-Caveat Lector-

>From http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0230/baard.php

Your Grocery List Could Spark a Terror Probe
Buying Trouble
by Erik Baard
July 24 - 30, 2002


(illustration: Marc Phares)

They thought they were making routine purchases—the innocent, everyday pickups of 
charcoal and hummus,
bleach and sandwich bags, that keep the modern household running. Regulars at a 
national grocery chain,
these thousands and thousands of shoppers used the store's preferred-customer cards, 
in the process
putting years of their lives on file. Perhaps they expected their records would be 
used by marketers trying to
better target consumers. Instead, says the company's privacy consultant, the data was 
used by government
agents hunting for potential terrorists.

The saga began with a misguided fit of patriotism mere weeks after the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon
attacks, when a corporate employee handed over the records—almost literally, the 
grocery lists—to federal
investigators from three agencies that had never even requested them. In a flash, the 
most quotidian of
exchanges became fodder for the Patriot Act.

When the company's legal counsel discovered the breach, she turned for advice to Larry 
Ponemon, CEO of
the consulting firm Privacy Council and a former business ethics professor at Babson 
College and SUNY. "I
told her it's better to be transparent," Ponemon recalls. "Send a notice to loyalty 
cardholders telling them
what happened. She agreed and presented that to the board but they said, 'No, we don't 
want to hand a
smoking gun to litigators.' " The attorney, who has since resigned from the grocery 
chain, declined through
Ponemon to be interviewed or to identify herself or her former employer. To this day, 
the customers haven't
been informed.

"It wasn't a case of law enforcement being egregiously intrusive or an evil agency 
planting a bug or wiretap.
It was a marketing person saying, 'Maybe this will help you catch a bad guy,' " 
Ponemon says.

As John Ashcroft's Citizens Corps spy program prepares for its debut next month, it 
seems scores of
American companies have already become willing snitches. A few months ago, the Privacy 
Council surveyed
executives from 22 companies in the travel industry—not just airlines but hotels, car 
rental services, and
travel agencies—and found that 64 percent of respondents had turned over information 
to investigators and
59 percent had lowered their resistance to such demands. In that sampling, conducted 
with The Boston
Globe, half of the businesses said they hadn't decided if they'd inform customers of 
the change, and more
than a third said outright that they wouldn't. Only three said they would go public 
about the level of their
cooperation with law enforcement.

The final destination of all that data scares Ponemon and other civil libertarians, 
defenders of the Fourth
Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure. Ponemon, for one, suggests 
federal authorities
are plugging the information into algorithms, using the complex formulas to create a 
picture of general-
population trends that can be contrasted with the lifestyles of known terrorists. If 
your habits match, expect
further scrutiny at the least.

"I can't reveal my source, but a federal agency involved in espionage actually did a 
rating system of almost
every citizen in this country," Ponemon claims. "It was based on all sorts of 
information—public sources,
private sources. If people are not opted in"—meaning they haven't chosen to 
participate—"one can generally
assume that information was gathered through an illegal system."

After crunching those numbers through the algorithm, he says, its creators fed in the 
files of the 9-11
terrorists as a test. "The model showed 89.7 percent accuracy 'predicting' these 
people from rest of
population," Ponemon reports.

Oddly enough, "one of the factors was if you were a person who frequently ordered 
pizza and paid with a
credit card," Ponemon says, describing the buying habits of a nation of college 
students. "Sometimes data
leads to an empirical inference when you add it to other variables. Whether this one 
is relevant or completely
spurious remains to be seen, but those kinds of weird things happen with data."



The thirst for consumer records is bipartisan. In April, Bill Clinton told the BBC 
that when it comes to fighting
terrorism, "more than 95 percent of the people that are in the United States at any 
given time are in the
computers of companies that mail junk mail, and you can look for patterns there."

Katherine Albrecht, a crusader against grocery loyalty cards and invasive marketing, 
notes in a paper to be
published in the Denver Law Review, "Virginia Congressmen Jim Moran (D-VA) and Tom 
Davis (R-VA) recently
introduced legislation that would require all states' driver's licenses and ID cards 
to contain an embedded
computer chip capable of accepting 'data or software written to the license or card by 
non-governmental
devices.' " The mandatory "smart chips" would carry bank and debit card data so that 
citizens could use their
ID cards "for a variety of commercial applications." Even library records, shopping 
coupons, and health
records could be stored on the chips.

