, raping and pillaging."
(26)

It is ironic that the 'Sudan Peace Act' also contains a section dealing
with "the investigation of war criminals" given that the same Act
provides the SPLA, an group accused of involvement in war crimes, with
millions of dollars worth of American tax-payers money. The 'New York
Times', for example, has stated that SPLA leader John Garang is one of
Sudan's "pre-eminent war criminals". (27). The U.S. Congress cannot have
been unaware of this appalling human rights record. The Clinton
Administration's Sudan expert, John Prendergast, who served with both
the National Security Council and State Department, and who has briefed
many of these legislators, has, for example, stated on record that the
SPLA "was responsible for egregious human rights violations in the
territory it controlled". (28)  Prendergast also personally placed on
record that: "The SPLA has faced a tidal wave of accusations and
condemnation from international human rights organizations and local
churches over its human rights record." (29)

Prendergast personally recorded SPLA involvement in wide-scale killings,
ethnic cleansing, terrorism, widespread raping of Equatorian women,
systematic abuse of humanitarian aid, corruption and an absolute
disregard for human rights. Prendergast confirmed the existence of
ethnic tensions between the largely Dinka SPLA, and the Nuer tribe, as
well as communities in Equatoria in southern Sudan, ever since the SPLA
came into being in 1983, with the SPLA showing an "absolute disregard
for their human rights". (30)  He was also able to confirm that, in an
echo of the war crimes carried out in Bosnia, SPLA behaviour included
the systematic raping of women from different ethnic groups. (31)

Very significantly, given the Act's desire to make SPLA access to relief
even easier, Prendergast further documented the SPLA's deliberate abuse
of aid and society in those areas it controls: "The human rights abuses
of the SPLA are by now well-documented...What is less understood is the
abuse and manipulation of humanitarian assistance, the undermining of
commerce, and the authoritarian political structures which have stifled
any efforts at local organizing or capacity building in the south. These
are the elements which have characterized the first decade of the SPLA's
existence."  (32)

While Prendergast was advising on Sudan, the SPLA engaged in ethnic
cleansing every bit as murderous as that carried out in Bosnia or
Kosovo. SPLA ethnic cleansing continues to this day. The BBC and other
reliable sources have reported on SPLA violence towards non-Dinka ethnic
groups, groups which "accused the SPLA of becoming an army of
occupation" (33), exactly the phrase used by Prendergast himself in
1997. (34) It would appear that the United States would believe that the
human rights of black and brown Africans are not the same value as those
of Bosnians or other white Europeans.


Humanitarian Assistance to Sudan: Operation Lifeline Sudan

The 'Sudan Peace Act' states and restates concern about the facilitation
of relief efforts within southern Sudan. The Act is also hostile to the
United Nations-administered Operation Lifeline Sudan. It further
repeatedly refers to the manipulation of food aid by the government of
Sudan. Whatever the veracity of the claims about the Sudanese
authorities, what the Act conveniently ignores is that the SPLA, the
organisation it seeks to logistically assist, and to whom it wishes to
make access to relief aid easier, has been the biggest abuser of relief
aid in this conflict. The human rights group, African Rights, for
example, has clearly stated that: "On the whole, SPLA commanders and
officials of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA, its
humanitarian wing), have seen relief flows as simple flows of material
resources. The leadership has also used aid for diplomatic and
propaganda purposes." (35) Despite stated concerns about the
manipulation of relief aid, this did not feature in the legislation.

