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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12559853#action_12559853
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Martin Zaun commented on DERBY-2109:
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> John H. Embretsen wrote:
> I have found the wildcard value of * for principal_name mentioned only in the
> JDK7 docs, but I tried it on Sun's JVMs 1.4.2 and 1.5.0, and it worked the
> same way, as described. Not sure if we can/should rely on that or not, and I
> don't know if other vendors do the same thing.
The javadocs of a 1.4 Sun JDK class
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.4.2/docs/guide/security/jaas/spec/com/sun/security/auth/PolicyFile.html
has a paragraph explicitly describing the use of * (recommended without
double-quotes) as wildcard for Principal names and classes (but that class has
been deprecated for other reasons).
But the general concept of "*" as wildcard character in policy files is
documented:
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/guide/security/PolicyFiles.html#Examples
> Daniel John Debrunner wrote:
> Either way, it seems there are already mechanisms to specify all users, thus
> we don't want to introduce another way of specifying all users by having a
> quoted *.
> Supporting PUBLIC as a DatabasePrincal name to represent all users could be a
> follow on change. It might make it clearer for folks used to SQL
> authorization.
One can argue that with System Privileges (server shutdown, create database)
we're in the realm of Java Security, not SQL authorization, controlled by Java
policy (file) permissions in contrast to grants/revokes.
If we feel that we're at the intersection of SQL and Java Security and that we
want to please users with either background -- we can easily support both,
PUBLIC and * as wildcard characters. Of course, allowing both rather adds to
the documentation.
> System privileges
> -----------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2109
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: Security
> Affects Versions: 10.3.1.4
> Reporter: Rick Hillegas
> Assignee: Martin Zaun
> Attachments: DERBY-2109-02.diff, DERBY-2109-02.stat,
> derby-2109-03-javadoc-see-tags.diff, DERBY-2109-04.diff, DERBY-2109-04.stat,
> DERBY-2109-05and06.diff, DERBY-2109-05and06.stat, DERBY-2109-07.diff,
> DERBY-2109-07.stat, DERBY-2109-08.diff, DERBY-2109-08.stat,
> DERBY-2109-08_addendum.diff, DERBY-2109-08_addendum.stat,
> SystemPrivilegesBehaviour.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html,
> systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
>
>
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the
> related email discussion at
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more
> secure in a client/server configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server
> security holes in 10.3. In particular, I'd like to focus on authorization
> issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently Functions/Procedures,
> but someday Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following
> database-specific issues, via granting execute privilege to system
> procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been
> controlled by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and
> derby.database.defaultConnectionMode) as described in the security section of
> the Developer's Guide (see
> http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).
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