Adding to this vision of technological dystopia, companies are already developing 
cameras and other
scanners that can seamlessly trace individuals as they wander through stores, going so 
far as to zoom in on
their faces should they linger over an item, to provide retailers with ever more data.

The problem is that, as with the link between take-out pizza and terrorism, statistics 
don't always prove
cause and effect. Mathematician Karen Kafadar of the University of Colorado at Denver 
explains that such a
finding is "a proxy. It just happened to have something that correlated. There's 
actually something else going
on but it's an indicator, like drinking beer and lung cancer might be. Beer doesn't 
cause lung cancer, but
people drinking a lot of beer might also be smoking."

Ponemon is more concerned about process than the data itself. "Total privacy does 
shelter bad guys, there's
no question about that. But transparency is also good," he argues. "There should be 
some labeling or
notice." In theory, consumers and investors could punish offending companies by 
channeling their money
elsewhere. Without honest managers, though, the free market's self-correcting 
mechanism never gets a
chance to kick in.

Librarians have filled their listservs with e-mails sharing strategies for resisting 
law enforcement attempts to
grab hold of their users' book lists. But the corporate world doesn't foster that kind 
of purist culture. When
the Federal Bureau of Investigation came knocking for the names of scuba divers this 
spring, the Professional
Association of Diving Instructors forked over a roll of more than 2 million certified 
divers without so much as
being served a subpoena.

The feds were acting on no specific threat, just a hunch that someone might attack 
that way. And again,
these data dumps are just attempts to do good. Would Attorney General John Ashcroft's 
new TIPS
campaign—the Terrorism Information and Prevention System—encourage people like the 
mole at the grocery
store chain to spill info into the tanks of unethical investigators?

The Department of Justice, which seeks informants in utility, cable, and other such 
industries operating in
communities, denies that it will cultivate sources placed in data-mining operations. 
"This makes TIPS sound so
much more sophisticated than it's going to be," says spokesperson Charles Miller. 
"This is still in development
but it's nothing more than something to make people more aware of what's going on 
around them, and most
people do that now anyway."

Likewise, both the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence 
Agency denied roles in any
sweeping algorithm to measure citizens' potential terrorist leanings. If anything, the 
FBI has recently been
taken to task for being a tin-cans-and-string Luddite organization. But the FBI is a 
client of the consumer data
aggregator ChoicePoint. And a U.S. official tells the Voice, "Can I categorically deny 
anybody in government
is doing it? No."

An admission that the government is combing through purchase records certainly would 
help explain why,
according to the Naples Daily News, federal agents reviewed the shopper-card 
transactions of hijacker
Mohammed Atta's crew to create a profile of ethnic tastes and terrorist 
supermarket-shopping preferences.



Algorithms are already used to search for things as diverse as credit card fraud and 
ideal college applicants.
Since 1998, airline ticket buyers have been sifted at the reservations desk by the 
Computer Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System, or CAPPS, a net championed by Al Gore and set to expand 
dramatically. The
group overseeing the algorithm, the Transportation Security Administration, won't 
comment on what new
data might be added to create CAPPS 2.

"At a conceptual level, the work that these algorithms do is not much different than 
the work that a detective
undertakes in assessing whether an individual is a suspect in a crime," explains 
Christy Joiner-Congleton, CEO
of Stone Analytics, a leading developer of such programs. "Good algorithms sort 
through mountains of
outcomes and possible contributing factors and identify relationships for very rare 
events, like terrorism. The
more exotic the outcome, the more data is needed to discover it, and the more 
sophisticated the algorithm
must be to discover it."

Academic mathematicians and statisticians who design algorithms have also called for 
broader databases.
Among them are Kafadar and Max D. Morris of Iowa State University, co-authors of a new 
paper titled "Data-
Based Detection of Potential Terrorist Attacks on Airplanes." They note that "[a]fter 
the fact, some common
elements of the suspected terrorists are obvious: None were U.S. citizens, all had 
lived in the U.S. for some
period of time, all had connections to a particular foreign country, all had purchased 
one-way tickets at the
gate with cash. The statistical odds that five out of 80 revenue passengers (in the 
case of one of the four
hijacked flights on September 11) fit this profile might, by itself, be unusual enough 
to warrant concern."