While professing deep concern about urgent humanitarian relief
deliveries within southern Sudan, the U.S. Congress also ignored that
fact that in June 2000 the group they support deliberately broke a
humanitarian ceasefire in Bahr al-Ghazal. This humanitarian ceasefire
had been brokered by the European Union in July 1998 in order to
stabilise aid access to southern Sudan's most famine affected areas.
(36)  The European Union registered "its grave concerns regarding the
offensive launched by the SPLM/A in the region of Bahr al-Ghazal". (37)

The recent offensive was launched by the SPLA, still clearly without any
discernible political agenda, despite UNICEF warnings that the drought
situation in drought-affected areas of Sudan was "fast approaching
critical" (38) and that the food supply outlook was "highly precarious"
and likely to worsen". (39) The World Food Programme has repeatedly
warned of the impending crisis in statements headlined 'Acute Hunger Set
to Hit Sudan as War Continues and Drought Unfolds', 'Major Food Crisis
Looms in Sudan' and, in June 2001, 'Sudan Food Crisis - On the Brink'.
(40)  It should be noted that the horrendous 1998 famine in southern
Sudan was precipitated by similar SPLA offensives As much was reported
on by CNN in early April 1998 under headlines such as "aid agencies
blame Sudanese rebel who switched sides": "Observers say much of the
recent chaos has resulted from the actions of one man, Kerubino Kwanying
Bol, a founding member of the rebel movement...He aided rebel forces in
sieges of three government-held towns, which sent people fleeing into
the countryside." (41) Newsweek magazine (18 May 1998) also reported
that: "Aid workers blame much of the south's recent anguish on one man:
the mercurial Dinka warlord Kerubino Kuanyin Bol".

Humanitarian relief to the war affected parts of Sudan is provided by
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). Operation Lifeline Sudan began in 1989
under the auspices of the United Nations, and with the approval and
cooperation of the government of Sudan and the SPLA. Operational
Lifeline Sudan is a consortium of aid agencies bringing together the UN
World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Children's Fund and 35 other non-
governmental organisations. It seeks to bring food and humanitarian aid
to those communities in southern Sudan most affected by the fighting and
drought, communities within both government and rebel-held areas of the
south. Operation Lifeline Sudan was unprecedented in as much as it was
the first time that a sovereign government had agreed to the delivery of
assistance by outside agencies to rebel-controlled parts of its own
country. As the London 'Guardian' newspaper observed:

"Most of the people affected live in areas controlled by anti-government
rebels and...they were reached by flights from Kenya. Governments
involved in civil wars usually refuse to authorise cross-border
feeding."  (42)

The Sudanese model, developed during the tenure of the present Sudanese
government, has subsequently been used in several other areas of civil
conflict. It is a matter of record that the number of Khartoum-approved
Operation Lifeline Sudan feeding sites in southern Sudan has grown from
twenty in the early 1990s to well over one hundred by 1998. During the
1998 famine, the number increased to more than 180 locations. (43)  So,
far from diminishing access to humanitarian relief, Khartoum would
appear to have greatly increased access. These increases in food
delivery sites were agreed by the Khartoum authorities despite it being
widely known that the SPLA were diverting very sizeable amounts of this
aid for its own uses, something which itself serves to prolong the
conflict.

Washington's claims about Sudanese non-cooperation with humanitarian
relief are also undermined by the fact that unanimous United Nations
resolutions have acknowledged "with appreciation" the cooperation of the
Sudanese government with agreements and arrangements facilitating
"relief operations". (44)

The strength of Operation Lifeline Sudan is that international relief
aid is delivered by a neutral United Nations structure in keeping with
international humanitarian law. The often questionable nature of
previous non-OLS "humanitarian" assistance to Sudan has been documented.
The American government, for example, has given millions of dollars in
funding to Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), a non-governmental organisation
active in southern Sudan. A November 1999 Norwegian television
documentary, entitled 'Weapons Smuggling in Sudan', has highlighted the
role played by NPA in logistically and politically perpetuating the
Sudanese civil war. (45)   There had always been considerable
speculation as to whether NPA was militarily involved with the SPLA.
This documentary confirmed that the NPA has for several years organised
an air-bridge for the supply of weapons to battle zones within Sudan.
One of the NPA pilots involved in the gun running stated that on one
occasion his plane had landed at SPLA bases with some 2.5 tonnes of
weapons. It was stated that Norwegian People's Aid had flown between 80
- 100 tonnes of weapons into Sudan in aeroplanes supposedly carrying
humanitarian assistance. Among the tonnes of weapons flown into Sudan
were landmines. The documentary also placed on record other clear
evidence of NPA military involvement with the SPLA.

