Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa (KIR) S.A. has applied to include the “SZAFIR ROOT CA” root certificate and enable all three trust bits.

KIR S.A. is a private corporation in Poland which currently mainly issues qualified certificates for general public and plans to issue non-qualified certificates (e.g. SSL certificates). KIR S.A. is an automated clearing house in Poland and its core business is clearings, and has built numerous business relationships within banking sector. Therefore, KIR S.A. is aiming to expand its sales in services such as SSL and VPN certificates. KIR S.A. has another line of products called PayByNet, and has created a vast network of relationships within online stores that KIR S.A. can leverage to create customer base for trusted non-qualified certificates.

The request is documented in the following bug:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=817994

And in the pending certificates list:
http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/pending/

Summary of Information Gathered and Verified:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8441701

Noteworthy points:

* The primary documents, the CP and CPS, are provided in both English and Polish.

Document Repository: http://elektronicznypodpis.pl/en/information/documents-and-agreements CPS: http://www.elektronicznypodpis.pl/files/doc/certification_practice_statement.pdf
CP: http://elektronicznypodpis.pl/files/doc/certification_policy.pdf

* CA Hierarchy: There is currently one internally-operated subordinate-CA which issues 6 types of end-user certificates: - Standard certificate - For protection of information sent electronically, using mainly e-mail, for authorizing access to systems, customer authentication in SSL connections. It allows signing and encrypting data in an electronic form and authenticating subscribers.
- Code signing certificate
- VPN certificate
- SSL certificate
- Test certificate - For testing co-operation of the certificate with solutions used or developed by a recipient of certification services or a subscriber. - ELIXIR certificate - For protecting information sending within ELIXIR and EuroELIXIR systems. This kind of certificates are issued only for Participants of ELIXIR and EuroELIXIR systems.

* The request is to enable all three trust bits.

** CPS section 3.2, Initial Identity Validation: Depending on the type of certificate the procedure of certificate issuance may be different and is relative to a specific certification policy. To receive a certificate it is necessary for the subscriber who is a natural person or an authorised representative of the recipient of certification services to present: 1) an identification card (or its photocopy depending on the type of certificate); 2) documents confirming rights to the domain (optionally, relative to the certificate type); 3) a file with the certificate request (if the pair of keys is generated individually by the subscriber). KIR S.A. may expect presentation of other documents, in case entering data other than the subscriber's first name and surname and the PESEL or NIP number into the certificate is requested.

** CPS section 3.2.2: Identification and authentication of entities other than a natural person is the case when data of such entity is included in the data for the certificate for the issuance of which it applies to KIR S.A., or data included in the certificate contains information about such entity, e.g. the name of the Internet domain. Depending on the type of certificate, identification shall be performed on the basis of documents sent by the recipient of certification services or data disclosed in the Agreement and in the order. The manner of confirming such data depends on the type of certificate. For this purpose KIR S.A. may request sending additional documents, check the data of the recipient of certification services in commonly accessible registers and services, obtain a card of signatures of persons authorised to represent the recipient of certification services. Issuance of the certificate may also require a personal meeting of a person authorised to represent a specific entity with an authorised representative of KIR S.A. Wishing to authenticate other data recording which in the certificate a specific entity requests, KIR S.A. may ask for: 1) placing data indicated by KIR S.A. in a target server by the subscriber acting to order of a legal person, which is to verify the rights to the Internet domain; 2) providing answer to a query sent by KIR S.A. to an e-mail address placing of which in the certificate a legal person demands.

** CPS section 3.2.5. Checking Rights to Receive Certificate
The recipient of certification services signs an agreement with KIR S.A. for the provision of certification services. Authorised representatives also sign data for the certificate included in the order for a specific subscriber. Thus, pursuant to an agreement they confirm the subscriber's right to use the certificate in which the data of the entity they represent is included. The right to represent an entity by such persons is checked by KIR S.A. in the course of identification and authentication.

** CP section 2.1, Standard certificate: These certificates may be used for securing electronic mail and for logging into the systems or services, authorising the subscriber during establishment of secure connections. In the process of issuing this type of certificates the operator KIR S.A. shall verify the subscriber’s identity and the right to obtain such certificate. The certificate is delivered to the subscriber most often with a pair of keys generated on a carrier defined by the subscriber. Data included in the certificate allows identifying the subscriber that uses the certificate.

** CP section 2.2: Certificates for signing codes are used for confirming authenticity and origins of binary codes. Based on the data included in the certificate it is possible for define the author or an entity that provides the code for a program or application. In the process of issuing this type of certificates the operator KIR S.A. shall verify the subscriber’s identity and the right to obtain such certificate and shall confirm reliability of the data entered into the certificate.

** CP section 2.4: An SSL certificate allows confirming authenticity of www servers and setting up secure connections using SSL and TSL protocols. A certificate may contain data of a single www server or associated servers within a single domain. In the process of issuing this type of certificates the operator KIR S.A. shall verify the subscriber’s identity and its right to obtain a certificate. The process may also include verification, whether the server or domain are held by the recipient of certification services.

** CP section 2.5: Test certificate -- These certificates are used for checking co-operation with the system or the subscriber’s IT solution. In the process of issuing this type of certificates the operator KIR S.A. shall verify the subscriber’s right to obtain such certificate. In case, when test certificate is to serve to examine the possibility of setting up secure connections, then process includes also verification, if www server or domain are at the disposal of recipient of certification services.

* EV Policy OID: Not requesting EV treatment

* Test Website: https://ssl.elektronicznypodpis.pl

* OCSP: http://ocsp.elektronicznypodpis.pl

* Audit: Annual audits are performed by Ernst&Young according to the WebTrust CA and BR criteria. The WebTrust seal file contains two audit statements: WebTrust CA and WebTrust BR.
https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=1681&file=pdf

* Potentially Problematic Practices – None Noted
(http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices)

This begins the discussion of the request from KIR S.A. to include the “SZAFIR ROOT CA” root certificate and enable all three trust bits. At the conclusion of this discussion I will provide a summary of issues noted and action items. If there are outstanding issues, then an additional discussion may be needed as follow-up. If there are no outstanding issues, then I will recommend approval of this request in the bug.

Kathleen

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