Package: release.debian.org Severity: normal Tags: bookworm User: release.debian....@packages.debian.org Usertags: pu X-Debbugs-Cc: pan...@packages.debian.org, Guilhem Moulin <guil...@debian.org> Control: affects -1 + src:pandoc
[ Reason ] pandoc 2.17.1.1-1.1 is vulnerable to CVE-2023-35936: Arbitrary file write vulnerability via specially crafted image element in the input when generating files using the `--extract-media` option or outputting to PDF format. The Security Team decided not to issue a DSA for that CVE, but it's now fixed in buster-security (2.2.1-3+deb10u1) as well as sid (2.17.1.1-2), so it makes sense to fix it via (o)s-pu too. [ Impact ] For users uprading from buster-security to bookworm, that would be a security regression. [ Tests ] A new unit test was added upstream, and backported along with the code fixes. I also manually verified that the PoC were fixed. [ Risks ] Regression risks are low: all upstream commits applied cleanly, and test coverage is good. (Upstream changes to pandoc.cabal are a no-op as far as debian packaging is concerned.) [ Checklist ] [x] *all* changes are documented in the d/changelog [x] I reviewed all changes and I approve them [x] attach debdiff against the package in stable [x] the issue is verified as fixed in unstable [ Changes ] * Add d/salsa-ci.yml for Salsa CI. * Fix CVE-2023-35936 and CVE-2023-38745: Arbitrary file write vulnerability via specially crafted image element in the input when generating files using the `--extract-media` option or outputting to PDF format. (Closes: #1041976) -- Guilhem.
diffstat for pandoc-2.17.1.1 pandoc-2.17.1.1 changelog | 17 +++++ copyright_hints | 6 + patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch | 24 +++++++ patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++ patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ patches/series | 6 + salsa-ci.yml | 9 ++ 10 files changed, 492 insertions(+) diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog 2022-11-19 14:13:51.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,3 +1,20 @@ +pandoc (2.17.1.1-2~deb12u1) bookworm; urgency=high + + * Non-maintainer upload. + * Rebuild for bookworm. + * Add d/salsa-ci.yml for Salsa CI. + + -- Guilhem Moulin <guil...@debian.org> Tue, 25 Jul 2023 23:01:50 +0200 + +pandoc (2.17.1.1-2) unstable; urgency=high + + * add patches cherry-picked upstream + to fix arbitrary file write vulnerability; + closes: bug#1041976, thanks to Guilhem Moulin; + CVE-2023-35936 CVE-2023-35936 + + -- Jonas Smedegaard <d...@jones.dk> Tue, 25 Jul 2023 18:43:57 +0200 + pandoc (2.17.1.1-1.1) unstable; urgency=low * Non-maintainer upload. diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints 2022-08-13 16:27:42.000000000 +0200 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -236,6 +236,12 @@ debian/pandoc.lintian-overrides debian/patches/020220218~2a70d9c.patch debian/patches/020220531~9aff861.patch + debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch + debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch + debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch + debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch + debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch + debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch debian/patches/series debian/rules debian/source/format diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +Description: fix a security vulnerability in MediaBag and T.P.Class.IO.writeMedia + This vulnerability, discovered by Entroy C, + allows users to write arbitrary files to any location + by feeding pandoc a specially crafted URL in an image element. + The vulnerability is serious + for anyone using pandoc to process untrusted input. + The vulnerability does not affect pandoc + when run with the `--sandbox` flag. +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/5e381e3 +Author: John MacFarlane <j...