Given that Norwegian People's Aid openly states that "[a] major
contributor to our programme in Sudan, is the USAID" (46) two questions
must be asked. The first is how much American taxpayers money has been
used to provide the Sudan People's Liberation Army with weapons of war,
including landmines? And secondly, was the Administration and Congress
aware that it was in effect funding such operations?

The activities of Norwegian People's Aid have long been of considerable
concern to some of its donors. The Norwegian government had previously
commissioned an independent investigation into NPA. The subsequent
report documented NPA complicity in the diversion of food aid to the
SPLA. It stated that:

"NPA's intervention is that of a solidarity group. It has taken a clear
side in the war. It supports the causes of SPLA/M...NPA's solidarity
approach means that in practice the activities of NPA are closely
related to the political and military strategies of the rebel movement."
(47)

This is the sort of organisation that the 'Sudan Peace Act' envisages
channelling "relief" in southern Sudan rather than the neutral and
accountable UN mechanisms.

The United States Congress cannot be unaware of the SPLA's systematic
theft of humanitarian aid and its diversion for its own purposes. In
July 1998, at the height of the devastating 1998 famine, the Roman
Catholic Bishop of the starvation-affected diocese of Rumbek, Monsignor
Caesar Mazzolari, stated that the SPLA were stealing 65 percent of the
food aid going into rebel-held areas of southern Sudan. Agence France
Presse also reported that:

Much of the relief food going to more than a million famine victims in
rebel-held areas of southern Sudan is ending up in the hands of the
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), relief workers said. (48)

There is also a direct link between the supply of food aid to the SPLA
and the war in southern Sudan. The SPLA has been documented as having
clearly engaged in the systematic theft and diversion of emergency food
aid intended for famine victims and refugees. The SPLA has repeatedly
used food aid, and its denial, as a weapon in their war against the
Sudanese government. In so doing it has been at least partly responsible
for the famines that have resulted in the deaths of so many Sudanese
civilians. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of SPLA food aid diversion
is that there is evidence that the SPLA sells diverted humanitarian aid,
either stolen from civilians or directly from aid agencies, in order to
purchase weapons and munitions with which to carry on the war. (49)  The
'Sudan Peace Act' seeks to make it even easier for the SPLA to divert
relief aid, directly affecting famine-stricken communities and
indirectly prolonging the war.

What then would be the sort of non-OLS "relief" situation in southern
Sudan? We already have a clear indication of what this would entail. In
February 2000, because of unacceptable demands made upon them by the
SPLA, eleven international non-governmental aid organisations were
forced to leave southern Sudan. These NGOs included CARE, Oxfam, Save
the Children and Medecins Sans Frontieres. The SPLA had demanded that
all aid agencies active in southern Sudan sign a memorandum which
dictated SPLA control over their activities, and aid distribution, as
well as which Sudanese nationals the agencies employed, and which
stipulated a swath of "taxes" and charges for working in southern Sudan.
The NGOs involved handled about 75 percent of the humanitarian aid
entering southern Sudan. (50)  The withdrawal of these NGOS directly
affected US$ 40 million worth of aid programs. (51) The expelled aid
agencies stated that one million southern Sudanese were at risk as a
result of the SPLA's decision to expel the NGOs. (52)  The European
Union described the SPLA demands as a serious violation of humanitarian
law and suspended its substantial aid program to rebel-controlled areas.
(53)

One can only imagine the uproar within Congress had the Sudanese
government cut the provision of humanitarian aid to southern Sudan by 75
percent. Such behaviour by the SPLA does not even rate a mention by
Congress. Not only has the SPLA severely restricted humanitarian
outreach within southern Sudan for political reasons, but the 'Sudan
Peace Act' would make it even easier for the SPLA to engage in massive
food aid diversion.


