On 14 May 2018 at 16:24, Mattia Rizzolo <mat...@debian.org> wrote: > On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 01:55:55PM -0300, Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer > wrote: >> Quoting from the above: >> >> The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against >> file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all >> available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where >> /dev/[u]random is not available. Since the fallback code is often not >> well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode >> entirely. >> >> So if we disable it we disable a feature providing a more robust method to >> provide randomness to ours users. > > Reading this sounds like the presence of the syscall could be tested at > runtime, and if present used and if not fall back to dev/urandom?
Patches directly at upstream (due to copyright issues) are welcomed :-) -- Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer http://perezmeyer.com.ar/ http://perezmeyer.blogspot.com/