Raphael Hertzog writes ("Re: soc-ctte discussion at DebConf7 [was Re: Social committee proposal]"): > Basicaly, any communication concerning the "proactive" part shall be > private. The person receiving the warning can publicize it by themselves > if they so desire (but it's certainly not expected to be the general rule, > it's just to avoid the criticism of lack of transparency).
Right. > We also agreed that the formulation was a bit broad. For instance, > granting "adm" membership (ie DSA team rights) is also an ACL decision, > but it's certainly not the resort of the social ctte. > > So we sort of decided that it should: > - make ACL decisions concerning the Debian lists (the listmasters clearly > indicated that they don't want to take those by themselves) > This includes the possibility to decide ML bans for DD as well as > for non-DD. > - make decision concerning DD's behaviour everywhere where they are acting > as member/representative of the project (including #debian* IRC channels). > - make recommandation to any other party that defers a judgment to the > social ctte (example: the OFTC admin defers a dispute on the > soc-ctte over ownership of a channel #debian*) > > Since it's a "delegated body", the DPL can grant additionals powers if > needed. This is a good alternative to explicitly specifying the powers. > We have decided to have 2 GR at the same time. One deciding the creation > of the soc-ctte and one deciding its membership. Indeed so. > AFAIR, the consensus was that: > - by default, every 2 years the project has to reapprove individually each > member of the soc-ctte. This gives the project an opportunity to recall > members who are judged as no more representative or whatever. > Reapproving probably means having more ranking above NOTA than rankings > below NOTA. Maybe we should make that ratio 66%. I remember 1 year rather than 2 but it doesn't make much difference. I disagree about the voting system. We should use straight approval voting: each voter votes `yes' or `no' separately for each candidate. Candidates who get more `yes' than `no' get to stay. Others are dismissed. The DPL will then make up the numbers. Obviously the DPL is expected not to reappoint the dismissed members (even though that's technically possible). I don't think it's necessarily a problem that the DPL has in theory powers which the SC setup expects the leader not to use. After all any such outrage could be overruled by GR. Ian. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]