Conclusion

The flaws of the 'Sudan Peace Act' are there for all to see. The Act is
characterised by cynicism, misinformation and double standards. While
professing deep concern about relief delivery in southern Sudan, for
example, the Act ignores the fact that the group it is sponsoring has
been guilty of diverting two-thirds of all relief going into the areas
it controls, was responsible for a suspension of 75 percent of
humanitarian projects in southern Sudan by insisting on SPLA control of
the relief aid, and has repeatedly launched offensives within areas that
are already seriously famine and drought affected. The Act claims to be
concerned about war crimes and yet actively seeks to sustain some of the
conflict's worst abusers of human rights.

The most constructive role that the U.S. Congress could play with regard
to the Sudanese conflict would be to bring the SPLA to the negotiating
table. Far from doing this, however, Congress has sought to encourage
the SPLA, a group without an identifiable political objective, with
millions of dollars in support - in effect encouraging further conflict.
When one has the respected former American president Jimmy Carter,
former Sudanese prime minister and opposition leader Sadiq al-Mahdi and
the Sudanese government all agreeing that the United States has been the
biggest single obstacle to peace in Sudan it is a concern that must be
recognised.

The Bush Administration's Sudan policy can only be described as confused
and uncoordinated. It would appear that a group of legislators who are
at best naïve and at worst dogmatic religious fanatics, are at present
driving America's Sudan policy. In so doing they are damaging the
reputation of the United States within the international community. The
simple fact is that Sudan has moved on politically, domestically,
economically, regionally and within the international community. The
sooner American policy reflects these changes and works towards a
peaceful solution to Sudanese problems the sooner Sudan will be at
peace.