@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs +@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ + import Network.HTTP.Client.TLS (mkManagerSettings) + import Network.HTTP.Types.Header ( hContentType ) + import Network.Socket (withSocketsDo) +-import Network.URI (unEscapeString) ++import Network.URI (URI(..), parseURI) + import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing) + import System.Environment (getEnv) + import System.FilePath ((</>), takeDirectory, normalise) +@@ -120,11 +120,11 @@ + + openURL :: (PandocMonad m, MonadIO m) => Text -> m (B.ByteString, Maybe MimeType) + openURL u +- | Just u'' <- T.stripPrefix "data:" u = do +- let mime = T.takeWhile (/=',') u'' +- let contents = UTF8.fromString $ +- unEscapeString $ T.unpack $ T.drop 1 $ T.dropWhile (/=',') u'' +- return (decodeLenient contents, Just mime) ++ | Just (URI{ uriScheme = "data:", ++ uriPath = upath }) <- parseURI (T.unpack u) = do ++ let (mime, rest) = break (== '.') upath ++ let contents = UTF8.fromString $ drop 1 rest ++ return (decodeLenient contents, Just (T.pack mime)) + | otherwise = do + let toReqHeader (n, v) = (CI.mk (UTF8.fromText n), UTF8.fromText v) + customHeaders <- map toReqHeader <$> getsCommonState stRequestHeaders +@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ + -> m () + writeMedia dir (fp, _mt, bs) = do + -- we normalize to get proper path separators for the platform +- let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> unEscapeString fp ++ let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> fp + liftIOError (createDirectoryIfMissing True) (takeDirectory fullpath) + logIOError $ BL.writeFile fullpath bs + +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs +@@ -28,12 +28,13 @@ + import qualified Data.Map as M + import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, isNothing) + import Data.Typeable (Typeable) ++import Network.URI (unEscapeString) + import System.FilePath + import Text.Pandoc.MIME (MimeType, getMimeTypeDef, extensionFromMimeType) + import Data.Text (Text) + import qualified Data.Text as T + import Data.Digest.Pure.SHA (sha1, showDigest) +-import Network.URI (URI (..), parseURI) ++import Network.URI (URI (..), parseURI, isURI) + + data MediaItem = + MediaItem +@@ -52,9 +53,12 @@ + instance Show MediaBag where + show bag = "MediaBag " ++ show (mediaDirectory bag) + +--- | We represent paths with /, in normalized form. ++-- | We represent paths with /, in normalized form. Percent-encoding ++-- is resolved. + canonicalize :: FilePath -> Text +-canonicalize = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise ++canonicalize fp ++ | isURI fp = T.pack fp ++ | otherwise = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise . unEscapeString $ fp + + -- | Delete a media item from a 'MediaBag', or do nothing if no item corresponds + -- to the given path. +@@ -77,22 +81,22 @@ + , mediaContents = contents + , mediaMimeType = mt } + fp' = canonicalize fp ++ fp'' = T.unpack fp' + uri = parseURI fp +- newpath = if isRelative fp ++ newpath = if isRelative fp'' + && isNothing uri +- && ".." `notElem` splitDirectories fp +- then T.unpack fp' ++ && not (".." `T.isInfixOf` fp') ++ then fp'' + else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> "." <> ext +- fallback = case takeExtension fp of +- ".gz" -> getMimeTypeDef $ dropExtension fp +- _ -> getMimeTypeDef fp ++ fallback = case takeExtension fp'' of ++ ".gz" -> getMimeTypeDef $ dropExtension fp'' ++ _ -> getMimeTypeDef fp'' + mt = fromMaybe fallback mbMime +- path = maybe fp uriPath uri ++ path = maybe fp'' (unEscapeString . uriPath) uri + ext = case takeExtension path of + '.':e -> e + _ -> maybe "" T.unpack $ extensionFromMimeType mt + +- + -- | Lookup a media item in a 'MediaBag', returning mime type and contents. + lookupMedia :: FilePath + -> MediaBag diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +Description: fix bug in git commit 5e381e3 + In the new code a comma mysteriously turned into a period. + This would have prevented proper separation + of the mime type and content in data uris. + Thanks to @hseg for catching this. +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/54561e9 +Author: John MacFarlane <j...@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs +@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ + openURL u + | Just (URI{ uriScheme = "data:", + uriPath = upath }) <- parseURI (T.unpack u) = do +- let (mime, rest) = break (== '.') upath ++ let (mime, rest) = break (== ',') upath + let contents = UTF8.fromString $ drop 1 rest + return (decodeLenient contents, Just (T.pack mime)) + | otherwise = do diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +Description: more fixes to git commit 5e381e3 + These changes recognize that parseURI does not unescape the path. + . + Another change is that the canonical form + of the path used as the MediaBag key + retains percent-encoding, if present; + we only unescape the string when writing to a file. + . + Some tests are needed before the issue can be closed. +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/df4f13b +Author: John MacFarlane <j...