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POLICYWATCH
Number 584
November 29, 2001
FOCUSING ON IRAQ: THE QUESTION IS HOW, NOT WHETHER
By Patrick Clawson
In Washington, the debate over Iraq is shifting from the simple
question of whether it should be targeted in phase II of the
antiterror war, to how we should deal with a country that continually
refuses to fulfill its UN obligations and surrender weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). From the latter viewpoint, options for Iraqi
policy are not confined to the extremes of either complete inactivity
or dispatching 500,000 troops for a ground campaign. There are
numerous approaches that the Bush administration can take if it is
determined to increase pressure on Saddam Husayn's regime. President
Bush spoke on Monday about the importance of resuming UN-mandated
arms-control inspections in Iraq, and the Security Council has been
considering this week whether to revitalize sanctions on Iraq.
Why Iraq?
While there may be a retributive aspect to the Afghan campaign, the main focus of U.S.
counterterrorism effort is to prevent further terrorist operations. An important
lesson from September 11 is that the United States is
vulnerable to surprise attacks; America must take seriously the risks posed by those
who repeatedly and publicly threaten it, and who are devout in acquiring the means
with which to inflict mass casualties. In order to p
reempt terrorists, the question to ask is: who has the means and motive to engage in
devastating terrorist attacks? After Al Qaeda, the most troubling figure is Iraqi
leader Saddam Husayn. Saddam has stubbornly hung on to
WMD and provoked repeated confrontations with the United States and its allies
because he refused UN inspectors. He sacrificed more than $100 billion in potential
oil revenue from 1991 to 1998 rather than surrender his W
MD capabilities. If Saddam cares that much about WMD, it is reasonable to assume that
he is prepared to use them. In light of America's ongoing experience with biological
weapons -- which revealed how disruptive trace amo
unts of anthrax can be -- the United States has every reason to be gravely concerned
about Saddam's refusal to comply with UN mandates.
Of note, the rationale for concentrating on Iraq has little to do with the scattered
information suggesting Al Qaeda may have worked with Iraq, or with the speculation
that Iraq may have been involved with the anthrax att
acks. Those opposed to pressuring Saddam about his WMD like to raise this red herring,
claiming that without real evidence tying Saddam to recent attacks, nothing can be
done about the Iraq threat. That reasoning is fault
y on two grounds: first, the lesson from September 11 is that responsible policy
prevents terrorism resulting in mass casualties rather than waiting until more
casualties occur before responding; second, the question of I
raq's link to September 11 obscures the main U.S. problem with Saddam, which is his
refusal to comply with clear UN requirements to give up WMD.
What Are the Options for Iraq Policy?
The framework for Iraq policy should be Saddam's WMD -- a matter for which there is
broad international concern -- and especially his refusal to comply with his
obligations under Security Council resolutions. The choice s
hould be stark:
� He must clearly demonstrate that the WMD programs have been dismantled as required
by the UN Gulf War ceasefire resolution, recalling that it places the burden of proof
on him to show that Iraq is WMD- free.
� Failing this, he should expect that the United States will take strong action
against his regime -- in line with Security Council resolutions authorizing use of
force -- along with such countries as wish to join this.
The choice is up to Saddam, but he is not likely to comply any more than the Taliban
were likely to hand over Osama bin Laden; offering him the choice, though, puts the
onus on him. If Saddam does comply fully, the United
States should follow a policy of deterring his regime, odious as it is, rather than
overthrowing it. The only hope of getting him to give up WMD will be to demonstrate
convincingly that, post- September 11, the United St
ates is prepared to take tough, determined, and ongoing measures against his regime
until he complies or is overthrown. It will not be easy; Washington suffers from a
lack of credibility because its past statements have n
ot been followed up with action. The victory in Afghanistan will improve America's
credibility, but a broad-action program is necessary to build on that momentum.
Elements could include:
� Stepping up enforcement of sanctions with sea- based assets in order to demonstrate
willingness to use military force without putting regional allies on the spot by
asking permission to use their bases. Cruise missiles
could hit the Syria-Iraq pipeline pumping stations in Iraq, which would have the added
benefit of showing Syrian president Bashar al-Asad the consequence of lying to
Secretary of State Colin Powell, to whom he promised in
Febraury that "if" the pipeline opened, the $2 billion in annual revenue would be
channeled through the UN oil-for-food program.
� Demonstrating early on the U.S. commitment to follow through by taking steps that
put American assets at risk. Examples could include: installing transmitters for the
existing U.S.-run Radio Free Iraq in northern Iraq i
n addition to their current location in Prague; returning to northern Iraq the CIA
presence withdrawn in haste in 1996 to collect intelligence and aid opposition forces;
and reinstating in the north the token military pre
sence of the Military Coordination Committee.
� Providing security guarantees to the Iraqi oppositions in the north, especially the
Kurds, so they allow more anti-Saddam activity from the 20 percent of Iraq they
already control. Those guarantees would be most credibl
e if made in public at meetings between the president and opposition leaders, and if
backed up by the presence of Americans on the ground, along the lines discussed above.
� Supporting the Iraqi opposition. The various opposition groups have tens of
thousands of soldiers on the ground -- more than the Afghan Northern Alliance has --
mostly from two Kurdish groups, the Kurdish Democratic Par
ty and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Despite this, U.S. critics disparage the
opposition for largely spurious reasons, such as the complaint that it is divided
among various groups. In fact, just as was done in Afghan
istan during the Soviet days, U.S. officials should encourage a wide array of
opposition groups, celebrating their diversity as harbingers of a democratic future.
Top U.S. officials should meet with the Iranian-based Shii
te opposition as well as other groups. Generous assistance should be provided, such as
communications equipment and funding to aid the internally displaced persons in the
Kurdish north.
� Presenting this plan to allies -- especially Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Britain -- as
a statement of policy, not as a proposal for coalition debate. The allies will object,
both because of genuine concerns and as a probe
of whether the United States will act tough rather than just talk tough. The most
effective U.S. response to the objections would be to offer to work collaboratively on
shaping tactics so that the allies are not exposed,
while making clear that the United States is committed strategically to proceeding.
A Washington Post-ABC poll taken November 27 found that 78 percent of Americans favor
"having U.S. forces take military action against Iraq to force Saddam Hussein from
power." What is needed now is to follow up Bush's st
art at reminding the world of the threat Iraq represents. Saddam should be confronted
with a stark choice: either he fulfills his obligations under UN Security Council
resolutions to get rid of his WMD, or he will have to
face the consequences.
Patrick Clawson is director for research at The Washington Institute.
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