Notes

1       'Carter Says Wrong Time for Mideast Talks', News Article by
Reuters on 24 April 2001.
2       'Carter, Others Say US Has Faltered in Africa', 'The Boston
Globe', 8 December 1999. For more details of American support to the
SPLA see 'Ex-President Opposes Policy of Aiding Khartoum's Foes', 'The
Washington Times', 25 September 1997; 'Sudan's American-aided
guerrillas', 'The Economist', 25 January 1997; 'Sudan Accuses US of
Supplying Rebels with Mines', News Article by Xinhua, 21 January 1999,
at 12:53:58; 'US flies in howitzers to subdue Sudan', 'Africa Analysis',
No 290, 6 February 1998; 'Albright Meets Sudan Rebels, Pledges US
Support', News Article by Reuters on 10 December 1997, at 09:05 EST;
'U.S. said to promise aid to Sudanese rebel areas', News Article by
Reuters on 2 June 1998, at 11:37:57.
3       See, for example, amongst many overtures: 'Interview - Sudan
Wants to Bury Hatchet with US', News Article by Reuters on 20 May 1999
at 09:19:23, 'Sudan Wants Dialogue With US, Bashir Tells Envoy', News
Article by Reuters on 7 March 2000 at 06:40:53, 'Sudan Wants Better Ties
with US's Bush', News Article by Agence France Presse on 2 February 2001
and 'Sudan Welcomes U.S. Peace Involvement but Urges Neutrality', News
Article by Associated Press on 28 May 2001.
4       See, 'Sudanese rebel leader wants "united" Sudan with
"equality"', News Article by Agence France Presse on 12 August 1999 at
08:12:59; 'SPLA committed to Sudan unity', News Article by
ArabicNews.com on 29 November 1997; 'Separatist leader wants Sudan to
split into two', News Article by BBC on 22 March 1999 at 18:21 GMT;
'Sudanese rebels accused of planning separate state', News Article by
Agence France Presse on 2 August 1999 at 11:49:08.
5       See, 'Sudan offers South secession', News Article by BBC on 22
February 1999 at 00:16:14 GMT; 'Southern secession better than more war:
Sudan's president', News Article by Agence France Presse on 22 February
1999, at 10:04:31;; 'Sudan Says Happy for South to secede', News Article
by Reuters on 7 May 1998.
6       'Khartoum Urges Rebels to "Stop Fighting and Talk"', News
Article by Agence France Presse on 5 June 2001
7       See, 'Referendum agreed at Sudan peace talks', News Article by
BBC World on 7 May 1998, at 11:06 GMT and 'SPLA plays down deal on
referendum in southern Sudan', News Article by BBC, on 7 May 1998, at
13:24 GMT.
8       See, 'Sudanese government declares ceasefire', News Article by
BBC World on 5 August 1999 at 16:24 GMT, at 11:58:37; 'Sudanese
government declares comprehensive cease-fire', News Article by
Associated Press on 5 August 1999 at 17:36:10; "Sudan Government to
Observe Ceasefire Despite SPLA Rejection", News Article by Agence France
Presse on 7 August 1999 at 14:33:50;'EU Welcomes Cease-Fire in Sudan',
News Article by Xinhua on 20 August 1999 at 10:36:48; 'Annan welcomes
ceasefire', News Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Network,
11 August 1999; 'Annan hails Sudan cease-fire allowing aid to flow',
News Article by Reuters on 6 August 1999 at 17:07:39; 'Annan calls on
Sudan's SPLM leader to sign ceasefire', News Article by Agence France
Presse on 7 August 1999, at 02:37:52; 'Sudanese rebels reject peace
plan', News Article by BBC World on 30 August 1999 at 14:33 GMT;
'Sudanese Rebels Reject Government Cease-Fire', News Article by Reuters
on 5 August 1999  at 12:03:55.
9       See, for example, 'Sudan's Government in Favour of Ceasefire in
18-year Civil War', News Article by Agence France Presse on 22 April
2001 and 'Government "Ready for a Ceasefire', News Article by United
Nations Integrated Regional Information Network, 15 May 2001.
10      "Sudan Backs Combination of Arab and African Peace Drives", News
Article by Agence France Presse on 24 October 1999 at 13:51:08
11      See, for example, 'Sudan calls for Western Pressure on southern
Rebels to Accept Ceasefire', News Article by Agence France Presse on 26
April 2000; 'US Catholic Clerics Urged to Pressurise Garang into
Accepting Cease-Fire', News Article by Sudan News Agency on 27 March
2001; 'Britain Can Pressurize Rebels to Realize Cease-Fire, Sudanese
Diplomat', News Article by SUNA, 26 February 2001; 'Sudanese Government
Welcomes Carter's Initiative to End the War in southern Sudan', News
Article by ArabicNews.com on 26 April 2001.
12      See, "Sudanese Rebels Reject Peace Plan", News Article by BBC
News Online Network on 30 August 1999 at 14.33 GMT; "Sudanese Rebels
Snub Libyan-Egyptian Mediation Effort", News Article by Agence France
Presse on 30 August 1999 at 21:01:12;  and then "Sudanese Rebel Leader
Supports Peace Plan: Egypt", News Article by Agence France Presse on 31
August 1999, at 23:20:41 and then Sudanese Rebels Say They Can't Commit
to Egyptian-Libyan Peace Drive', News Article by Agence France Presse on
14 May 2001; "Sudanese Rebels Reject Reconciliation Accord", News