Racial profiling finds quasi-acceptance in the hunt for terrorists, as it does in the 
drug war or the pursuit of
serial killers, who tend to be middle-aged white men. But Kafadar and Morris argue 
that the "historical data
must be relevant to a specific flight. For example, a United flight leaving San 
Francisco for Seoul, Korea,
could be expected to carry a much larger fraction of Asian passengers than one might 
see on a flight from,
say, Des Moines to Denver," the authors write. A trip like Atta's, Kafadar tells the 
Voice, "wasn't a flight
coming from Saudi Arabia. There were a disproportionately high number of Arabic names 
given about 80
people to choose from."

But the algorithm method didn't fail on 9-11—the human response did. When the 
screening program spotted
something unusual about at least one of the flights, the people in charge elected only 
to reinspect the
luggage. According to The Wall Street Journal, CAPPS tagged hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi 
and Khalid Al-Midhar
because they'd reserved their tickets by credit card, but paid in cash. The right-wing 
National Review
slammed CAPPS for failing to include race, religion, and national origin in its 
calculations or to tie the system
into manual searches of passengers, and not just baggage.

MIT mathematician David R. Karger says harassing individuals is foolhardy, but so is 
refusing to consider
sensitive demographics. "This is just making your predictive capability worse," he 
writes in an e-mail interview.
"Much more appropriate is to use the best data you've got, but to remember that 
probability doesn't mean
certainty."

Joiner-Congleton writes, "Fundamentally, the algorithms themselves (if created in a 
technically correct
fashion) are not the thing to fear. Rather, as in life, the things to fear are the 
conclusions drawn and the
subsequent actions taken. Nevertheless, drawing conclusions from data is a necessary 
thing in life. People
must do this to survive. Imagine the havoc that would be wreaked on the roads of 
America if we ignored the
sounding of a horn on the freeway. Horn-blowing is usually associated with a dangerous 
event. We ignore it
at our peril."

She even conceives of developing algorithms so advanced that society might intervene, 
to get people liable
to be recruited into cells back on track before they can be seduced by elements like 
Al Qaeda. "There is a
possibility that with sufficient information about known terrorists we could evolve to 
the point where we could
spot terrorists in the making," she argues. "We believe that individuals can be at 
risk of becoming drug
addicts, or joining gangs, or having affairs, or any number of things at certain times 
and under certain
conditions in their lives. . . . Thorough and continued algorithmic investigation of 
terrorist behavior is very
likely to shed light on their origins, and possibly lead to proactive efforts."



But there's a truly slippery slope here. We live in a nation that for months has held 
at least 700 people—and
possibly hundreds more— incommunicado, with no more solid connection to terrorism than 
that they were
born in Middle Eastern countries.

Privacy may seem like a luxury in a nation at war, but that moral concept lies at the 
heart of constitutionally
guaranteed liberties. That's why so many people are willing to fight for it. A lawsuit 
filed by John Gilmore, an
early employee of Sun Microsystems, aims to restore the anonymity central to the 
freedom to travel in
America. He names Ashcroft, FBI director Robert Mueller, and security czar Tom Ridge 
as defendants, among
other officials, along with two airlines. Gilmore wants to prevent security at 
airports from demanding
identification from him, or subjecting him to arduous and invasive searches when he 
refuses to provide a
photo ID. The emphasis, he says, should be on strengthening cockpits and developing 
"fly by wire" systems
to automatically land planes under threat. But our terrorism fears extend well past 
airlines to water-tainting,
dirty bombs, suicide bombers, conventional bombing, or even simply opening fire with 
an assault weapon in
Grand Central Station—the kinds of attacks that are difficult to prevent in an open 
society.

For now, we rely on tools like algorithms, and algorithms make mistakes. Albrecht 
notes that in a three-month
test period, the Department of Defense investigated 345 employees after a program 
falsely fingered them
for abusing shopping privileges. In another case, an elderly woman was repeatedly 
stopped and questioned
in airports because her name matched that of a young man already in prison for 
murder—a glitch that may
indicate CAPPS or another algorithm is using data illegally, for basic criminal 
investigation and not anti-
terrorism. Further, supermarket records have been seized by Drug Enforcement Agency 
investigators looking
for purchases of small plastic baggies, often used in the drug trade, Albrecht 
observes.

"I am not a number!" shouted Patrick McGoohan, star of the British TV show The 
Prisoner, when he rejected
life in an idyllic village where he was held and constantly monitored. "I am a free 
man." Now that this nation is
at war with terror, perhaps you'll remain free as long as your "Potential Terrorist 
Quotient" remains low
enough.




Read more of the Voice's coverage of the attack on civil liberties in post- September 
11 America.


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