@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/issues/8918 +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs +@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ + import Network.HTTP.Client.TLS (mkManagerSettings) + import Network.HTTP.Types.Header ( hContentType ) + import Network.Socket (withSocketsDo) +-import Network.URI (URI(..), parseURI) ++import Network.URI (URI(..), parseURI, unEscapeString) + import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing) + import System.Environment (getEnv) + import System.FilePath ((</>), takeDirectory, normalise) +@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ + openURL u + | Just (URI{ uriScheme = "data:", + uriPath = upath }) <- parseURI (T.unpack u) = do +- let (mime, rest) = break (== ',') upath ++ let (mime, rest) = break (== ',') $ unEscapeString upath + let contents = UTF8.fromString $ drop 1 rest + return (decodeLenient contents, Just (T.pack mime)) + | otherwise = do +@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ + -> m () + writeMedia dir (fp, _mt, bs) = do + -- we normalize to get proper path separators for the platform +- let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> fp ++ let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> unEscapeString fp + liftIOError (createDirectoryIfMissing True) (takeDirectory fullpath) + logIOError $ BL.writeFile fullpath bs + +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs +@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ + import qualified Data.Text as T + import Data.Digest.Pure.SHA (sha1, showDigest) + import Network.URI (URI (..), parseURI, isURI) ++import Data.List (isInfixOf) + + data MediaItem = + MediaItem +@@ -54,11 +55,11 @@ + show bag = "MediaBag " ++ show (mediaDirectory bag) + + -- | We represent paths with /, in normalized form. Percent-encoding +--- is resolved. ++-- is not resolved. + canonicalize :: FilePath -> Text + canonicalize fp + | isURI fp = T.pack fp +- | otherwise = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise . unEscapeString $ fp ++ | otherwise = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise $ fp + + -- | Delete a media item from a 'MediaBag', or do nothing if no item corresponds + -- to the given path. +@@ -81,11 +82,11 @@ + , mediaContents = contents + , mediaMimeType = mt } + fp' = canonicalize fp +- fp'' = T.unpack fp' ++ fp'' = unEscapeString $ T.unpack fp' + uri = parseURI fp + newpath = if isRelative fp'' + && isNothing uri +- && not (".." `T.isInfixOf` fp') ++ && not (".." `isInfixOf` fp'') + then fp'' + else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> "." <> ext + fallback = case takeExtension fp'' of diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +Description: add tests for fillMediaBag/extractMedia +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/fe62da6 +Author: John MacFarlane <j...@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/pandoc.cabal ++++ b/pandoc.cabal +@@ -791,6 +791,7 @@ + tasty-lua >= 1.0 && < 1.1, + tasty-quickcheck >= 0.8 && < 0.11, + text >= 1.1.1.0 && < 2.1, ++ temporary >= 1.1 && < 1.4, + time >= 1.5 && < 1.14, + xml >= 1.3.12 && < 1.4, + zip-archive >= 0.2.3.4 && < 0.5 +@@ -800,6 +801,7 @@ + Tests.Lua + Tests.Lua.Module + Tests.Shared ++ Tests.MediaBag + Tests.Readers.LaTeX + Tests.Readers.HTML + Tests.Readers.JATS +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs +@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ ++{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} ++module Tests.MediaBag (tests) where ++ ++import Test.Tasty ++import Test.Tasty.HUnit ++-- import Tests.Helpers ++import Text.Pandoc.Class (extractMedia, fillMediaBag, runIOorExplode) ++import System.IO.Temp (withTempDirectory) ++import System.FilePath ++import Text.Pandoc.Builder as B ++import System.Directory (doesFileExist, copyFile, setCurrentDirectory, getCurrentDirectory) ++ ++tests :: [TestTree] ++tests = [ ++ testCase "test fillMediaBag & extractMedia" $ ++ withTempDirectory "." "extractMediaTest" $ \tmpdir -> do ++ olddir <- getCurrentDirectory ++ setCurrentDirectory tmpdir ++ copyFile "../../test/lalune.jpg" "moon.jpg" ++ let d = B.doc $ ++ B.para (B.image "../../test/lalune.jpg" "" mempty) <> ++ B.para (B.image "moon.jpg" "" mempty) <> ++ B.para (B.image "data://image/png;base64,cHJpbnQgImhlbGxvIgo=;.