Article by Associated Press on 29 November 1999 at 15:23:09.
13      'Sudanese Rebels to Receive Dlrs 3 Million in Assistance', News
Article by Associated Press on 25 May 2001.
14      'U.S. Slates $3 Million for Sudan's Opposition', 'The Washington
Post', 25 May 2001.
15      'U.S. Slates $3 Million for Sudan's Opposition', 'The Washington
Post', 25 May 2001.
16      See, for example, 'Khartoum Urges Rebels to "Stop Fighting and
Talk"', News Article by Agence France Presse on 5 June 2001 and 'Sudan's
Government Calls on International Community to Push for Cease-Fire',
News Article by Associated Press on 5 June 2001.
17      'An Act To Facilitate Famine Relief Efforts and a Comprehensive
Solution to the War in Sudan', 107th Congress, 1st Session, Washington
D-C, 13 June 2001.
18      'Civilians Flee Town Under Siege', News Article by Sudanese
Catholic Information Office, Nairobi, 8 June 2001.
19      'Tens of Thousands Displaced by Bahr al-Ghazal Fighting', U.N.
Integrated Regional Information Network, 11 June 2001.
20      'Fighting in Sudan's Bahr el Ghazal Leaves 57,000 Displaced:
Bishop', News Article by Agence France Presse on 13 June 2001.
21      'Ex-President Opposes Policy of Aiding Khartoum's Foes', 'The
Washington Times', 25 September 1997.
22      "Interview - Sudan Says US Harming Peace Prospects", New Article
by Reuters on 25 October 1999 at 14:58:29
23      'Developments in Sudan Favour National Reconciliation: Mahdi',
News Article by Agence France Presse on 25 December 1999 at 12:38:20.
24      'Humanitarian Organizations Oppose Plan Providing Food to
Sudanese Rebels', Press Release by InterAction, the American Council for
Voluntary International Action, Washington-DC, 30 November, 1999.
25      'Rights Group Warns US Against Feeding Sudan Rebels', News
Article by Reuters on 14 December, 1999 at 11:34:40.
26      'Misguided Relief to Sudan', 'The New York Times', 6 December
1999.
27      'Misguided Relief to Sudan', Editorial, 'The New York Times', 6
December, 1999.
28      John Prendergast, 'Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in
Sudan and Somalia', Pluto Press, London, 1997,  p.77.
29      Ibid, p.72.
30      Ibid, p.57.
31      Ibid, p.28.
32      Ibid, p.46.
33      See, for example, 'Growing Friction in Rebel-Held Southern
Sudan', News Article by BBC Online on 9 June 1999 at 16:36 GMT.
34      Ibid, p.57.
35      Alex de Waal (Editor), 'Food and Power in Sudan', African
Rights, London, 1997, pp.5,7.
36      'UN and other Agencies Warmly Welcome Temporary Cease-Fire over
part of southern Sudan', United Nations Department of Public
Information, 16 July 1998.
37      'Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union
on the Civil War in Sudan', European Union, 30 June 2000.
38      'Drought Situation "Fast Approaching Critical" - Unicef', News
Article by United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network,
Nairobi, 11 May 2001.
39      'Food Supply Precarious and Likely to Worsen', News Article by
United Nations IRIN, Nairobi, 15 May 2001.
40      See, 'Acute Hunger Set to Hit Sudan as War Continues and Drought
Unfolds', News Release by World Food Programme, Nairobi, 13 February
2001; 'Major Food Crisis Looms in Sudan', News Release by World Food
Programme, Nairobi, 29 March 2001, and 'Sudan Food Crisis - On the
Brink',  News Release by World Food Programme, Nairobi, 15 June 2001.
41      '1 million people face famine in Sudan, Ethiopia', News Article
by CNN on April 10, 1998: Web posted at 6:04 p.m. EDT (22:04 GMT).
42      'Millions Still in Need in Sudan', 'The Guardian', London, 25
April 1998.
43      'The Guardian', London, 25 April 1998.
44      'Emergency Assistance to the Sudan', UN General Assembly
Resolution A/RES/53/1 O, 17 December 1998.
45      'Vapensmuglerne I Sudan', 'Brennpunkt', NRK Television, Norway,
17 November 1999.
46      See, for example, the Norwegian People's Aid website at
http://www.npaid.org/about_npa/funding.html
47      'Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan',
a report submitted to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
COWI, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, November 1997, p.27.
48      'Aid for Sudan Ending Up With SPLA: Relief Workers', News
Article by Agence France Presse on 21 July, 1998 at 08:23:48.
49      'Aid Money Supported Rebellion in Sudan', 'Aktuelt', Denmark, 20
May, 1998.
50      'Rights Group Urges More Talks on Sudan Relief', News Article by
Associated Press on 8 March, 2000 at 05:30:49 EST.
51      'Seven Aid Agencies Urge Renewed Negotiations for Relief to
Southern Sudan', News Article by Associated Press on 1 March, 2000.
52      'Expelled Aid Agencies Say Million at Risk in Sudan', News
Article by Reuters on 1 March, 2000.
53      'European Commission Statement on Southern Sudan', European
Union, 29 February, 2000.



ENDS






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