On Thu, October 23, 2014 1:08 pm, John Nagle wrote: > Examine the cert of "https://www.sevendays.co";. > > Here's one of those certs with a huge number of unrelated hosts. > This seems to be a Cloudflare legacy setup from the pre-TLS era. > Unfortunately, this cert became valid on 10/09/2014. It's > not a legacy cert.
So? It's perfectly valid and conforming with all of the policies set out by Mozilla and the CA/Browser Forum. > > Should certs like this be rejected as misrepresenting the identity of > the organization? Junk certs like this let any domain in the cert > impersonate any other domain, so they are a form of "wildcard" cert. > Now that all major browsers have TLS, they are unnecessary and can > be phased out, correct? So what? 1) It's not misrepresenting the organization. BR certs do not, have not, and have never been a means of asserting the organization. Thinking that TLS certs do that is a fabrication that some CAs promulgate, but has nothing to do with the purpose of TLS certificates (which assert a binding between a *domain* and a key) 2) Calling them junk certs implies you think there's something wrong with them, but you'd need to spell that out. Nothing is wrong with them by any of the root store policies. 3) Wildcard certs are both valid and useful. They are expressly permitted in the BRs. > > Firefox displays "You are connected to sevendays.co. Verified > by GlobalSign NV-SA" for this site. That misrepresents what the > cert really told Firefox. No it doesn't. You connected to the IP address returned by dns for sevendays.co, and received a cert certified by GlobalSign NV-SA that asserts that an entity with operational control over sevendays.co has control over a private key presented in the certificate and the TLS chain. This is all truthful and accurate information. > The message should read "You are > connected to one of the following sites, and give the list. > Or perhaps "You are connected to ssl2910.cloudflare.com" which > appears to be authorized to host sevendays.co". That would > assist in accelerating the phaseout of these old certs. Accelerating the phaseout of these certs is a non-goal with no positive security value. > > There's a real risk here. A break-in at any of those sites > allows impersonating all of them. This creates a huge > attack surface. This doesn't change at all if they're using separate certs, if the certs are still hosted by the same company on the same machine. I'm sorry, but I believe you've been confused as to what the purpose is, but there's nothing wrong with these certs. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