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <> ++ B.para (B.image "" "" mempty) ++ runIOorExplode $ do ++ fillMediaBag d ++ extractMedia "foo" d ++ exists1 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "moon.jpg") ++ assertBool "file in directory extract with original name" exists1 ++ exists2 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "f9d88c3dbe18f6a7f5670e994a947d51216cdf0e.jpg") ++ assertBool "file above directory extracted with hashed name" exists2 ++ exists3 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua") ++ exists4 <- doesFileExist "a.lua" ++ assertBool "data uri with malicious payload does not get written to arbitrary location" ++ (exists3 && not exists4) ++ exists5 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "d5fceb6532643d0d84ffe09c40c481ecdf59e15a.gif") ++ assertBool "data uri with gif is properly decoded" exists5 ++ setCurrentDirectory olddir ++ ] +--- a/test/test-pandoc.hs ++++ b/test/test-pandoc.hs +@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ + import qualified Tests.Writers.AnnotatedTable + import qualified Tests.Writers.TEI + import qualified Tests.Writers.Markua ++import qualified Tests.MediaBag + import Text.Pandoc.Shared (inDirectory) + + tests :: FilePath -> TestTree +@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ + [ Tests.Command.tests + , testGroup "Old" (Tests.Old.tests pandocPath) + , testGroup "Shared" Tests.Shared.tests ++ , testGroup "MediaBag" Tests.MediaBag.tests + , testGroup "Writers" + [ testGroup "Native" Tests.Writers.Native.tests + , testGroup "ConTeXt" Tests.Writers.ConTeXt.tests diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +Description: improve tests for fillMediaBag/extractMedia + Ensure that the current directory is not changed up if a test fails, + and fix messages for the assertion failures. +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/5246f02 +Author: John MacFarlane <j...@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs ++++ b/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs +@@ -6,16 +6,15 @@ + -- import Tests.Helpers + import Text.Pandoc.Class (extractMedia, fillMediaBag, runIOorExplode) + import System.IO.Temp (withTempDirectory) ++import Text.Pandoc.Shared (inDirectory) + import System.FilePath + import Text.Pandoc.Builder as B +-import System.Directory (doesFileExist, copyFile, setCurrentDirectory, getCurrentDirectory) ++import System.Directory (doesFileExist, copyFile) + + tests :: [TestTree] + tests = [ + testCase "test fillMediaBag & extractMedia" $ +- withTempDirectory "." "extractMediaTest" $ \tmpdir -> do +- olddir <- getCurrentDirectory +- setCurrentDirectory tmpdir ++ withTempDirectory "." "extractMediaTest" $ \tmpdir -> inDirectory tmpdir $ do + copyFile "../../test/lalune.jpg" "moon.jpg" + let d = B.doc $ + B.para (B.image "../../test/lalune.jpg" "" mempty) <> +@@ -26,14 +25,13 @@ + fillMediaBag d + extractMedia "foo" d + exists1 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "moon.jpg") +- assertBool "file in directory extract with original name" exists1 ++ assertBool "file in directory is not extracted with original name" exists1 + exists2 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "f9d88c3dbe18f6a7f5670e994a947d51216cdf0e.jpg") +- assertBool "file above directory extracted with hashed name" exists2 ++ assertBool "file above directory is not extracted with hashed name" exists2 + exists3 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua") + exists4 <- doesFileExist "a.lua" +- assertBool "data uri with malicious payload does not get written to arbitrary location" ++ assertBool "data uri with malicious payload gets written outside of destination dir" + (exists3 && not exists4) + exists5 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "d5fceb6532643d0d84ffe09c40c481ecdf59e15a.gif") +- assertBool "data uri with gif is properly decoded" exists5 +- setCurrentDirectory olddir ++ assertBool "data uri with gif is not properly decoded" exists5 + ] diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +Description: ix new variant of the vulnerability in CVE-2023-35936 + Guilhem Moulin noticed that the fix to CVE-2023-35936 was