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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel#action_12465306
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Rick Hillegas commented on DERBY-2109:
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I agree that a DatabasePrincipal should encode both the database name and the
authorization id inside that database. It is interesting that the same
authorization id can have different credentials depending on the connected
database.
I don't know what the terms-of-art here are, but for the rest of this
discussion, I'm going to use the following nomenclature:
systemWideID - This is a user name that is authenticated with databaseName =
null.
databaseScopedID - This is a user name that is authenticated with a non-null
databaseName.
It is interesting that we authenticate the user twice when creating a database.
First we authenticate with a systemWideID. If that succeeds, we create the
database and mark that authorization id as the database owner. Then we
re-authenticate the user as a databaseScopedID, using the same credentials.
Clearly this assumes that at bootstrap time, the same credentials will work for
the systemWideID and the databaseScopedID.
The policy file syntax for Principals is a little limited. That is, you're only
allowed to declare one argument to your Principal's constructor. This means
that we have to glue together the authorization id and database name. Maybe we
can model this on the names used for KerberosPrincipal. Those names are of the
form [EMAIL PROTECTED] I don't know if the @ is going to be a nuisance. Any
separator we choose will have escaping problems and @ may be particularly
annoying to customers who want their authorization ids to be email addresses.
But here's what it would look like:
# this is a systemWideID
grant principal org.apache.derby.authentication.DatabasePrincipal "fred" ...
# this is a databaseScopedID
grant principal org.apache.derby.authentication.DatabasePrincipal "[EMAIL
PROTECTED]" ...
# this systemWideID is an email address
grant principal org.apache.derby.authentication.DatabasePrincipal
"fred@@comcast.net" ...
# this databaseScopedID is an email address
grant principal org.apache.derby.authentication.DatabasePrincipal "fred@@[EMAIL
PROTECTED]" ...
I think that the create-database privilege should be granted to systemWideIDs
for the following reasons:
1) The actual database creation today depends on whether we can authenticate
the systemWideID, not the databaseScopedID.
2) This is a generic privilege which is not bound to a particular database name.
I think that the engine-shutdown privilege is also a systemWideID. So for this
first release, I think we only need systemWideIDs--although the user guides
should explain the implications of escaping @.
> System privileges
> -----------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2109
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: Security
> Affects Versions: 10.3.0.0
> Reporter: Rick Hillegas
> Fix For: 10.3.0.0
>
> Attachments: systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
>
>
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the
> related email discussion at
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more
> secure in a client/server configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server
> security holes in 10.3. In particular, I'd like to focus on authorization
> issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently Functions/Procedures,
> but someday Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following
> database-specific issues, via granting execute privilege to system
> procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been
> controlled by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and
> derby.database.defaultConnectionMode) as described in the security section of
> the Developer's Guide (see
> http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).
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