On Tue, 11 Feb 2003, Michel Messerschmidt wrote:
> The TPM is a mandatory part of the TCPA specifications.
> There will be no TCPA without TPM.
That makes sense, TPM is just key storage.
> And there will be no TCPA-enabled system with complete user control.
> Just look at the main specification:
> - users can't access nor alter the Endorsement Key
> - the TPM can't be disabled completely. This allows operating systems
> that bind ("product activation" ?) themselves to an unique TPM and
> refuse to start if it's not fully activated.
>
> If a system doesn't meet these reqirements (as the IBM paper suggests)
> it isn't a TCPA system.
Not having access to the secret key inside the TPM is what makes the
hardware secure. Not being able to disable it is a problem for sure.
To me that implies the user does not have control. So my idea of a
"good" TCPA is not part of the spec. Too bad. That makes it
impossible to sell to anyone with a brain cell left.
> TCPA uses some interesting possibilities that may enhance system
> security. But with the current specifications, it likely destroys any
> privacy that's left on todays systems.
If they want to sell it, they'll have to fix the specs. Any IT pro
is going to explain to the CEO how it allows somebody else access
to all a companies data, and poof, TCPA goes away.
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