incomplete. + An attacker could get around it + by double-encoding the malicious extension + to create or override arbitrary files. + . + $ echo '![](data://image/png;base64,cHJpbnQgImhlbGxvIgo=;.lua+%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fb%252elua)' >b.md + $ .cabal/bin/pandoc b.md --extract-media=bar + <p><img + src="bar/2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fb%2elua" /></p> + $ cat b.lua + print "hello" + $ find bar + bar/ + bar/2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua+ + . + This commit adds a test case for this more complex attack + and fixes the vulnerability. + (The fix is quite simple: + if the URL-unescaped filename or extension contains a '%', + we just use the sha1 hash of the contents as the canonical name, + just as we do if the filename contains '..'.) +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/eddedbf +Author: John MacFarlane <j...@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-38745 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs +@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ + -> m () + writeMedia dir (fp, _mt, bs) = do + -- we normalize to get proper path separators for the platform ++ -- we unescape URI encoding, but given how insertMedia ++ -- is written, we shouldn't have any % in a canonical media name... + let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> unEscapeString fp + liftIOError (createDirectoryIfMissing True) (takeDirectory fullpath) + logIOError $ BL.writeFile fullpath bs +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs +@@ -87,16 +87,17 @@ + newpath = if isRelative fp'' + && isNothing uri + && not (".." `isInfixOf` fp'') ++ && '%' `notElem` fp'' + then fp'' +- else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> "." <> ext ++ else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> ext + fallback = case takeExtension fp'' of + ".gz" -> getMimeTypeDef $ dropExtension fp'' + _ -> getMimeTypeDef fp'' + mt = fromMaybe fallback mbMime + path = maybe fp'' (unEscapeString . uriPath) uri + ext = case takeExtension path of +- '.':e -> e +- _ -> maybe "" T.unpack $ extensionFromMimeType mt ++ '.':e | '%' `notElem` e -> '.':e ++ _ -> maybe "" (\x -> '.':T.unpack x) $ extensionFromMimeType mt + + -- | Lookup a media item in a 'MediaBag', returning mime type and contents. + lookupMedia :: FilePath +--- a/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs ++++ b/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs +@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ + let d = B.doc $ + B.para (B.image "../../test/lalune.jpg" "" mempty) <> + B.para (B.image "moon.jpg" "" mempty) <> +- B.para (B.image "data://image/png;base64,cHJpbnQgImhlbGxvIgo=;.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <> ++ B.para (B.image ";.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <> + B.para (B.image "" "" mempty) + runIOorExplode $ do + fillMediaBag d +@@ -34,4 +34,14 @@ + (exists3 && not exists4) + exists5 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "d5fceb6532643d0d84ffe09c40c481ecdf59e15a.gif") + assertBool "data uri with gif is not properly decoded" exists5 ++ -- double-encoded version: ++ let e = B.doc $ ++ B.para (B.image ";.lua+%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fb%252elua" "" mempty) ++ runIOorExplode $ do ++ fillMediaBag e ++ extractMedia "bar" e ++ exists6 <- doesFileExist ("bar" </> "772ceca21a2751863ec46cb23db0e7fc35b9cff8.png") ++ exists7 <- doesFileExist "b.lua" ++ assertBool "data uri with double-encoded malicious payload gets written outside of destination dir" ++ (exists6 && not exists7) + ] diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series 2022-08-13 16:27:42.000000000 +0200 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,4 +1,10 @@ 020220218~2a70d9c.patch 020220531~9aff861.patch +020230620~5e381e3.patch +020230623.1~54561e9.patch +020230623.2~df4f13b.patch +020230623.3~fe62da6.patch +020230623.4~5246f02.patch +020230720~eddedbf.patch 2001_templates_avoid_privacy_breach.patch 2002_program_package_hint.patch diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +include: + - https://salsa.debian.org/salsa-ci-team/pipeline/raw/master/recipes/debian.yml + +variables: + RELEASE: 'bookworm' + SALSA_CI_DISABLE_REPROTEST: 1 + SALSA_CI_DISABLE_LINTIAN: 1 + SALSA_CI_DISABLE_BLHC: 1
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