http://www.insideindonesia.org/digest/dig78.htm [Image] Digest 78 Wiranto's "No" to East Timor 12 April, 1999 For all his sometimes clownish mannerisms, President Habibie has been Indonesia's Gorbachev in many ways. He rode the crest of a wave of political creativity generated by the massive protests of 1998. But now that wave has spent much of its force. The army-backed Liquica massacre in East Timor on 6 April represents a conservative backlash, in which failed Suharto-era ideas are being put forward as real solutions once more. Habibie has been mocked as a Suharto protégé. Yet under him press freedom has flourished, labour unions have sprung up freely, and almost all political prisoners have been freed. He has talked with dissatisfied Irianese and Acehnese community leaders. And he has foreshadowed independence for East Timor as an option. However, on the single most important Suharto legacy - military privilege - he has made little headway. In this Habibie is not alone. Virtually the entire political establishment has agreed that, unlike last year's demonstrators, they don't want the military out of politics now. Not one of the major parties - despite their long opposition to Suharto - have placed an end to the privilege of organised violence at the top of their political agenda. Such a loss of political nerve is now coming home to roost in East Timor. The Liquica massacre, in which at least 25 people, including toddlers and old women, died at the hands of a military-backed militia, could well be a message to that establishment from armed forces commander General Wiranto. The message: no more experimentation with the future of East Timor. In March a high-level UN delegation visited East Timor to begin preparations for the poll in July or August on East Timor's future association with Indonesia. According to reliable reports, the delegation had great difficulty getting to see General Wiranto even briefly as they passed through Jakarta on 25 March after their visit to East Timor. The Far Eastern Economic Review noted last month that General Wiranto is relying more on retired General Benny Murdani, the architect of the East Timor tragedy. Officers seen as Murdani proteges have been favoured in recent promotions. Murdani told a visiting academic in January he disapproved of Habibie's conciliatory autonomy offer for East Timor, and of the Xanana diplomacy. He believed that in 'four to five months' the armed forces Abri would be ready to crack heads once and for all in East Timor. Tough talk, for a man supposedly long out of power. Wiranto's message on East Timor, if I have read it correctly, may unfortunately fall in good soil in Jakarta. Indonesia may yet prove to be a reluctant decoloniser. Eager to depict Habibie as a lame duck, presidential aspirant Megawati says she opposes the Habibie initiative offering independence if the East Timorese reject an autonomy offer. She wants the matter decided by a freshly elected parliament, in which she has made it clear she will oppose independence. Abdurrahman Wahid has been similarly unhelpful. Amien Rais is the only prominent party leader with an open mind on East Timor. The reason for the hawkishness among political prominents is not difficult to find. Unrest around the vast archipelago in recent months, whether engineered or not, has had the predictable effect of stimulating nostalgia for Suharto's security approach. The conservative view that Indonesia is perhaps too violent to be democratic may be gaining ground in influential circles. The Habibie-sponsored political process over East Timor has triggered copy-cat demands in Aceh and Irian Jaya, where until now the word 'referendum' had never been heard. Frequently aired anxiety over Indonesia's possible 'disintegration' has dampened the creativity of 1998, leaving the hawks to offer their already failed policies with renewed assurance. In East Timor, those policies mean once more backing violent militias to give the impression of a civil war, in which Abri is the essential disinterested peacekeeper. The new conservative ascendancy is not easy to challenge from abroad. The UN process, for all its good will, remains dependent on Indonesia. Australia has a security treaty with Indonesia that makes it impossible to pit Australian soldiers against Indonesians in defence of the Timorese. All this does not mean East Timorese self-determination is now out of the question. There are many reasons for hope. It does mean the decolonisation process will be slower and messier than was thought just a few weeks ago. Habibie said in February he would like to see the East Timor issue resolved by 1 January 2000. Unless Indonesia's political movers and shakers rediscover their creative nerve, that magic date is likely to pass with no joy for the Timorese. [This article appears in The Age (Melbourne), 15 or 16 April 1999] Gerry van Klinken, editor, 'Inside Indonesia' magazine. [Image] To unsubscribe send a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with in the message body the line: unsubscribe demi-demokrasi
