Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
User: release.debian....@packages.debian.org
Usertags: unblock

Hi

Please unblock package spice

It fixes two CVEs, CVE-2016-9577 CVE-2016-9578, reported by Moritz as
#854336. Markus Kschany fixed it as:

+spice (0.12.8-2.1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Add CVE-2016-9577-and-CVE-2016-9578.patch:
+    - CVE-2016-9577: A buffer overflow vulnerability in
+      main_channel_alloc_msg_rcv_buf was found that occurs when reading large
+      messages due to missing buffer size check.
+    - CVE-2016-9578: A vulnerability was discovered in the server's
+      protocol handling. An attacker able to connect to the spice server could
+      send crafted messages which would cause the process to crash.
+      (Closes: #854336)
+
+ -- Markus Koschany <a...@debian.org>  Mon, 13 Feb 2017 21:42:01 +0100

Attached the resulting debdiff from the version in testing.

unblock spice/0.12.8-2.1

Regards,
Salvatore
diff -Nru spice-0.12.8/debian/changelog spice-0.12.8/debian/changelog
--- spice-0.12.8/debian/changelog       2017-01-06 14:50:55.000000000 +0100
+++ spice-0.12.8/debian/changelog       2017-02-13 21:42:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
+spice (0.12.8-2.1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Add CVE-2016-9577-and-CVE-2016-9578.patch:
+    - CVE-2016-9577: A buffer overflow vulnerability in
+      main_channel_alloc_msg_rcv_buf was found that occurs when reading large
+      messages due to missing buffer size check.
+    - CVE-2016-9578: A vulnerability was discovered in the server's
+      protocol handling. An attacker able to connect to the spice server could
+      send crafted messages which would cause the process to crash.
+      (Closes: #854336)
+
+ -- Markus Koschany <a...@debian.org>  Mon, 13 Feb 2017 21:42:01 +0100
+
 spice (0.12.8-2) unstable; urgency=medium
 
   * Build on all little-endian architectures (Closes: #734218)
diff -Nru spice-0.12.8/debian/patches/CVE-2016-9577-and-CVE-2016-9578.patch 
spice-0.12.8/debian/patches/CVE-2016-9577-and-CVE-2016-9578.patch
--- spice-0.12.8/debian/patches/CVE-2016-9577-and-CVE-2016-9578.patch   
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ spice-0.12.8/debian/patches/CVE-2016-9577-and-CVE-2016-9578.patch   
2017-02-13 21:42:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <a...@debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 21:38:02 +0100
+Subject: CVE-2016-9577 and CVE-2016-9578
+
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/854336
+Origin: 
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/rpms/spice.git/commit/?id=d919d639ae5f83a9735a04d843eed675f9357c0d
+---
+ server/main_channel.c |  3 +++
+ server/reds.c         | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/server/main_channel.c b/server/main_channel.c
+index 0ecc9df..1fc3915 100644
+--- a/server/main_channel.c
++++ b/server/main_channel.c
+@@ -1026,6 +1026,9 @@ static uint8_t 
*main_channel_alloc_msg_rcv_buf(RedChannelClient *rcc,
+ 
+     if (type == SPICE_MSGC_MAIN_AGENT_DATA) {
+         return reds_get_agent_data_buffer(mcc, size);
++    } else if (size > sizeof(main_chan->recv_buf)) {
++        /* message too large, caller will log a message and close the 
connection */
++        return NULL;
+     } else {
+         return main_chan->recv_buf;
+     }
+diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
+index 61bf735..4c60f58 100644
+--- a/server/reds.c
++++ b/server/reds.c
+@@ -2110,6 +2110,14 @@ static void reds_handle_read_link_done(void *opaque)
+     link_mess->num_channel_caps = 
GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_channel_caps);
+     link_mess->num_common_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_common_caps);
+ 
++    /* Prevent DoS. Currently we defined only 13 capabilities,
++     * I expect 1024 to be valid for quite a lot time */
++    if (link_mess->num_channel_caps > 1024 || link_mess->num_common_caps > 
1024) {
++        reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
++        reds_link_free(link);
++        return;
++    }
++
+     num_caps = link_mess->num_common_caps + link_mess->num_channel_caps;
+     caps = (uint32_t *)((uint8_t *)link_mess + link_mess->caps_offset);
+ 
+@@ -2202,7 +2210,8 @@ static void reds_handle_read_header_done(void *opaque)
+ 
+     reds->peer_minor_version = header->minor_version;
+ 
+-    if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess)) {
++    /* the check for 4096 is to avoid clients to cause arbitrary big memory 
allocations */
++    if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess) || header->size > 4096) {
+         reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
+         spice_warning("bad size %u", header->size);
+         reds_link_free(link);
diff -Nru spice-0.12.8/debian/patches/series spice-0.12.8/debian/patches/series
--- spice-0.12.8/debian/patches/series  2017-01-06 14:50:42.000000000 +0100
+++ spice-0.12.8/debian/patches/series  2017-02-13 21:42:01.000000000 +0100
@@ -1 +1,2 @@
 stop-linking-with-libcacard.diff
+CVE-2016-9577-and-CVE-2016-9578.patch

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