On Sat, 15 Dec 2001, An Metet wrote:

> > Remailer operators should have permanent encrypted links to one another,
> > with constant (or at least message-uncorrelated) traffic volumes.
> > They can still use latency, message pools, and other features, of course.
> > But when it comes time to deliver messages to the next remailer in the
> > list, that should be done with a reliable and direct connection that
> > doesn't have to depend on the vagaries of sendmail, procmail, Microsoft
> > servers or the many other layers that get in the way.  This would both
> > increase the reliability of the remailer network and improve its security
> > by hiding inter-remailer traffic.
> 
> Great idea! Cypherpunks write code. Let us know when you have something we
> can look at.

Plan 9 OS:

http://plan9.bell-labs.com

Hangar 18 Distributed Computing Co-Op:

http://einstein.ssz.com/hangar18

A Plan 9 based tool we hope to have available this summer;

igor

A remailer for Plan 9


One of the primary values of the Internet is email. It provides a reliable
and consistent link across time and space. It is the proto-typical killer
app. However, to use email effectively there should be two additional
features. We don't promise more don't exist. The first feature is the
ability to reflect or remail a single email to many recipients. The second
is to strip identifying header information from the sender prior to the
subscriber getting it.

igor does not use 'embedded routing commands' like many other anonymous
remailer packages. We believe that tampering or altering the body of the
email is simply wrong. We offer two way to input data into igor. The first
is through Subject: line escaped commands and the second is through
additional header files. An example of each is,

Subject: Some title or other [igor: some_commands, must_come_last]

or,

X-igor: some_commands

This allows the first remailer to strip the command data out and then
process the email as if igor had never been involved. igor supports limited
routing selection, which is intended to make traffic analysis harder. igor
sends individual emails embedded in igor-specific header info to eliminate
as much interaction with the email itself. All inter-igor traffic is
encrypted with PK's managed by the Evil Geniuses.

Route Commands (ie igor: * * ...):

strip                   Strip the From: header
zombie                  Strip the From: header and replace with
                        From: Walking Dead
route#                  Route the message through # other igor nodes,
                        not selectable by the user, where # is from 1 to 3.
                        route0 is assumed and means send to recipient
                        directly
cover                   Provide cover traffic for each outbound email by
                        sending all know igors a single bogus email.
                        This provides n-copy cover traffic.
subscribe $             Subscribe to mailing list $
who $                   Who is subscribed to list $?
info $                  Provide info on list $
help                    Request an info-help file


igor Configuration Parameters (igor.conf):

MyPubKey                This remailers public key, non-traffic related
                        encryption key. Used for encrypting traffic or
                        data.

MyOwnKey                This remailers private key, non-traffic related
                        de-cryption key. Used for decrypting traffic
                        or data.

MyPubRing               My public key ring, this contains a mapping of each
                        'authorized' igor remailer we will operate with. We
                        use this key to encrypt traffic TO the listed
                        remailers. There are no line length limits.

                        e.g.

                        [EMAIL PROTECTED]#242ds032fdsasetewdvdsasdfewwere...
                        [EMAIL PROTECTED]#2303210343203828353234898324397...                
 
                        [EMAIL PROTECTED]#23XD24398dDWSc35K2)3C2#d...
                        ...

MyOwnRing               My private key ring, this contains a mapping of each
                        'authorized' igor remailer we will operate with. We
                        use this key to decrypt traffic FROM the listed
                        remailers.

GHeader: $              Place this at the beginning of all emails through
                        this remailer

GFooter: $              Place this at the foot of all emails through this
                        remailer

Open: *, *, *, ...      These mailing lists will provide all info to any
                        reqeustor

List: *, *, *, ...      These mailing lists will provide info only to a
                        current subscriber

Close: *, *, *, ...     These mailing lists will not provide any info

Verify: *, *, *, ...    These mailing lists always verify each operation
                        through the Evil Geniuses.

ArchDir $               The archive files should go in the $ directory

Archive: *, *, *, ...   These mailing lists will create an archive file,
                        #.arc


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