Le 14 avril 2021 00:51:31 GMT+02:00, Russ Allbery <r...@debian.org> a écrit : >Timo Röhling <t...@gaussglocke.de> writes: > >> I would like to implement a cryptographic protocol that provides the >> same level of verifiability for secret votes as the currently used >> public votes. In particular, I would like to see some additional proof >> that the published hash values actually belong to eligible voters. > >As Kurt mentioned (but buried in one of those debian-vote threads), take a >look at Belenios if you aren't already familiar with it. > >https://www.belenios.org/ > >It presumably would need some work to be usable for Debian votes due to >needing integration with PGP signatures and our keyring, and unfortunately >we can't use the really cool homomorphic encryption mode because we want >to do Condorcet, but it otherwise seems like the right sort of direction. >As a bonus, the developer is a member of the Debian project. > >I would rather an existing system like that, which has already undergone >some cryptographic peer review, than for us to try to come up with >something novel. Secure online voting is an insanely hard problem, and >while we have enough unique conditions that we can probably relax the >constraints that make it unsafe for general population political >elections, there are still a lot of ways it can go wrong that are very >inobvious. > >-- >Russ Allbery (r...@debian.org) <https://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/> >
+1 If you wish to start a DEP on the matter Timo I am eager to grant you DEP16 as you asked. :) -- Pierre-Elliott Bécue From my phone
