Hi Przemyslaw,
        
1) Suspension
I can see that it's no problem for a certificate's status as shown in
OCSP or in a CRL (as viewed from outside your organization) to
transition from valid to 'Revoked' as a result of a 'suspension' within
your system.
The problem comes when you try to 'unsuspend'.  You can't transition
back from 'revoked' to valid.

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt
3.3.  Revocation
...
An entry MUST NOT be removed
   from the CRL until it appears on one regularly scheduled CRL issued
   beyond the revoked certificate's validity period.

Regards
Robin Alden


> -----Original Message-----
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+robin=comodo....@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Certificates
> Sent: 25 September 2014 14:03
> To: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: Re: KIR S.A. Root Inclusion Request
> 
> Answers for Jeremy Rowley questions:
> 
> A couple of notes:
> 1) Under Section 3.4 and 4.9, suspension is not permitted for SSL
certs
> under the BRs.
> 
> Where the BR forbids certificates suspension? The Repository gives an
> answer "revoke" for suspended certificate, so it's consistent withe BR
> s13.2.7.
> 
> 2) Section 3.3 should specify when re-verification is required (at
least
> every 39 months).  Although the CPS does say the original issuance
> process is followed, I didn't this specified at the certificate
lifecycle is 5
> years.  Also, be aware that five year certs are only permitted until
April 1,
> 2015. After that, the maximum lifecycle is 39 months
> 
> Yes, we know about this requirement. Presently, we do not issue
> certificates above 2 years validity period, although we mentioned such
> possibility in CPS. We do verification both for first certificate and
renewal,
> in particular we verify rights to domain for SSL certificates.
> Our internal procedures describe this process in details.
> 
> 3) See section 13.1.5 of the BRs for the reasons a CA must revoke a
> certificate.  Section 4.9 of your CPS doesn't really match these.
> 
> The reasons for revoking subscriber certificate pointed in CSP
> corresponds to the reasons pointed in BR. But if the connection isn't
clear
> we can clarified it more in CSP by introducing some changes.
> 
> 
> 4) Archiving is required for 7 years under the BRs (5.4.3 and 5.5).
> 
> That's a mistake in CPS. We will change it.
> 
> 5) 6.28 should require at least two individuals acting together to
activate
> the private key
> 
> It is done by two persons. It is mentioned in CPS s.6.2.2 that the
secrets
> are distributed among 5 persons.
> CSP s6.2.6. Uploading a private key to cryptographic modules is done
in
> the following situations:
> 1)      launch of the certification authority during the system
start-up;
> 2)      recovery of the key of the certification authority in the
back-up
> location;
> 3)      replacement of the cryptographic module.
> The key is uploaded to the module with the presence of the holders of
> co-shared secrets. To upload the key it is necessary to have the
presence
> of the number of secrets described in Clause 6.2.2. Uploading is done
> within a closed security environment. A private key is made up of
> elements. Parts of the secret key from the cards are provided in
> sequence, enciphered files are uploaded into the module's memory and
> then deciphered. A private key is ready to use. Uploading of the key
into
> the module is recorded in the register of events.
> CSP s.6.2.8 Once uploaded into the module, the key shall be active.
> 
> 6) Some of your EKU extensions are not permitted in the same
> certificate.
> 
> We are aware of it. In the SSL certificates we use only
> clientAuthentication and serverAuthentication.
> 
> 7) Note the recently announced SHA-2 requirement. SHA-1 is the only
> hash specified in the CPS. 5 year certificates will not be possible.
> 
> We are aware of it and we will start issuing certificates with SHA 256
> before this date and also  supplement our CSP accordingly.
> 
> 8) What is your OCSP response for a not issued cert?
> 
> The answer is "unknown" - CSP s4.9.9.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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