-- Joseph Ashwood: > > > > So it's going to be broken by design. These are > > > > critical errors that will eliminate any semblance of > > > > security in your program.
James A. Donald: > > > I challenge you to fool my canonicalization algorithm by > > > modifying a message to as to change the apparent meaning > > > while preserving the signature, or by producing a > > > message that verifies as signed by me, while in fact a > > > meaningfully different message to any that was genuinely > > > signed by me. Joseph Ashwood: > That's easy, remember that you didn't limit the challenge to > text files. It should be a fairly simple matter to create a > JPEG file with a number of 0xA0 and 0x20 bytes, by simply > swapping the value of those byte one can create a file that > will pass your verification, but will obviously be corrupt. > Your canonicalization is clearly and fatally flawed. If so easy, do it. > > Joseph Ashwood must produce a message that is meaningfully > > different from any of the numerous messages that I have > > sent to cypherpunks, but which verifies as sent by the > > same person who sent past messages. > > > > Thus for Kong to be "broken" one must store a past message > > from that proflic poster supposed called James Donald, in > > the Kong database, and bring up a new message hacked up by > > Joseph Ashwood, and have Kong display in the signature > > verification screen Joseph Ashwood: > To verify that I would of course have to download and install > Kong, In other words, you are blowing smoke, and know full well you are blowing smoke. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG H1Nbd40fMEd0QoHFng2hEcuA2a/BP07ab+GOBowZ 4HIcNbSdMF02EWVm52VJqtj0Jas+Wmq/SZ/UyT0uq