previously on this list Thorsten Glaser contributed:

> > A wide misconception. Chroots are easily implemented and add security
> > almost for free (often /dev/log is all that is needed) and so can be
> > used by default without any potential problems, they also never bring
> > new risks and always make life difficult for an attacker to raise
> > priviledges or get what they are actually after when done
> > correctly. Even at a simple level it should be obvious that they can
> > just nullify the payload so the attacker simply goes elsewhere. Does  
> 
> Bwahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha!
> 
> (To casual observers: the entire paragraph is very wrong.)
> 
> Yes, chroots help isolating things, but, just like systrace(4), they
> are far from being inescapable.

I also said the following and nothing is inescapable atleast in any
general conversation, so who is being black and white now! Chroot
provides a noticeable improvement in security at a very low cost in
time to implement and almost 0 maintenance. Systrace has security merit
too despite it's shortcomings at isolating ROOT in CERTAIN SITUATIONS
and is used by sshd now by default.

> > If the kernel
> > can be attacked from the chroot then likely the MAC can and due to
> > increased complexity, arguments just as easily arise against both.


-- 
_______________________________________________________________________

'Write programs that do one thing and do it well. Write programs to work
together. Write programs to handle text streams, because that is a
universal interface'

(Doug McIlroy)

In Other Words - Don't design like polkit or systemd
_______________________________________________________________________

I have no idea why RTFM is used so aggressively on LINUX mailing lists
because whilst 'apropos' is traditionally the most powerful command on
Unix-like systems it's 'modern' replacement 'apropos' on Linux is a tool
to help psychopaths learn to control their anger.

(Kevin Chadwick)

_______________________________________________________________________


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